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ABSTRACT
This study examines the performance of the three mili­
tary regimes that ruled Ghana during the period, 
1966 - 1982.
The analysis would seem to suggest that, contrary to 
post-covp rhetoric and expectations, military regimes 
are, in general, poor economic and political perfor­
mers. In the field of foreign policy, a rational
foreign policy based on an even balance between 
Ghana's national interest and its actual and potential 
power eluded the country under the three regimes.
The study is exploratory, designed to contribute a 
better empirical base to the field of study and to 
formulate a preliminary theoretical proposition, 
namely that, in Ghana, the foreign policy formulation 
and conduct of military officers tends to vary accor­
ding to differences in their reference group identifi­
cations and these in turn, vary according to differen­
ces in the professional socialisation process under­
gone by the country's officer corps. To the degree 
that the professional socialisation of officers
differs, or to the degree that it changes over 
time, differences can be expected in the nature of
Ghana's foreign policy under military rule.
It would therefore be expected that as tho colonial
experience becomes remote, so will the reference group 
identifications of the military officers be affected, 
and with it, their attitudes and behaviour.
In time, Ghana may come to rely on its own training 
institutions and/or its army may undergo combat 
experience (such as the one in Congo-Zaire) from 
which it develops an indigenous military tradition 
as a result of which non-indigenous reference groups 
can be expected to be of much less salience for 
the officer corps.
Finally, it may be noted that in Ghana, junior 
officers who do not receive "elite" training in
foreign academics, or those who were not profession­
ally socialised in the pre-independence coloi.ial 
army, can be expected to possess less intense 
psychological commitments to non-indigenous reference 
rjroups than those of their superiors who have
received such training. But whether foreign or
locally trained, the analysis would suggest that
military officers are hardly the right people 
to pursue successful foreign policies. The main
reason for this is the military's lock of political 
legitimacy, with all its international economic, 
political and diplomatic implications.
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C H A P T E R  1
INTRODUCTION
Military rule in Sharia can be said to be part 
of a wider phenomenon of military intervention 
in the politics of developing countries generally 
and of African states in particular *1 *. Much 
of the extensive literature tends to deal almost 
exclusively with motives and rationalisations 
of military rule in the states concerned These
taxonomies of "factors" regarded as to
the coup-prone states of Africa seem to ignore
the fact that the kinds of features said to give 
rise to coup-proneness are often just as charac­
teristic of t • states where coups have not occurred. 
Dependency, > anomic malaise, ethnic competition, 
corruption, inadequately professionalised armies, 
widespread public discontent ar.-1 shortages of
essential commodities arc some of the factors
often citad as precipitating c "i-s d 1 etat in
Africa.
In snort, traditional thought .. the nature of 
military intervention in dcv-'Jci.ing countries 
and the location of the impetus for such action 
in a state has, in a sense, typically polarised
along the theoretical biases of the investigators:
those whose primary professional interests were 
military have sought the causes of mi. itary interven­
tion in the social background of the officer corps 
or with reference to the internal structure of 
a military organisation ^  \  while those whose 
interests were primarily political, in the political 
and institutional structure of the society.
The argument of the latter group of scholars heu$ 
been that. officers of every social class have 
led coups, that there is no discernible relationship 
between such factors as internal military cohesion 
and political intervention. Samuel Huntington 
sums up the latter position in defining the nature 
of praetorian society:
"Military explanations do not explain military 
intervention ... military interventions are only 
one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon 
in underdeveloped societies: the general politici­
zation of social forces and institutions ... In under­
developed societies the military are concerned 
not only with pay and promotion, although they 
are concerned with that, but also with the distri­
bution of power and status throughout the political 
system."  ^^
In the class of ideologically motivated ccups,
Huntington discorns three separate and distinct 
patterns $ the attempts by radically oriented soldiers 
to destroy a conservative oligarchy (such as the 
1952 Free Officers Coup in Egypt or the Thai Revolu­
tion of 1889); responses to the escalation of
social conflicts hy groups such as unions and 
students (the recurring political instability 
in the Dominican Republic is an excellent example 
of this t^ne of intervention); and finally "veto 
coups" which prevent "the accession to power of 
popular lower class or reform movements", or deter 
a party in power wishing to "promote radical policies 
or to develop an appeal to groups the military 
wishes to esclude from power." *4 ^ (The Brazilian
coup is a good example of the last type of ideological
intervention).
One can accept both Huntington's criticism of
theorists who neglect the importance of political 
variables in the study of military intervention, 
as well as M s  own analysis of the positive relation­
ship between the absence of political institutionali­
sation and the frequency of military intervention. 
However, this does not necessitate either accepting 
entirely his statement that "military explanations 
do not explain military interventions", or the 
unstated presumption that in all ctisos, military 
intervention is based on social or ideological 
variables. *^ *
a.
Other scholars, such as S.E. Finer, have noted at 
least two other potential motives for military inter­
vention in societies that can be classified as prae­
torian: intervention to preserve or extend military 
corporate interests and intervention to gain or 
preserve the personal benefits and perquisites of 
the military. *®*
The first type of non-ideological intervention, 
the corporate coup, is well illustrated by the Alge­
rian coup of 1965. Here the representatives of the 
professional military, led by Boumediynno, overthrew 
Ben Bella as a response to the latter's attempts 
to interfere in the operation of the military, parti­
cularly through increasing the importance of the 
ruling party within the military. ^  * The lack of 
ideological antipathy to the Ben Bella regime ex­
hibited by conspirators is apparent in the similarity 
of the policies pursued by the Ben Bella and Boume- 
dienne governments. In fact, after the coup, Alge­
rians began speaking of "Ben Bellism without Ben 
Bella". (8)
Although the actions of the Algerian government 
in attempting to control the military was obviously 
a political act, the response of the military was 
based not on the polit Irirntion of the military, 
but, rather, upon their specific corporatc interests.
In praetorian societies, where political power is 
centralised in a single-party state bureaucracy, 
there is no prescribed institutional recourse for 
a military exposed to corporate insecurity other 
than the overthrow of the government: appeals to
legislative bodies, courts, political parties or 
public opinion are not viable options.
The second type o* non-ideological intervention 
is due to the lack of recourse for military leaders 
who are experiencing loss of status, income, allowan­
ces and perquisites. In this sense, military inter­
vention based on self-interest has at least a partial 
military explanation. In the case of Ghana, it is 
admitted that the country is a polity with a low 
level of institutionalisation and that actions of 
the Nkrumab, Busia and Limann governments were such 
as to weaken their respective support among many 
important interest groups within society.
It still remains to examine the tortuous relationship 
between the military and the government in order 
to explain the immediate factors leading to military 
intervention. As one of theso factors, Huntington 
has suggested the existence of a condition he refers 
to as "political decay". However, in his tismi sial 
essay, he never defines the term. A careful reading 
indicates that Huntin • n sees a positive correlation
between political decay and civilian violence. He 
notes that in praetorian systems, "claims on govern­
ment are advanced by the mechanism of civilian vio­
lence and military intervention". Resort to direct 
action by aJ 1 social forces is not a deviation from 
the system's norm, rather "the persistent use of 
violence is the system, or et least a very large 
part of it,"
Other observers of African politics have noted as­
pects of what may be broadly classed as political 
decay. Claude Welch has concluded that governments 
may be weakened by the "declining prestige of the 
major political party, as exemplified by increased 
reliance upon force to achieve compliance; a stress 
upon unanimity in the face of centrifugal forces; 
and a consequent dania) of effective political -'hoi- 
ee." According to Welch, the decline o l the
major political party m%y lead to a schism among 
prominent politicians, further weakening the govern­
ment. A. Zolberg would add to this list,the politici­
zation of primordial ties such as was evident in 
Nigeria in 1965-66 or in Northern Ireland in 1971-
C)Qarly, a polity experiencing ethnic or religious 
warfare, urban chaos or the disintegration of the 
ruling political party may be said to ho suffering 
political decay.
The Relationship Between Political Decoy and the 
Three Types of Intervention
Despite Huntington's demonstration of the relation­
ship between political decay and ideological military 
intervention, the linkages between political decay 
and the other two types of coups are not so straight­
forward .
The events leading to corporate coups do not necessa­
rily involve political decay. A government may, 
for example, choose to chany >ature of civil -
military relations for reasoz cnal to the do­
mestic political system. The boundaries between 
the civil and military spheres m-.y be changed for 
ideological reasons, such as the desire to adopt 
the strict party control typical of civil - military 
relations in communist countries. ^2) the
Algerian ease, there is no clear relationship between 
military intervention and growing social or political 
disorder, international humiliation, or economic 
depression. Corporate interventions have corporate 
explanations.
Broadly speaking, thore are two types of self-inte- 
rest coups r those which result from loss of status 
anc1 income by the officer corps and those carried 
out by officers who feel their professional career
has been retarded by actions of the government in 
power. The instigation of coups by officers who
have been passed over for promotion clearly is not 
related to political decay; while coups motivated
by the officers' financial status have only an in­
direct relationship with political decay; these 
are more likely to be asaw .dated with economic decay. 
There is a high correlation between the incidence
of economic and political decay. Economic decay 
that does not affect the rtrmy will eventually lead 
to political decay and ideological intervention 
in a praetorian polity.
These views are valuable as they throw consider­
able light on some of the critical factors that 
make for military intervention. ^  ^  They do not, 
however, address themselves specifically to the 
question of what foreign policy outputs could con­
ceivably be expected from a military-backocl gover- 
ment once it has consolidated its rule.
To this end, this study addressee itself to the 
almost neglected field of the military's performance 
in office in the specific field of international 
relations. A primary objective of this study ic 
to describe and analyse vhe actual foreign policy 
goals pursued by the various military-backed govern­
ments of Ghana in the period 1966-1982. Additionally,
the study will seek to discover whether domestic 
military rule in Ghana is compatible with a success­
ful Foreign Policy.
Foreign Policy under military rule is a politically 
relevant area of study in view of the fact that 
military intervention has become a fact of political 
life in Ghana. Indeed, for the sixteen year period 
covered by this study, the country saw an average 
of one military-backed government every four years.
The period starts (1 966) and ends (1 982) with 
a military government. But for two brief periods 
of six years (1969-1972; 1975-1981) during which
the country was run by Wcstern-educated elites, 
it was the men of the armed forces and the police 
who controlled the foreign policy of the country. 
The pendulum of decision-making swung from being 
a patently pro-West in 1966 to violently anti-West 
in 1982. Rumours of coups and attempted coups were 
common throughout the period. All this, in spite 
of the late President Kwame Nkrumah's admonition 
that "It is not the duty of the army to rule or 
govern because it has no political mandate and ito 
duty is not to seek political mandate.11
This fact, that military intervention in the politd js 
of Ghana has become a dynamic and perBistcnu occuren­
ce since 1966, poses the problem of what could rea­
sonably be expected in the area of Foreign Policy, 
from a military-backed government. Once in power, what 
is likely to be the nature of Foreign Policy that a 
Ghanaian military government will pursue? The focus 
of this study is not on the causes of coups but the 
Foreign Policy outputs of coups. A case study of 
Ghana has implications for other Black African states 
with similar problems.
The concept of Reference Groups is used as an 
ancillary conceptual framework in this study in order 
to provide a theoretical basis for the understanding 
of the influence of professional socialisation on 
Ghana's military leadership. In this I am deeply in­
debted to Robert M. Price from whose article entitled 
"A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: 
Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case,"(^ ) 
this model has been largely derived.
Although the original article is limited to a 
consideration of the National Liberation Council (NLC) 
government (1966-1960), the assumptions and hypotheses 
which underlie it as a whole, are implicitly relevant 
to the period under study.
The influence of a group on the attitudes of an indi­
vidual or individuals is of ton treated in terms 
of the concept, Reference Groups. A Reference
Group is a social unit which the individual sees
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as holding interest, attitudes and values in common 
with h-s own and which he takes as a basis for self- 
evaluation and attitude formation. A person need 
not even be a member of a group in order for it 
to influence him. If he mersly aspires to become
a member, the attitudes hold by the group may 
serve as a guide to his opinions and behaviour. 
Usually however, groups to which a person belongs 
are Reference Groups for him.
Although a Reference Group is usually a group whose 
acceptance and approval is desired, in some instances 
an individual inay ue influenced by a group that
he dislikes or is rebelling against. In this case, 
he is motivated to adopt attitudes contrary to
those of the group anti is termed a Negative Reference
A Reference Group may have one or both of two
functions $
1. the normative function, setting and enforcing
standards of conduct and belief)
2. the comparison function, serving as a standard
for comparison point against which persons 
measure themselves and others.
The effects of a Rcferenco Group depend on its
salience to a particular itiutio or problem.
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The imp.'. nations of the above-mentioned characteris­
tics of the concept could be summarised thus: The 
"colonial experience" and the training process under­
gone by the officer corps of the Ghana armed forces 
and the police is such as to produce Reference Group 
identifications with the officer corps and socio­
cultural variables of the ex-colonial power resulting 
in commitments to their set of traditions, symbols 
and values. Such identifications and commitments 
are seen to affect the behuviour of these Ghanaian 
officers both in their relations with domestic civi­
lian political authorities and in the formulation 
and execution of Ghana's foreign policy once these 
officers assume political office.
The Ghana armed forces lack political skills (and 
are in fact, anti-political) for reordering Ghanaian 
society. They therefore fall back on civilian bureau­
crats who are themselves foreign oriented in the 
sense that they share the body of interacts and 
values common in the Western world (an example of 
such values would be the belief in the virtues of 
parliamentary democracy in contrast to one-party
It should be said that the explanatory power of 
the Reference Group theory is limited and must be 
viewed as a beginning rather than as an end in the
effort to understand foreign policy under military 
rule in Ghana. Its major thrust is in the direction 
of description and exploration rather than in rigo­
rous explanation and unfailing prediction.
In carrying out this project, two difficulties have 
been experienced. One major problem has concerned 
access. A military regime hardly fosters the kind 
of research climate in which an investigator can 
operate. For one thing, many of the decisions made 
by military authorities are made behind closed doors 
and in some cases the principal decision-makerr 
are unknown. For another, many of the key military 
participants who could be interviewed tend to feel 
greatly inhibited and apprehensive about saying 
things which could he used as evidence against them 
with dire consequences. Dealing with such a sensitive 
topic, it has not been possible to have a represen­
tative sample of top decision-makers dutifully ans­
wering the most obtrusive yet very important and 
relevant questions. Moreover, the. active and know­
ledgeable actors in the field of Foreign Policy 
in Ghana have either died, left the country on volun­
tary or forced exile or could not bo traced. Primary 
information contained herein has been gleaned from 
civilians and friends of l .-military rulers.
Names have been mentioned where such disclosures
would not cause trouble to the persons involved.
A second major pronJ em has been the dearth of publi­
shed works dealing specifically with Foreign Policy 
under the various military regimes. Hence, the explo­
ratory analytical study has been adopted as the 
main tool of the investigation. The intention is 
to help develop a body of knowledge in the area 
of this subject.
The purpose of exploratory studies has been defined 
as formulating a problem for more precise investi­
gation, increasing familiarity with the phenomenon 
to be investigated later in a more highly structured 
study, clarifying concepts and establishing links 
and priorities for further research and developing 
hypotheses.
Exploratory studies seem to be the moot appropriate 
format in the case of problems about which little 
knowledge is available. It has been the intention 
in this presentation to review publicly available 
printed data with sensitivity to hypotheses that 
could be derived from them rather than by making 
an inventory of existing hypotheses and testing 
them explicitly. Exploratory studies lead to .Insights 
and hypotheses, but do not test or demonstrate
The study has been historical, descriptive, compara­
tive and analytical. Materials for the study have 
been both primary (interviews, government publica­
tions, etc.) and secondary. Details of these sources 
have been noted in the footnotes as well as in the 
bibliography.
Chapter Two covers in considerable detail the socio­
economic and political background of Ghana before 
1 966 when the first of m series of coups took place. 
This chapter, though separate from the remaining 
chapters, is complementary to the individual chapter 
backgrounds. The latter constitute the introductory 
sections of the chapters and are specific to each 
military coup and rule.
Chapter Three describes and reviews Ghana's Foreign 
Policy under the CPP government led by Dr. Kwamn 
Nkrumah. The next four chapters deal, respectively, 
with the Foreign Policies of tho National Liberation 
Council, the intervening yoartj, the National Redemp­
tion Council, Supreme Military Council, and th<y 
Foreign Policy of the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council - Provisional National Defence Council.
The concluding Chapter reviews and evaluates the
thaL
The comparative section of the chapter is based 
on five criteria, namely, the Foreign Policy Actors, 
the causations of their policies as well as the 
alignment and the effect of their respective policies. 
Tentative conclusions are then drawn about probable 
foreign policy outputs of military regimes in Ghana.
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C H A P T E R  T W O
SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
The present day West African state of Ghana was 
called Gold Coast before it attained political
independence on 6th March, 1957 . ^
Within the Gold Coast there was a large number 
of distinct traditional states which, partly helped 
by the British policy of indirect rule, maintained 
a sense of their separate identities throughout
the colonial period. Although the Akan-speaking 
states of the Colony and Ashanti shared a common 
cultural heritage, there were 62 separate traditional 
states in the Colony area (the first colonized, 
southern region) in 1931, varying greatly in size
and importance. There were several dozen states 
in Ashanti, many of which were constantly engaged 
in a struggle to assert thoir autonomy from the 
Ashanti Confederacy. And in the Northern Territorif* 
the colonial government recognised some two dozen 
political units when the "protectorate" was establi­
shed , which, Fago notes, "fails to take into account 
the autonomous tendencies of many of the sub­
units . 1  ^^  ^ Although social, economic and political
change helped to erode certain aspects of the 
traditional social and political systems as inter-
rej.ai-.ed sets of norms, values and structures, 
these systems survived colonial rule. Territorially, 
the four parts of the Gold Coast were administered 
separately during the colonial period; no inter­
regional political links developed.
There were important advances in the Gold Coast 
between 1900 and 1945, particularly in terms of 
the significant percentage of farmers who had 
been drawn conclusively within a cash economy 
(most notably but not exclusively the many peasant 
cocoa farmers), a growing wage labour force and 
large increases in education, urbanization, communi­
cations, governmental revenue and external trade. 
However, this social and economic growth was sharply 
skewed regionally and ethnically within the country, 
with the southern Colony area being most favoured 
in all aspects (including cocoa production almost 
until World War II), the south-central Ashanti 
region second and the British Togoland trusteeship 
territory to the east (a strip running the length 
of the country) and the vast Northern Territories 
coming last in almost all aspects. Modern distinctions 
in terms of education, wealth and secularization 
all providing access to wage employment, material 
benefits and high modern status-helped to compound 
and oxacerbatc older distinctions based on language, 
customs, social and political structures and histo­
rical enmities.
The social and economic modernization and the 
subordination of the traditional African states 
to colonial authority brought about some radical 
changes in social values, the structures and norms 
of authority and patterns of participation. The 
colonial structure rested in significant measure, 
on the traditional authorities, whom it utilized 
as loca'. agents. It sought to protect both the 
office of chieftaincy and its occupants from challenge. 
By removing ultimate power from the hands of the 
traditional authorities and then sustaining them 
in the face of community disfavour, the colonial 
administration helped to bring both traditional 
leaders and chieftaincy itself in many areas into
disrepute. Among the Akan-speaking traditional 
states in south and central Ghana, chieftaincy 
was an elective (from royal lineages) and limited 
majesty, hedged by the councils of lineage elders 
or other, higher chiefs in council and, to a lesser 
extent, by the traditional prerogatives of the 
commoners (non-royal lineage and non-slave) with
regard to the enstoolmont (election) or destoolment 
of their chiefs. With modernization and access 
to new social roles and values, the essentially
religious norms which regulated and sanctified
social roles, behaviour and structures wore signi­
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ficantly undorminod. Thus, the chiefly office, 
its occupants and the traditional and colonial 
prerogatives and abuses associated with both, 
attracted a high level of antagonism from those 
modernized and transitional men who saw both the 
colonial and traditional authorities as restricting 
their drive for social mobility and political 
power.
An anticolonial nationalism (irupted at the end 
of World War II. Prior to that, a small, bourgeois, 
merchant-professional class with aristocratic 
proclivities (partly comprising old coastal trading 
families) had emerged and promoted African advance­
ment by constitutional reform, in political compe­
tition with the chiefs. The post-World War II 
nationalism was precipitated by imminent expecta­
tions of change and the felt grievances of many 
groups: the merchant-professional class, denied
commercial opportunity, social status and political 
power (by tho chiefs); the anguished cocoa farmers, 
whose trees, stricken by a contagious disease, 
were being cut; rural youth (commoner) associations, 
constrained by coloniully supported traditional 
power; ex-scrviccmen , potty traders and frustrated, 
alienated primary- and middlcschool leavers (both 
graduates and dropouts), educated to the opportunity 
but bereft of the possibility of social mobility
- 23
ficantly undermined. Thus, the chie£ly office,
its occupants and the traditional and colonial 
prerogatives and abuses associated with both, 
attracted a high lave-1 of antagonism from those 
modernized and transitional men who saw both the 
colonial and traditional authorities as restricting 
their drive for social mobility and political
An anticolonial nationalism orupled at the end 
of World War II. Prior to that, a small, bourgeois, 
merchant-professional class with aristocratic 
proclivities (partly comprising old coastal trading 
families) had emerged and promoted African advance­
ment by constitutional reform, in political compe­
tition with the chiefs. The post-World War II 
nationalism was precipitated by imminent expecta­
tions of change and the felt grievances of many 
groups: the merchant-professional class, denied
commercial opportunity, social status and political
power (by the chicfs); the anguished cocoa farmers,
whose trees, stricken by a contagious disease, 
were being cut; rural youth (commoner) associations, 
constrained by colonially supported traditional 
power? ex-scrvicemcn , petty traders and frustrated, 
alienated primary- and middloschool leavers (both 
graduates and dropouts}, educated to the opportunity 
but bereft of the possibility of social mobility
24
and modern status within the confines of a colonially 
and traditionally structured society. The diffuse 
grievances of many groups were animated by expecta­
tions and events and were aggregated in the sentiment 
that things could only be put right under African 
rule. Throughout much of the Colony and Ashanti
the legitimacy of colonial authority and its agents,
the chiefs, was discredited and soured and legiti­
macy passed to those who recognised, demanded 
and incarnated the right of African rule.
POLITICAL DEMANDS, PARTICIPATION, AND STRUCTURES
As the anticolonial nationalism moved to militancy 
(1948-52), as well as during an interim period of 
internal self-government (1951-57), certain social 
cleavages became highly politicized and were manifes­
ted in different political structures. During both 
these periods of significant social stress, there
was a widely manifested class-community conflict 
in the Colony and Ashanti ^ ^ , which was initially 
a conflict between modern secular and traditional 
authority, the latter represented by cliiefc and 
councils. With the great expansion of political 
participation in tho 19501 a through the extension 
of the franchise, thoro was a wide-acale politiciza­
tion of primordial ties, resulting in the rise of 
religious, ethnic and regional parties. Participation
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in these pol tical groups was animated not only 
by primordial ties but by socio-economic grievances, 
since, as noted, the extension of modernization 
was skewed regionally and ethnically and thus did 
not result in cross-cutting but in reinforcing ties 
and identities among traditional groups. Salient 
during tho early period (1940-52) was a class con­
flict. This ranged the older, reformist merchant- 
professional class, mostly in the Colony, against 
a post-World War II generation whose leadership 
was predominantly petty-bourgeois teachers, small 
traders, a few larger businessmen and journalists 
and whose support included the relatively small 
but growing number of semi-industrial workers, an 
urban and rural lower-middle, transitional class 
of the partially educated, and a large number of 
peasant farmers attached to the capitalist-sxport 
economy.
These class-community and class conflicts of thfc 
1 9401s and 1 950's which were to ro-occur in the 
late 1960's and 1970's, reflected some fundamental 
social and political cleavages which shaped the 
structure of political conflict in Ghana during 
the 1 950'rj and 1 SCO's. Politics occurred i n the 
context of an unintegrated society, in which the 
host of traditional societies - with Lheir values, 
norms and struchurcs (not just political) - over-
lapped with the emergent, modernizing society, tradi­
tional structures competed with the new weak politi­
cal structures for political authority, and an in­
crease in the authority of the latter did not necessa­
rily mean a decrease in that of the former. ^  
Traditional structures and norms helped to animate 
the politicization of primordial loyalties and,
with the anti-colonial movement itself and then the 
imminent prospects of self-government, nurtured 
the vast inflation of political demands to which
the new government was subjected. The nature of
the society, along with the relative scarcity of 
economic resources, severely limited the range of
political choices.
The political structures which arose in the post-war 
period to aggregate and represent the diffuse inter­
ests articulated, were prcho-parties and, more impor­
tantly, party-movements. The latter combined charac­
teristics of a broad social and political (national 
or sub-national) movement with those of a party 
and maintained elements of oach at all times. As 
movements, they functioned (or believed they were 
functioning) in an extra-constitutional environment, 
tended to subordinate specific interest to an over­
riding interest (often rendering those specific 
interests illegitimate), attempted to integrate 
or align intimately with their cause ml] associat-
ional groups and worx'K? towards a moral community 
(whether village, traditional state, ethnic group, 
or country) above the divi-iveness of partisan poli­
tics, united in common abhorrence of a "stranger" 
(e.g., colonialist or other ethnic groups). As par­
ties, they recognized (from time to time) and worked 
within a constitutional framework? competed in elec­
tions, recognized the legitimacy or at least the 
necessity of satisfying specific interests for elec­
toral support and more or less tolerated opposing 
political groups.
The first important post-war political party was 
the United Coast Convention (UGCC) led by the in­
telligentsia of the small merchant-professional 
^lass, which began as a proto-party or faction to 
aggregate both its class grievances (v , a-vis the 
chiefs and colonial structure) and nation list senti­
ment. Its leadership was almost wholly composed 
of lawyers; it was basically elitist and reformist 
in nature. Animated by events (chiefly, and anti­
inflation campaign, the February, iy46 riot and 
the cocoa crisis) and a young secretary-general, 
Nkrumah) brought home from England to organize it, 
the UGCC quickly became a very loosely structured 
social and political movement, to which a large 
number of smaller associational, youth and political 
groups attached themselves. Outstanding and influen­
tial among these were farmers' groups, the Ex-Ser- 
vicemen's Union, trade unions and youth groups in 
the Colony and Ashanti. Aware that colonial authority 
had been gravely undermined, the British government 
(as distinct from the parochial colonial administra­
tion) prepared to give way to constitutional change 
and give the UGCC leadership a power position. With 
their leadership and tactics challenged from within 
by younger, better organized and more militant ele­
ments, some of them close to Nkrumah, the UGCC elite, 
cautioning patience, refused to submit its leadership 
to popular, ''uneducated" opinion. A final schism 
occurred in mid-1949, bringing the birth of the 
CPP and leaving the UGCC with many disputatious 
leaders and few followers.
There has teen a contentious debate over the nature 
of the CPP. ^  It has been referred to as a party, 
a movement and a political machine, the latter desig­
nation Doing used quite differently by various ob­
servers. It had characteristics of all three and 
changpd in both structure and function over time.
In the pre-independence period it was a relatively 
icsely structured party-movemcnt (as characterized 
above), a fragile national coalition which the lea­
dership persisted in trying to integrate and render 
coherent and responsive to its aims, an attempt
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which was hardly altogether successful. It began 
as populist, in ideology, and chiliastic in vocabula­
ry. It derived its legitimacy from its militant 
nationalism (which grew tactical during 1951-57), 
from its identification as the party of the commoners, 
on whose behalf it facilitated and legitimated a 
social and political revolution which was already 
occuring at the grassroots in the Colony and Ashanti, 
and from Nkrumah1 s charismatic appeal, which was 
sharply limited in range over tiir. hut initially 
crucial to securing the CPP as a rc’t.-yiably coherent 
political structure. Explicit in all three sources 
of legitimacy was the CPP's decidedly secular dedica­
tion to rapid and economic cha. ge.
As the first organized national movement, it had 
an initially powerful impetus, drawing to its nationa­
list aspirations, many specific interest groups, 
the educated and semi-educated commoners seeking 
rapid social mobility and all those who sought to 
gain advantage from a winner. Its organizing impetus 
was strong, but membership itself was often a casual 
thing. Sweeping to power in the 1951 elections, 
the CPP utilized its powers and resources to organize 
and attempt to win the support of the farmers (in 
the United Ghana Farmers’ Company through the 
para-statal Cocoa Purchasing Company), the trade 
unions, the ex-servicomen , youth associations (which
it tried with difficulty to absorb, even when 
its leaders were CPP), Muslims, chiefs and various 
ethnic groups. Basically, the party was organized 
around the local councils established in 1951 (provi­
ding local control and patronage) and the parliamen­
tary constituencies.
The CPP leadership sought to maintain a national 
focus, a predominantly secular appeal and a 
fairly broad ethnic/regional representation in govern­
ment. Its local partisans recruited politically 
on the basis of ethnic and other parochial ties 
but sought to orient and integrate parochial solida­
rities and interests into the larger, nationalist 
organization.
There was a small national leadership with an undivi­
ded national orientation, and strong, demanding 
and parochial constituency party leaders, whose 
interests frequently differed from those of the 
national leadership. The national leadership, in 
which Nkrumah was pre-eminent, and the constituency 
leadership both lent to and derived strength from 
each other. ^  To the extent that the CPP can be 
likened to a "political machine", organizationally 
and in terms of the dispensation of resources and 
favours to party faithful as a means of control, 
it comprised one primary machine directed from the
national level and a large number of lesser machines. 
The local machines were attached, but not always 
responsive, to the top leadership, having their 
own interest, pressures and constituencies to take 
into account. The national leadership often
made accommodations to the local leadership in order 
not to create disturbances and impair party unity 
as the local leadership made accommodations within 
its own fief.
In the CPP Nkrumah was the leader from the beginning, 
the charismatic, popular nationalist hero, Osag- 
yefo and he successfully turned back challenges
to his tactics (vis-a-vis the British) and authority 
in the early 1950's. His increasingly secure grasp 
of leadership prerogatives was enhanced by his posi­
tion of formal authority within the government. 
In the early 1950's CPP propagandists started to 
turn the spontaneous, often evangelically phrased, 
glorification of Nkrumah's qualities into a cult. 
None of this, however, securod Nkrumah and the CPP 
from local political demands nor reduced the fragili­
ty of the CPP structure.
The parochial, heterogeneous nature of the societies 
in the Gold Coast and conflicts in vaJues and inter­
ests rendered the CPP subject to fragmentation as, 
with the expansion of political participation and
t^ fc
the imminence of full African self-government, many 
stepped forward to claim their communities' share 
in the status, material and power benefits of self- 
rule. With independence near, the nationalist orien­
tation which the CPP had given particularistic de­
mands, was weakened. Specific interests and parochial 
and ethnic suspectibilities, perspectives and jealou­
sies reasserted themselves. The CPP found that its 
local roots were not only its strength but its weak­
ness. There were many specific (e.g. economic) local 
or ethnic interests which were dissatisfied with 
the distribution of amenities, power and status. 
Equally important, there were significant social 
groups which disputed the legitimacy of CPP leader­
ship, the secular state, the criteria of political 
participation and authority and the limits of state 
and nation. Neither the political demands which 
were made nor the political conflicts which arose 
were clear-cut. Value and interest demands were 
interwoven and compounded by parochial channels 
of articulation and aggregaHon. Such was the diffuse­
ness, quantity and intensity of demands based on 
interest, ethnicity and values that it was uiffcult, 
if not Impossible, for the national CPP to represent 
all satisfactorily. The CPP quickly came to regard 
demands based upon ethnicity as being both illegiti­
mate and as destructive to itself as assertive tradi­
tional authority. Although the CPP leadership engaged
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in considerable political bargaining with interest 
and ethnic claims, it was prone to regard this pro­
cess as anathema to the party as a national movement 
and inconvenient in reducing its own options. Virtu­
ally unopposed by any organised political groups 
from 1951 to 1954, CPP leaders regarded the CPP 
as the incarnation of the nation, a view that ren­
dered them inhospitable to the claims of new groups.
A number of political groups arose in the early 
and mid-19501 s to oppose the CPP. Available as an 
ally to all these political groups were many of 
the traditional authorities. Their power and status 
were reduced in 1951 by a local government act which 
replaced the chiefs and their councils as organs 
of local government with two-thirds-elected local 
councils; the elections were all but swept by the 
CPP in 1952. The opposition of some chiefs was in­
tense and grounded in values as well as interest, 
for they regarded the CPP as destructive of the 
moral universe which sustained their society and 
their office.
It is important to note that, with a single excep­
tion, all the significant political groups which 
arose to oppose the CPP did so not as parties but 
specifically os movements, opposed to the social 
divisiveness Dllcgcdly introduced by party politics.
Both the CPP and opposition political leaders, for 
diverse reasons, entertained beliefs concerning 
the sanctity of social solidarity and the evil of 
social and political conflict, which inspired each 
to view the other in particularly abhorrent terms.
After their electoral defeat in 1951, the UGCC lea­
ders continued to oppose the CPP and amalgamated 
with several small urban factions in 1 952 to form 
the Ghana Congress Party (GCP). It constantly sought, 
but could not find, a constituency outside of the 
several chieftaincies whose rulers were directly 
related to its two primary leaders. Dr. Kofi Busia, 
a university professor, and J.B. Danquah, a lawyer. 
They demanded government by the "best men" available, 
not the CPP riffraff and malcontents.
The Togoland Congress (TC), established in 1951 
by the Ewe in southern British Togoland, battled 
for the separation of British Togoland from the 
Gold Coast and a union with French Togoland. Insis­
tent upon polarizing sentiments between the CPP 
and TC among the Ewe, the TC was sustained by an 
acute feeling of social and economic neglect under 
the British, a strong Ewe subnationalism (whose 
form and direction were greatly disputed among the 
Ewe themselves). and a fear that the Ewo would for­
feit both a distinctive historical identity and
their prerogatives if British Togoland was "swal­
lowed up" by Ghana. The Muslim Association Party 
(MAP) was formed in 1 953, drawing off CPP Muslim 
support, to rectify the social and economic neglect 
of the Muslims (about 12 percent of the population). 
It drew most of its support from the Muslim Lumpen- 
proletariat in southern towns, where Muslims, many 
of them immigrants from surrounding territories, 
lived in the zongo ("stranger") wards and held low 
economic positions. It recruited miiitantly on the 
basis of common religious ties and neglect.
The Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA’s) 
from the Northern Territories established the Nor­
thern People's Party (NPP) in early 1 954 in order 
to represent distinctly and for electoral purposes 
the social and economic demands of their seriously 
underdeveloped region. It was primarily organized 
around the still powerful traditional state council 
of important northern chiefs. It was extremely loose­
ly structured and ethnically diverse, though in 
each area it recruited on a parochial (often sub- 
ethnic ) basis. Its leaders included teachers, educa­
ted sub-chiefs and important state council employees 
and were often of a royal lineage. Politically in­
experienced in national politics and fearful of 
manipulation by the south, NPP leaders demanded 
a distinct status for the North in the government
and a huge socio-economic development programme.
In the 1954 general election the GCP, MAP and NPP 
together won 20 out of 104 seats and almost 21 per­
cent of the total vote, though most of this was 
due to the NPP's 15 seats and 9,7 percent. In con­
trast, the CPP won 72 seats, with 56,4 percent of 
the vote, and was strong in all regions. A large 
"Independent" vote was primarily a CPP "rebel” vote? 
it was indicative of the CPP's inability to maintain 
the loyalty of the communities of those men who 
had been denied a CPP candidacy. ^  ^
The rise of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) 
in Ashanti posed the most serious threat to the 
CPP because it undermined a strong area of CPP stre­
ngth, raised divisive issues and polarized political 
action. The emergence of the NLM was occasioned 
by two specific grievances: cocoa farmers furiously 
demanded that the government cocoa price be rai­
sed ^   ^• and the many unsuccessful CPP "rebels" 
and their supporters in Ashanti (25 percent of the 
Ashanti vote in 1954) angrily charged that the na­
tional CPP had dictated the nominations to the Ashan­
ti constituencies and that the southern CPP lea­
ders - "strangers" - were dominating Ashanti. These 
two groups provided an incendiary spark, igniting 
a range of diffuse interest and value demands which
many among the Ashanti had articulated but which 
had until then found no group to adequately aggre­
gate. The Ashanti harboured a strong sense of histo­
rical significance as a people. There was a
pervasive suspicion that the Ashanti, with a powerful 
military heritage of dominance over the states to 
the south and north, were now being dominated by 
southern peoples. The CPP "rebels" and Ashanti Youth 
Association leaders turned to the chiefs for support, 
and the threat to Ashanti helped to heal commoner- 
chieftaincy antagonisms in many areas. As a rich 
region, producing 50 percent of the cocoa, it felt 
it was being short-changed to subsidize poorer re-
Ashanti identified itself as a nation and the NLM 
as a national movement (explicitly not a party), 
dedicated to restoring a responsive indigenous lea­
dership in Ashanti. It quickly became in many respects 
a mass party/movement, captained by many ex-CPP 
commoners, strongly supported by many chiefs and 
organized broadly; if often from the chief's state 
councils, which were the only available political 
structures not controlled by the CPP. It recruited 
less in terms of sccular demands than of Ashanti 
nationhood and drew under its wing many a&sociational 
groups which severed their tics to the CPP, It pro­
posed a federal rather than a centralized state,
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in which federal powers were weak and residual powers 
went to the regions, a new constitution and a new 
election. All of these demands it supported with 
a furious, p. 1 ;iotic fervor. Intimidation and violen­
ce became rife in Ashanti as the NLM and CPP battled 
for support.
One may, with good reason, hypothesize that the 
CPP leadership looked askance at the proliferation 
of political demands and competing groups and was 
basically intent upon preserving political preroga­
tives for itself. Nonetheless, the meanii of some 
of these demands and the intent of some opposing 
political parties were such as to reduce Ghana's 
viability as a state, impair its capacity for develop­
ment and appear to tho CPP leadership to represent 
challenges to its authority as government by ille­
gitimate means for Illegitimate ends. This does 
not mean that the CPP regarded all these groups 
as illegitimate or their expressions of interest 
unjustified or beyond its capacities or convenience 
to honour.
The CPP was intolerant in ideological or value terms 
to political participation and recruitment primarily 
on the basis of ethnicity (the NLM and TC) and commu­
nal ties (the MAP and Islam). It regarded this as 
basically divisive to the nation-state. It could
readily be seen how political recruitment by paro­
chial appeals impaired the tenuous sentiment of 
loyalty to national institutions and perspectives ? 
the CPP recognized this both in terms of NLM, TC 
and MAP utter defiance of the government, and in 
the large defections from CPP ranks to the NLM, 
TC and MAP. The TC advocated territorial fragmen­
tation and the NLM's demand for federation could 
have been equally destructive of the sinews of the
Till; 1 956 general election did not settle matters, 
frum which CPP leaSvrs undoubtedly drew lessons. 
The JPP aqain won 72 of 104 seats in the National 
>.ssemtly, with 57 percent of the vote. However, 
the opposition parties had won popular pluralities 
in Ashanti and the Northern Territories and refused 
to accept a constitution which failed to meet their 
demands. Amidst threats of secession and defiance 
from the t h and NLM, the CPP was compelled to accept 
British 'rodiation, in order to attain independence 
and, cenyeyuently, a constitution with which it 
was far satisfied and prepared to alter after
independence. '^ ^
The difficult, in finding acceptable limits to 
conflict between the CPP and the opposition derived 
from: the high level of distrust with which each
political leadership perceived the intentions and 
behaviour of the other; the nature of the politi­
cized social cleavages, featuring commoner-chief- 
taincy, national-parochial and class-community con­
flicts; Nkrumah's and his lieutenants' desire to 
maintain themselves in power and to pursue in an 
unfettered manner their own valued political, social 
and economic designs, which were personal, local, 
national and international; and the often needlessly 
provocative behaviour of many opposition leaders, 
predicated on a profound distaste for CPP leadership, 
CPP power and the consequences of a social revolu­
tion they were incapable of reversing. This animated 
among some a willingness to sustain almost any cause 
and course which would embarass, disrupt or bring 
down the government.
It is conceivable that a level of political tolerance 
adequate to the maintep1-•,ce of relatively democratic 
procedures might have developed if the political 
crises had eased off; there was certainly wide dis­
tress at the level of social and political conflict. 
However, a range of demands a. se simultaneously 
on the morrow of independence, which again gave 
Nkrumah and his lieutentants a sharr sense of unease. 
The more significant included: a minor but alarming 
Ewe rebellion in former British Togoland; the rapid 
rise of an angry, aggressive political movement
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among the Ga in Accra; a long, economically trouble­
some strike by Motor Drives' Union, as well as defi­
ance and threats of strikes from large public service 
employees' unions; economic demands forcefully thrown 
up to the government by the irate, pro-CPP Bx-Ser- 
vicemen's Union, which threatened to march on Nkru- 
mah's residence; and, capping this, an incipient 
revolt by angry, backbench CPP parliament members, 
who threatened to go over the opposition side if 
they were not accorded more influence. *14 * The 
nature, extent and intensity of these demands and 
conflicts as well as the CPP leadership's perception 
of them set the stage for the post-independence
THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ORDER
The behaviour of Nm  i.nah, the government and party 
in the post-independence period must be viewed from 
a number of perspectives inter-(wined in the thou­
ghts and behaviour of the political actors. Nkrumah 
and those who were and who became his lieutentants 
sought to establish a national society and political 
system, which would surmount all political cleavages 
and sustain CPP power, the latter both a personal 
concern and a belief in the rightness and necessity 
of a strong national and secular leadership. They 
also sought to fashion a now institutional framework,
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though this was undertaken gradually on an ad hoc 
basis. And they sought to develop the Ghanaian econo­
my as rapidly and dramatically as possible. Nkrumah, 
in particular, entertained as a fundamental aim 
a large role for Ghana and himself in Africa's libe­
ration, unification and international presence. 
Through these goals Nkrumah and his lieutenants 
sought to legitimize their power and roles.
At independence, Nkrumah, the CPP and the government 
cannot be said to have enjoyed a high degree of 
legitimacy in many areas of the country. a'he
unwillingness to accord legitimate authority to 
the government and Nkrumah was a function not only 
oi political opposition and distrust but also of 
the primacy of attachment to traditional and local 
structures and values.
The central problem of the political system was 
that there was no legitimized authority structure 
or institution, ono which was, or was perceived 
to be, broadly acceptable to the Ghanaian people. 
Whatever the contribution of Nkrumah1s charismatic 
authority to legitimizing the CPP had been, many 
Ghanaians in Ashanti, British Togoland and Northern 
Territories clearly refwood to recognize it. The 
legitimacy of the new secular structure of authority, 
the National Assembly, was, like Nkrumah's charisma,
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a victim of the 1954-56 political conflict when 
the opposition deemed it wholly unrepresentative 
and spurned it; in the post-1556 period it was regar­
ded as too manipulable an instrument of the CPP 
regime, which was regarded as fundamentally dicta­
torial even before it became so.
The responses of Nkrumah, the party (with varying
responses at national and local levels) and govern­
ment to problems of power legitimacy, state-building 
and national integration were heavily influenced 
by the bitterness and distrust in the 1954-56 con­
flict and by the wealth of ethnic (Ga, Ewe and Ashan­
ti), interest (labour, ex-servicemen, business) 
and power (opposition, internal CPP) demands forced 
upon them in the months following independence.
The immediate post-independence measures were de­
signed not only to assert and sustain CPP and govern­
ment power but also central government strength 
and legitimacy, national integration and the secula- 
rity of modern structures (e.g. banning parties 
based on ethnicity, religion and region, which forced 
the opposition to amalgamate into the United Party)«
In the years following independence in 1957, the 
CPP, party and government, moved to employ measures
to control the demand side of the political system:
to control, restrict or suppress groups or inst'tu-
tions concerned with the articulation, aggregation 
and communication of interests. This did not occur 
at once, but was the consequence of a series of 
political and economic crises, in each of which 
the CPP felt threatened and applied restrictive 
measures. These regulative efforts featured the 
use of both the carrot and the stick; the politically 
and/or administratively accomplished destoolment 
of important opposition chiefs (except the Asante- 
hene, who in 1958 pledged to uphold the government) 
and the attempted depoliticization of and limiting 
of their authority and functions; the centralization 
of constitutional authority, through the legal remo­
val of the Constitution's "entrenched" clauses, 
which was hardly evil in itself; ^  abolition 
of regional assemblies and the appointment of CPP 
leaders to the political/administrative positions 
of Regional Commissioner (1957), filled by members 
of Parliament and District Commissioner, beginning 
in 1985, filled by local leaders, who were in theory 
directly responsible to the head of government, 
Nkrumah; suppressive political tactics and election 
fraud against the opposition, often on local ini­
tiative ^  ^  \  which went hand in hand with party 
and government inducements to opposition leaders 
and areay to partake in government largess; a host 
of increasing.;' repressive statutes, some with unduly 
severe sanctions, which served to delimit personal
45 -
and civil liberties, the best known of which was 
the earliest, the Preventive Detention Act.
New problems involved in state- and nation-building 
required a ritualization and rationalization of 
authoriy. Ritualization involved non-partisan mea­
sures like establishing and making familiar a natio­
nal flag and anthem, replacing British with African 
regalia in Par; i" ••’•»nt in 1 960 and more partisan 
measures lik-i Nkrumah's face on new coins
and scamps, Nkr,. move to Christianburg Castle
(the residence of British governors) to symbolize 
the transfer of authority and the building-up of 
Nkrumah as the father of the nation, beyond reproach 
and criticism (which received legal sanction). At 
a later stage, an adulatory, effusive cult of Nkru­
mah 's personality was diftused through press, radio, 
party and government and government- channels and 
schools. In the 1960's there were some ambitious
plans to undertake the socialization of youth; for 
example through the Young Pioneers (whose appeal 
varied with the availability of uniforms), to incul­
cate deference to Nkrumah, the party and the state.
The extension of government authority was closely 
linked with the expansion of CPP authority, though 
in a manner which tied it Inextricably to the govern­
ment and state. The result in structure was what
Zolberg has aptly called "party-state", in prac­
tice and increasing monopolization of "legitimate" 
political prerogative by the CPP government leader­
ship, and Nkrumah above all. State and party were 
linked, providing ample demonstration of party power, 
through the replacement o£ colonial servants by 
CPP Regional Commissioners and District Commission­
ers. In its efforts to control groups making demands, 
the government "recognized" (a colonial precedent) 
the CPP-controlled United Ghana Farmers' Council 
(UGFC) as the official farmers' organization in 
1957. The ambitious head of the Trades Union Congress 
(TUCi, John Tettegab, drew upon government power 
(the 1958 Industrial Relations Act and amendments) 
to centralize the TUC in CPP hands, in exchange 
for bringing organized labour under government sanc­
tion, In 1959 the government created the Central 
Cooperative Council in order to replace the non­
partisan Cooperative Alliance and the Ghana Coopera­
tive Marketing Association (cocoa) and to develop 
industrial anl commercial cooperatives (which never 
got off the ground).
The CPP leadership of these and other dssoviational 
groups meant in practice that they were not accoun­
table to their own constituencies but to Nkrumah 
and the government. Although soma of these leaders, 
such as the UGt’C's Apniah-Donquah, represented the
interest of their followers to the government more 
forcefully than others, they were often interested 
in bringing their organizations to support govern­
ment policies, with little or no consultation with 
their groups: for example, the UGFC in contributions 
of 16 percent of earnings for development and in 
price reductions in cocoa; the TUC in the 5 percent 
forced savings in 1961, against which rank-and-file 
unionists revolted in the politicized Sekondi-Takora- 
di strike of 1961. ^  ^  Unable to articulate discon­
tent with specific policies and leaders, the discon­
tent of workers and farmers was increasingly aimed 
at the system as a whole. Although the party-state 
enveloped these groups, it frequently could not 
control them beyond the national leadership level 
(and often not even there) due to their size, the 
responsiveness of subordinate leaders to membership 
pressures and their bargaining power as strategic 
(and therefore politically worrisome) economic and 
solidarity groups; they could and did readily frus­
trate government policies.
Opposition strength declined steadily from 1957 
' 1960, due to a swing back to the GPP, a desire 
for an end to social conflict, government repres­
sion and the attraction of greater power. Opposition 
chiefs were destooled, the UP lost local elections 
and the number of UP members in the assembly dwindled
from 32 in 1957 to 13 in mid-1960, when Ghana became 
a Republic (6 were detained, many more "crossed 
the carpet" to the CPP). At a relatively early point, 
some opposition leaders considered violence. The 
arrest of two UP MP's in December 195ti for involve­
ment in a plot to kill Nkrumah and others worsened 
the position of the UP and was a major source of 
CPP apprehensions and the readiness of the govern­
ment to increasingly resort to preventive deten­
tion.  ^^  ^ In the 1 960 presidential election, the 
UP received only 11 percent of the votes. Violence 
increased in 1 962 with the attempted assassination 
of Nkrumah in August and random bombing of crowds 
later in the year, which brought the government 
to a heavier reliance on repressive measures and 
on instruments of force, the military and police.
The CPP leadership's attempts to control interest 
articulation and aggregation and to ignore political 
demands when communicated not unnaturally resulted 
in a decline in political participation. Success 
in reducing opposition strength left the CPP without 
the stimulus of political conflict. The tendency 
of the CPP leadership to identify the CPP with the 
nation, as in its early years, became again explicit 
as Nkrumah' s 1959 assertion that "the CPP is Ghana 
and Ghana is the CPP" was voiced on all occasions. 
This claim to represent the nation was practised
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from 32 in 1957 to 13 in mid-1960, wl- i Ghana became 
a Republic (6 were detained, many more "crossed 
the carpet" to the GPP). At a relatively early point, 
some opposition leaders considered violence. The 
arrest of two UP HP's in December 1958 for involve­
ment in a plot to kill Nkrumah and others worsened 
the position of the UP and was a major source of 
CPP apprehensions and the readiness of the govern­
ment to increasingly resort to preventive deten­
tion. In the 1960 presidential election, the
UP received only 11 percent of the votes. Violence 
increased in 1962 with the attempted assassination 
of Nkrumah in August and random bombing of crowds
later in the year, which brought the government
to a heavier reliance on repressive measures and
on instruments of force, the military and police.
The CPP leadership's attempts to control interest 
articulation and aggregation and to ignore political 
demands when communicated not unnaturally resulted 
in a decline in political participation. Success
in reducing opposition strength left the CPP without 
the stimulus of political conflict. The tendency 
of the CPP leadership to identify the CPP with the 
nation, as in its early years, became again explicit 
as Nkrumah's 1 959 assertion that "the CPP is Ghana 
and Ghana is tho CPP" was voiced on all occasions. 
This m to represent the nation was practised
locally by im'ucing people, even former opposition 
members, to join the CPP. Membership became more 
widespread, more nominal; relaxation in local politi­
cal conflicts and ever-present pressures and demands 
of local societies rendered the CPP an increasingly 
diffuse, socially conservative and parochial organi­
sation. Since its inception its roots had been indi­
genous, not alien. With a decline in social stress, 
these roots - kinship and clan ties, local and ethnic 
solidarity, local interest both traditional and 
modern - exerted themselves, *21 * The CPP remained 
a distinct organization but one with only a limited 
responsiveness to national direction. This
was not invch altered by the reorganization of insti­
tutions, when in the T960's the district became 
the major local unit of government (councils), ad­
ministration (district commissioners), party and 
parliamentary representation (1965). On? reason 
for the lack of discipline in the local-national 
link was that District Commissioners were assigned 
to their own home areas.
The radicalization of tho CPP party-state starting 
in 1959-60 derived from a number of interrelated 
sources: realization of the atrophy of tho CPP and 
of the sloth, corruption and pursuit of self-intcresi 
by many local and national loaders; the drive of 
new CPP elites for status and power? the search
for a coherent ideology, as a guide anr| as an instru­
ment of socialization and CPP legitimation; the 
emergence of vast economic ambitions anc problems; 
and challenges to Nkrumah's pan-African leadership 
with the appearance of many new states in 1 960 and 
an anti-Western animus fuelled in part by the Congo 
crisis and African dependency.
Nkrumah's realization of the need to revitalize 
the CPP in order to mobilize certain strata for 
economic development and to recapture the CPF's 
early drive demanded new orientations, functions 
an* power for some party structures - the TUC, UGFC 
and party press •• &nd the creation of new struc­
tures - the Central Cooperative Council, Young Pio­
neers, Young Farmers League and ideological cad­
res. The "old guard" petty-burgeois CPP leader­
ship included among others some capitalist entre­
preneurs, large and petty traders and others who 
had acquired economic interests and enriched them­
selves during their years in power. They represented 
the drive for social mobility and status of a new, 
acquisitive, lower-middle and middle class of educa­
ted commoners: they were not the socialists Nkrumah 
sought for Ghana's development. Both TUC and UGFC 
leaders and the few militants in the press were 
seeking new roles and power, and Nkrumah gave them 
status, money and power to challenge the "old guard".
who were readily attacked as corrupt "self-seekers". 
The CPP was reorganized for the umpteenth time (on 
paper), and a Ga CPi militant, Tawia Adamafio, a 
latecomer to the CPP (1953), was made secretary- 
general. Tettegah and Adamafio, in close partnership 
and with the support of the press militants, sought 
to re-energize the party through party organs, new 
but short-lived TUC ur.it-, at-T through Party Study 
Groups which vigorously attacked the incompet* i-e 
and conservatism of the CPP government leadership. 
While Adamafio (with Nkrumah1s support) proclaimed 
as the • official slogan "The Party Is Supreme", his 
quick acquisition of a governmental post, as minister 
of presidential affairs, was recognition of the 
overwhelming preponderance of government as distinct 
from CPP power.
Major political alterations were started between 
1960 and 1962 which were continued after Adamafio 
fell from power in August, 1 962. Nkrumah and the
militants began - intervene more directly in the 
bureaucracy, stimulating change by bringing some
departments directly under the president's offi­
ce. *2<** The UGFC became enormously powerful, acqui­
ring in 1961 a monopoly on cocoa buying (eliminating
independent marketing cooperative and later impor­
tant roles in developing producer cooperatives and 
agriculutral mechanization. The CPP MP's under siege
of the militants, suffered somewhat, but became 
a more critical and institutional group. Nkrumah, 
urged on by militants, determined that the state 
should play the central role in economic develop­
ment, established institutions for serious planning, 
whose plans he and his ministers generally disregar­
ded, launched many new state industries, received 
the US-UK-IBRD loan for the vast Volta dam-alumina 
complex and then turned to the Communist countries 
for aid and export markets for cocoa during his 
summer, 1961, three-month tour. Bitter factional, 
power struggles broke out within the CPP, chiefly 
between the old and new elites, sometimes over pro­
grammes. Ideology was used as a weapon by the new 
socialist militants against the insufficiently socia­
list "old guard"; Nkrumah's top liejtentants and 
most senior ministers. Finance Minister Komla Gbe- 
demah and Minister of State and Agriculture Kojo 
Botsio, were driven from the party and government - 
Gbedemah into exile and opposition to return after 
the coup, Botsio and the old guard to be recalled 
within a year when Nkrumah found the militants in­
competent. The militants were aggressive, subject 
to ideological corruption and divided among themsel­
ves by ambition, ethnicity and ideology.
There also began the search for a usable ideology, 
a tortuous journey, in part serious, grievously
marred by indecisiveness over its use and thus its 
shape - whether it should be an integrative myth 
(Nkrumahism, African socialism, "Consciencism" 
a chronological progression marked by increasing 
popular incomprehension and withdrawal) or a vanguard 
ideology ("scientific socialism"). The vanguar-
dists, who were wholly dependent on Nkrumah for 
support, were ahead when the coup occurred, but 
only within the confines of an increasing Nkrumah 
cult and at the expense to the regime of the increa­
sing alienation of the rest of the party - local, 
regional and national - whose leadership ignored 
or merely mouthed the revolutionary rhetoric.
The advent of ideology as a weapon brought nuw re 
pressive measures, arbitrarily rather than massively 
applied and new attacks against social and political 
institutions - the civil service, universities and 
judiciary. These meas-ires in turn spawned plotting 
and violence, such as the attempted assassination 
of Nkrumah by a policeman in January, 1964.
The January, 1964, constitutional referendum, marked 
by maosive intimidation and fraud and making Ghana 
by law a one-party state, brought home to many their 
loss of political participation, as did the 1965 
parliamentary election, a uon-ovent, in which the 
candidates were selected by Nkrumah and his lieute­
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nants and returned unopposed (though almost all 
former MP's kept their seats, itself a recognition 
of their local ties).
Nearly successful assassination attempts induced 
Nkrumah to withdraw from public view and eye all 
suspiciously. A network of informers was established, 
anM-rumour-mongering laws passed. *27 * Nkrumah 
governed by manipulating among contending factions 
and interests (party and non-party), playing one 
group off against another in order to maintain his 
leverage and autonomy, thrusting for change but
obsessed with the need tor order. Decision-making
was unstructured, a function of Nkrumah1s inatten­
tion, his varying advisors, his desire for haste 
in implementation of an idea before it was closely 
examined (e.g. economic projects), his vacillation
iid his failure to discipline his ministers. Much 
of Nkrumah1 s time was devoted to pursuing his pan- 
African and international politics; his responsive­
ness to political demands, internal and external, 
was conditioned by his perception of himself as
a national and international revolutionary leader, 
for example, his failure to appreciate the articulate 
opposition to the financial costs of his pan-African 
ambitions and the dislike and distrust of Ghana's 
increasingly intimate ties with tho Communist coun-
The restriction of claims on the political system 
did not lessen the demands but assured thu rise of 
sub-terranean politics - pursuit of interests through 
kinship; personal and bureaucratic links - and anomic 
dissidence, few instances of which were reported by 
the controlled press. The choking-off of channels of 
interest articulation and communication lessened 
the flow of information to party and government lea­
ders ; thus, they were uninformed about popular 
demands and grievances or doubted their credibility, 
and when expressions of discontent broke out they 
were surprised and occasionally panicked, often re­
sponding initially with repression and by suspecting 
malign if not subversive intentions.
CONCLUSION
A political system had developed in Ghana under 
conditions noted earlier as being generic to 
politics, in particular, the inflation of demands, 
the politicization of traditional cleavages and, 
thus, the limited legitimation of national political 
authority. The national system which developed over 
time in Ghana, and elsewhere in much of Africa with 
variations in emphasis, had the following characteri­
stics : an increasing centralization of decision-ma­
king power in the hands of the loader and a strong 
tendency to personal rule; on increasing reliance in 
this rule upon personal loyalties (whence, return of
the "old guard", increase in the number of Nzimas - 
Nkrumah's ethnic group - in the cabinet and security 
service), partly secured by material rewards, inclu­
ding the allocation (appropriation) of offices and 
direct benefits (money, housing); in response to 
the rapid increase in participation and demands, 
the creation of oligarchic controls and manipulation 
of interests and groups; despite attempted centra­
lization and curta... ment of sub-s\ «tem autonomy, 
relative degrees of autonomy for sub-ordinate poli­
tical leaders outside the national ventre and in 
certain structurally differentiated groupt..
Some observers have noted how closely these new 
political systems resemble the patrimonial system 
described by Weber, stressing the above features 
as well as increasingly salient traditional sources 
of ideological legitimation, with a shift from a 
future to a past-orientation and reliance upon a 
personally controlled coercive apparatus. How­
ever, as Zolberg points out, authority in these 
states tends to rest upon a clustering of ch Js- 
matic, traditional and bureaucratic traits. It is 
important to note that in Ghana the bureaucracy, 
even though manipulated, was more differentiated, 
specialized and institutionalized (particularly 
in terms of behavioural norms) than elsewhere in 
Africa and, therefore, with the exception of certain
presidential secretaries, operated much less as 
personal instiuments of rule than on a legal-rational 
basis. Also, even allowing for the large element 
of mystification in Ghana's political cultures (in­
cluding Nkrumah's cult), there was increasing secula­
rization, and the main thrust of ideological legiti­
mation and of leadership goals was oriented to the 
future, not the past.
The regime entertained a certain range of permissive­
ness, the limits of which were frequently probed. 
The acceptance of CPP goals provided a basis for 
criticism between the ideal and the practice, which 
left a lot of room for complaint, such as in the 
National Assembly, which spent much time in the 
regime's last years criticizing the government's 
economic performance. R.O. Amuako-Atta, after having 
been dismissed as minister for opposing the UGFC 
cocoa-buying monopoly in 1961, had pursued his oppo­
sition in the Assembly and sounded an early warning: 
"What I am saying is in tin interest of us all, 
politically. Because if there are irregularities 
and they are not pointed out now and are brooded 
upon, the next thing we shall see is some sort of 
revolution." <30)
Basic to the regime's loss of crita. apport groups
were its economic policies and the disastrous econo-
mic conditions in the last several years. The deve­
lopment potential of the economy was fundamentally 
limited by its basic colonial character and by the 
structure of the world market demand for its most 
important export, cocoa, which provided 65 percent 
of its foreign exchange earnings. Nkrumah and
his ministers felt that the most rapid possible 
economic development was imperative, and development 
for them was synonymous with industrialization and 
increasing expenditures and jobs. Up to 1959, the 
development emphasis had been on infrastructure 
and social services (especially education). By 1951- 
62 the government had decided on a structural change 
in the economy by means of a preponderant role for 
the state sector and a push for industrialization 
and the mechanization of agriculture through producer 
cooperatives and the state farms. In 1961 the
government also tardily impi-.ed economic controls 
in response to a sharp decli' ' n the cocoa price
and a balance of payments deficit.
In the next five years the government encountered 
steadily worsening economic conditions due to factors 
both within and beyond its control. An increased 
cocoa crop brought a rise in local demand and infla­
tion but not more foreign exchange because of the 
decline in the world price (from $ 603 per long 
ton in 1958 to $ 241 in 1 965 ). Severe balance ot
payments deficits, only sporadically reduced by 
import controls, depleted foreign currency reserves. 
This regime, and Nkrumah directly, refused in the 
face of increasing inflation to curtail its huge 
budget deficits (expenditures exceeded revenue by 
60 percent in 1962-63, 27 percent in 1 965 ), which
the government financed by dramatic increases in 
internal and external borrowing. *33* This heavy 
external borrowing, much of it for hastily and ill- 
considered agricultural and industrial development 
projects and extravaganzas, quickly resulted in 
an intolerable debt burden, since 82 percent of 
this external debt consisted of medium-te^ 
lier's credits. The malfunctioning of import con­
trols, due to administrative incompetence and cor­
ruption, political corruption and hoarding ^4)^ 
resulted In fre-u.mt scarcities of consumer goods 
and drastic sho. ‘ges of spare parts, which caused 
a decline in productivity in the private sector 
and the laying off of workers. The ONP increased 
between 1955 and 1 932 at an average annual rate 
of 4,8 percent, but by 1964 it dropped 'o 2,8 percent 
and in 1965 to 0,2 percent, practical' til; Ghana's 
estimated rate of population growth , ■  2,6 per- 
cnt.
Government Inattention to problems, lack of disci­
pline and self-indulgence exacerbate development
problems unduly. Commitments were made for develop­
ment projects without serious study, outside existing 
plans, with medium-term financing ft v long-term 
projects; there was little attempt until the last 
year to compel the proliferatiang state industries 
to be profitable or even accountable.
Economic conditions served to discredit the regime 
and stood in articulate mockery of the party-state's 
boasts of progress. The vast increases in revenue 
required to finance rising government expenditures 
were extracted from wage and salary earners, cocoa 
farmers (by "voluntary” development contributions, 
special taxes and, finally, hesitantly, reductions 
in the cocoa price) and foreign businesses. A pain­
fully high rate of inflation reached a high in 1965, 
when the consumer price index (base: March, 1963
= 100) rose from 128 to 165, with the largest increa­
se in local food costs. Statistically, the
standard of living declined, though, in fact, there 
were vast compensatory increases in social services, 
in health, water supplies, education and village 
development. (In fact, basic to Ghana's dilemma 
was the regime's attempt to provide high levels 
of social services without the productivity to finan­
ce them). Employment stood still or declined in
1965, with more school leavers seeking jobs.
Popular support for the regime eroded with the decline 
in economi- conditions, creating the opportunity 
for the military to Intervene with the anticipation 
of widespread public approbation. The military 
and police might well have intervened in any case 
on behalf of their own institutional interests. 
But despite the regime's authoritarianism, the pro­
bability of a coup would have oeen reduced if econo­
mic life had been m?re bouyant, discontent less 
animate, and the military and police thus unarmed 
with the crucial public issue to legitimize their 
seizure of power.
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DR. KWAME NKRUMAH'S GOVERNMENT
In order to investigate how the various military 
governments pursued their respective foreign policies 
whilst in office, it is necessary to describe at 
the onset the "traditional" (civilian) setting in 
which Ghana's foreign policy operated prior to mili­
tary rule. This will place the military's approach 
and performance in perspective.
The nature, style and motivation of Ghana's foreign 
policy prior to military rule can partly be traced 
back to the country's colonial history. ^  The 
colonial Administration bequeathed the English lang­
uage to the country as the official language of 
government, education, commerce and industry and 
law. The country's systems of education, law and 
administration were largely patterned after those 
of the United Kingdom. Ghana's economic, financial 
and commercial links after independence remain with 
the West. Indeed, the country's army was originally 
part of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF}.
Until September 1961, British Officers occupied 
senior posts in the army and the army itself was 
equipped with either British weapons or weapons
from some other Western nations.*2* Even now Britain 
remains Ghana's major source of arms, ammunition 
and military aid. At independence in 1957, the majo­
rity of the country's leaders : n Government, the 
civil service, the University and the army were 
trained either in the UK or in the United States. 
Furthermore, tangible ties (such as those between 
professional bodies had been established between 
Ghana and the UK and intangible ties (such as the 
commitment to liberal and Parliamentary democracy, 
freedom of expression and parliamentary government) 
had gained some important adherents. The external 
trade and finances of the country were closely tied 
to the West during the colonial erti.
All these factors, and also because Britain granted 
Ghana's independence under conditions untainted 
by bitterness, have continued to make Ghana's poli­
tical, economic and commercial and educational links 
with the Western powers - especially Britain - very 
important. Even at the peak of the anti-Western 
campaign in Ghana, from 1961 to February 1966, ^  
Ghana did not show great hostility towards Britain 
and the Commonwealth. Indeed, it was the late Dr. 
Kwame Nkrumah who suggested the establishment of 
the Commonwealth Secretariat during the Prime Mini­
sters' Conference of July 196-1. And despite his 
opposition to the position taken by Mr. Harold Wilson
on Rhodesia, Dr. Nkrumah agreed to serve on the 
abortive Commonwealth Peace Mission to Vietnam which 
was established in June 1965 at the summit meeting 
of Commonwealth leaders.
As Kwame Nkrumah himself said in 1958, history had 
brought Ghana and the West together *4 * and this 
could not be erased overnight. This was echoed in 
October 1969 by the Prime Minister of Ghana, Dr. Kofi 
Busia, in his address to the UN General Assembly: 
" ... (Ghana's) own historical contacts and experien­
ces have brought it about that we share more common 
interests with some (Western) countries at this 
point of time than with others."
Such "historical contacts and experiences" have 
produced significant opinions which favour a pro- 
West foreign policy. These opinions are to be found 
among the Western educated elite in the civil ser­
vice and the Universities. Indeed, among the armed 
forces that have ruled the country during the period 
1966-1982, such pro-West sentiments have not been 
wanting.
Foreign policy may be looked at as a nation's 
maximization of its value synthesis. Such maximiza­
tion of Ghana's interests have traditionally 
operated around:
(a) Non-Alignment ,
(b) Colonialism and Neo-Colonlalism, and
(c) Pan-Africanism.
Non-Alignment;
Ghana entered the world stage on 6 March 1957, deter­
mined to remain non-aligned, ^hat is to enter into 
no formal military or ideological commitment to 
either of the power-blocs. Already in 1955, Ghana, 
as an advanced colony (Gold Coast, the country was 
called before independence), had sent observers 
to the Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned States.* 6 *
On June 26, 1959, the Governor General, in a Sessio­
nal address to the National Assembly described Gha­
na's foreign policy as "non-alignment and positive 
neutralism”. * 7 * The term "non-alignment" seemed
to indicate her desire to remain outside the peri­
phery of the cold war. The "positive neutralism" 
on the other hand emphasised the participation!st 
elements in her foreign policy. These included, 
among others, a policy of friendship with all nations 
and malice toward none.  ^® *
Non-alignment was only a template of Ghana's exter­
nal relations. Provision for the security of Ghana, 
protection of her national interests ^  \  loyalty 
to the Charter of the United Nations \  liqui­
dation of colonialism, imperialism and racial dis­
crimination, settlement of international disputes
by peaceful means ^  \  advocacy of disarmament
as an approach to peace, avoidance of excessive 
economic reliance on a state or an ideological group 
of states and respect for the territorial integrity 
of all states, were all presented as norms of Ghana's 
foreign policy. It was conceived as a "policy of 
balancing equilibrium in the troubled seas of inter­
national relations". ^ P r e s i d e n t  Kwame Nkrumah 
thought that Ghana couJ.d help to "bridge the gulf 
that separates the two ideological blocs"
Ghana aimed to emphasise co-operation, not conflict.
Nkrumah once articulated Ghanaian goals as follows: 
"It is our belief that international blocs and rival­
ries acerbate and do not solve disputes and we must 
be free to judge issues on their merits and to look 
for solutions that are just and peaceful, irrespec­
tive of the powers involved. Wo do not wish to be 
in the position of condoning imperialism or aggres­
sion from any quarter. Powers which pursue policies
of goodwill, co-oporation and constructive inter­
national action will always find us on their si-
d.." <")
Ghana did not seem to subscribe to the theory of 
"demonology" - the division of nations and peoples 
into good anJ bad - in international politics. Kofi 
Baako, a member of the cabinet said in Parliament 
on September 4, 1 958: "If you say that the world 
is divided into two camps - right and wrong - and 
dt the same time you align with the West, then you 
are saying that the Wust is always right and the 
East is always wrong. And we do not agree with that." 
(15)
Dr. Nkrumah wrote that "as to issues between them, 
neither bloc can claim to be permanently right or 
permanently wrong."
Ghana therefore, generally stressed the need to 
hold on, with other non-aligned nations, to the 
middle ground. It sometimes displayed a determination 
to "intercede and to mediate in the interests of 
world peace. 11  ^^  Nkrumah once suggested that
non-aligned powers, including Ghana, could "inter­
pose" between the existing blocs.
In implementing the policy of non-alignment and 
positive neutralism, Ghana appeared to rely on world 
opinion.
Ghana did not seem to subscribe to the theory of 
"demonology" - the division of nations and peoples 
into good and bad - in international politics. Kofi 
Baako, a member of the cabinet said in Parliament 
on September 4, 1958: "If you say that the world
is divided into two camps - right and wrong - and 
at the same time you align with the West, then you 
are saying that the West is always right and the 
East is always wrong. And we do not agree with that." 
(15)
Dr, Nkrumah wrote that "as to issues between them, 
neither bloc can claim to be permanently right or 
permanently wrong." *
Ghana therefore, generally stressed the need to 
hold on, with other non-aligned nations, to the 
middle ground. It sometimes displayed a determination 
to "intercede and to mediate in the interests of 
world peace. " * * ^  Nkrumah once suggested that
non-aligned powers, including Ghana, could "inter­
pose" between the existing blocs. *
In implementing the policy of non-alignment and 
positive neutralism, Ghana appeared to rely on world
On December 16, 1959, Kofi Baako saj.d in Parliament: 
" ... there is something called world public opi­
nion, in which the government very well believes. 
It is this international opinion that the government 
wants to boost ... "  ^ Nkrumah argued that world
opinion was an important ingredient of Ghana's poli­
cy: "We (the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations) 
represent a large segment of world opinion and herein 
lies our strength. Ours is a force which cannot 
be employed coercively. It can only be employed 
persuasively; but it is nevertheless an effective 
force." ^ 0} a private meeting of the Afro-Asian 
group at the United Nations, Nkrumah asserted that 
the group could "exert moral pressure on the two 
main blocs and prevent them from plunging all of 
us into the holocaust of a disastrous war."
He further claimed that non-alir-nment was a "moral 
force in international affairs." *
Military non-alignment was the kernel of Ghana's 
policy. For it did not seem to believe peace could 
be ensured by preparing for war. P.K.K. Quaidoo, 
then a cabinet member, made this clear in a state­
ment in the Ghanaian Parliament on September 4, 
1958. "This policy is in direct conflict with the 
ancient rule: si vis pacem nara helium, that means, 
if you want pcacc, prepare for war. In spite of 
what anybody says, we do not acccpt that as a basis
for our foreign policy because we never achieve 
peace by war." (23*
Military entanglement, Ghana seemed to fear, could 
place her in the tutelage of a foreign power which 
would become the arbiter of her fate, for the foreign 
power would gain an intimate knowledge of the defen­
ce structure of Ghana. *24 ^ Besides, she believed
that military alliances tend to promote, not resolve 
conflict. For they "revive old rivalries and create 
new dangers" ^5)^ In fact, small nations in the 
past were, Ghana pointed out, sucked into the quar­
rels of great powers. * The entangling alliances 
of small countries with great powers were believed 
to be one of the ce jses of World War I. * Further, 
in practical terms, Ghana felt that small nations
would lose everything and gain little by a world
conflict. Ghana, therefore, aspired to reduce
international tension. For she feared that "when
the bull elephants fight, the grass is trampled
down." <29>
Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism:
The Charter of the United Nations, under Chapter XI, 
provides for self-determination in the Non-Self- 
Governing Territories. Ghana utilised these provi­
sions to help the struggle for freedom of colonial
peoples. But it often concentrated its attention 
on the territories of Africa, believing that its 
own freedom would be meaningless until all of Africa 
was free,
Nkrumah maintained that colonialism was the out­
growth of capitalism. "The origin of colonisation", 
he wrote, "is nothing else than the enterprise of 
individual interests, a one-sided egotistical impo­
sition of the strong upon the weak." *3I^
Colonialism, according to him, was a policy by which 
a foreign power bound "territories to herself by 
political ties with the primary object of promoting 
her own economic advantage," In Consciencism.
Nkrumah wrote that he had always believed that the 
basis of colonialism was economic. ^ ) He insisted 
that colonialism was a source of conflict and only 
complete decolonisation would truly liberate man 
from "the moral, political and cultural restraints 
which hamper his full progress and development in 
many parts of the world." *33* It was also held
that "life in Africa would havo been happier, pro­
gress would have been greater, in Ghana as well 
as in the rest of Africa, had there been neither
colonialism nor imperialism." ^ * Anti-colonialism 
accordingly became one of the tenets of Ghanaian
foreign policy.
Colonialism was opposed in every form.Nkrumah consi­
dered colonialisn a devil ^5)^ though he rejected 
ideological demonology. Nkrumah argued that colonia­
lism changed its tactics and assumed subtler forms. 
He called it Neo-Colonialism, the worst form of 
imperialism.
The essence of neo-colonialism, according to Nkrumah, 
was that a state affected by it possessed a facade 
of sovereignty with all its visible trappings. In 
reality, however, its economic system and its politi­
cal policy were directed from outside. ^  * Economi­
cally, such a state was said to be compelled to 
buy manufactured products from the colonial power. 
Neo-colonialism, according to this theory, protected 
imports into the country from the colonial power, 
clamped down local development end sometimes even 
the fiscal policy was controlled by the dominating 
state. * Bilateral economic aid was also cited 
as one of the tools of neo-colonialism. ^
Nkrumah held that the mechanics of imperialism were 
responsible for widening the disparity between the 
rich and the poor nations. This, he said, was also 
a consequencc of the fall in the world price of 
raw materials, the backbone of emerging nations. 
For example, Ghana's 210 000 tons of cocoa in 1954-55 
earned hor 239,4 million United States Dollars as
against, an estimated $ 215,6 million in 1964-65
on a projected crop of 590 000 tons. This full
in cocoa prices had apparently serious repercussions 
on policy makers in Ghana. They felt that the buyers 
were denying Ghana the benefits of its increased 
production. Ghana, therefore, sought to rectify 
the imbalance in its economy as a producer of raw 
materials and escape the traps of one-crop economy.
Pan-Africanism;
African Unity was considered by Ghana as an impor­
tant facet of its foreign policy. Nkrumah believed 
that only a strong political union could bring about 
a full and effective development of Africa's resour­
ces for the benefit of Africa’s peoples. He
wrote: "Divided we are weak; a United Africa could 
become one of the greatest forces for the good of 
the world." *
Nkrumah argued that differences in culture and lang­
uage in various parts of Africa need not be an ob­
stacle to African unity. Ghana placed Pan-Afri­
canism on the commanding heights it occupied during 
the period 1957-66. It believed that, despite histo­
rical differences, the sense of brotherhood engen­
dered by African culture would enable African states 
to make enlightened self-immolation in the cause
of African unity possible and acceptable. But Nkrumah 
did not demand such J sacrifice immediately. He 
sought to protect the diversity of Africa: "The
individual character of population groups might 
properly be expressed in special kinds of develop­
ment within the universal plan; particularly in 
the fields of specialised production, whether in 
agriculture or in industry, or handicraft and cul- 
ture." 1431
Ghana felt that a united continent would benefit 
immensely on an economic plan. Nkrumah argued thus: 
"The unity of the countries of Africa is an indispen­
sable precondition for the speediest and fullest 
development, not only of the totality of the conti­
nent, but also of the individual countries linked 
together in the Union." ^
Nkrumah insisted that the Union would Iso assist 
Africans in breaking the melancholy circle of pover­
ty. (45* He denied that he was advocating a coming 
together of poor states. Africa's resources could 
be better exploited under political vv.ity and this 
could help a wider capital development, he said.
Nkrumah constantly preached unity to convert passive 
sympathy of the masses into active participation:
" ... there arc three alternatives open to African
states; firstly, to unite and save the continent; 
secondly, to disunite and disintegrate; or thirdly, 
to sell out. In other words, either unite or to 
stand separately and disintegrate or to sell oursel­
ves to foreign powers." He insisted that Afri­
ca's needs must be the paramount concern of every 
African leader. For his part, Nkrumah had appa­
rently conjured up in his mind a vast edifice of 
continental dimensions, with all its majesty and 
glory. But he refused to agree with the view that 
his concepts were utopian: "I have often been accused 
of pursuing a policy of the impossible. But I cannot 
believe in the impossibility of achieving African 
union any more than I could ever have thought of 
the impossibility of attaining African freedom.” *48*
Again and again, he insisted that a single represen­
tation at international councils, resting on the 
strength of the whole continent, would be more posi­
tive in its influence than all the separate represen­
tations of the African states put together. ^  * 
Pan-Africanism, it was believed, would not only 
assist Africa in the United Nations, but will also 
help the cause of world peace. The permanent machi­
nery of the African states at the UN was a partial 
vlfillrvnt of this hope. Ghana utilised the forums 
t .ovided by the UN, the Commonwealth and later, 
the OAU co promote these principles.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has not directly confronted 
the question as to whether Ghana’s foreign policy 
as formulated and executed under Dr. Nkrumah1s 
government succeeded in enlarging the country's 
influence and in augmenting its power.
Professor W. Scott Thompson's definitive case 
study of Ghana before the military regimes constitute 
an excellent source of information on this period.
In Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-3966, Professor 
Thompson closely examines the role of the charis­
matic leader in foreign oolicy decision-making,
as well as the function of the competing elites - 
professional diplomats and party ideologues 
in their efforts to fashion policy according
to their perceived interests.
The enquiry is conducted at several levels,
corresponding to the concern of Ghana's foreign 
policy in its actual operation. Ghana's relations
with the great powers and specifically its develo­
ping tics with Moscow and Poking, arc one concern, 
as, more theoretically, are the examination
of the limits of the influence of a small state
trying to sway the actions of the great powers
in international crises.
At another level, Ghana's foreign policy had 
as its primary aim the uniting of Africa and 
this historical movement is studied in its several 
stages. The utility of the methods used - ideology, 
diplomacy and subversion - are weighed. The
results in policy of irridentism combined with 
ideology, are explored as they relate to Ghana's 
tangled relations with its neighbours.
Throughout the study the author considers the
effects of the domestic forces set free by Dr. Nkru- 
mah’s attempt to import a new "ideology" tied 
to both domestic and foreign policy goals. The 
State's role in the Congo (Zaire) crisis, the
non-aligned and Afro-Asian movement, Nkrumah's 
dilemma in trying to change Ghana1s trade and 
economic structures to reflect her new links 
with the Soviet Union are all given comprehensive 
and thorough analysis.
The author draws a number of conclusions from
the study. Some of those are first, that Ghana's 
foreign policy of the period was Nkrumah's and
a reflection of his moods and ambitions. This
is a valid assessment of the situation but Nkru­
mah's domination of the foreign policy processes 
was understandable. Given the general vearning 
for the "African Revolution" (which involved
« difficult struggle to attain the "political
kingdom", to decolonise, that is,) and the strong 
opposition to it by certain significant sectors
of the Ghanaian educated population, Nkrumah 
had little choice but to exercise and be seen 
to exercise firm leadership. It needs to be 
remembered also that Nkrumah used Ghana's foreign 
policy as an adjunct to his effort to build
a united nation that could easily be torn apart 
by ethnicity. Dr. Nkrumah's single minded commit­
ment to Ghana's foreign policy is moreover vindi­
cated when it is remembered that all Ghanaian 
governments (including the military) subsequent
to Nkrumah's have had to make public professions
of adherence to Nkrumah's foreign policies. 
Dr. Killa Liman's PNP government infact, won 
the last elections prinicpally because they 
assured the electorate that they would, if elected, 
strive to implement Dr. Nkrumah's uncompleted 
domestic and foreign policies.
As for the view that Nkrumah's foreign policy
failed partly because his intellectual capacity
would bear further examination, all that can 
be said is that Nkrumah was not a social scientist, 
a theoretical scholar in the traditional academic 
sense. He was, in a sense, the initiator and 
leader of a difficult revolution that sought
to decolonise almost a whole continent and its 
peoples. He knew what he wanted, namely "a political 
kingdom" - a transfer of political power from 
alien rulers to indigenous peoples. It is therefore 
as a charismatic and inspiring leader that Nkrumah 
should be judged and not as an abstract thinker. 
Practice without theory may be blind but theory 
without practice is definitely empty 1
Yet another view about Ghana’s foreign policy 
of the period is that, the country's foreign 
policy failed because Nkrumah was unrealistic 
about the limits of Ghana's resources (natural 
and human) and of its geopolitical significance 
especially after 1962. The result, it said, was 
that he expended Ghana's resources to achieve 
unrealistic ambitions and objectives.
There is much to be said for this view. Ghana 
is a small country with a small population and 
limited resources. Undoubtedly some and perhaps 
much of the country's resources of the period 
in question could have been more profitably used 
in domestic development. Had that happened Nkrumah 
could probably have had a happy domestic support 
base for his foreign policies. After all, charity, 
it is said, begins at home.
However, as Nkrumah saw it, African revolutionary
history had thrust a role upon Ghana which made 
it impossible (and indeed immoral) for the country 
to choose between moderate development at home 
and piecemeal and limited policies abroad. To 
him, Ghana's independence was meaningless unless 
it led to African continental independence and 
unity. Ghana's resources were to be used to attain 
the twin objectives so that greater African resources 
would be available to oil African countries. 
The timing was, to him, the best as any further 
delay would result in individual, almost non- 
viable countries becoming embroiled in their 
individual problems with the possibility of foreign 
interference and re-colonisation (neo-colonialism). 
Someone had to start the movement or else it 
might not get off the ground. Nkrumah chose to 
take the initiative. That he did so was not solely 
because he did not understand how the international 
system worked or that he was egoistical as was 
claimed by Sir Tafawa Be lev/a, the Nigerian Prime 
Minister at the time.
Kwame Nkrumah’s commitment to African Unity could 
be said to have had its origins in several sources. 
Professor K.A.B. Jones-Quartey, in a letter to 
W. Scott Thompson, had this to say: "At Lincoln,
ho always brooded about Africa's lack of a 1 national1 
symbol or myth. Britain had is Monarchy, America
had its flag and the Constitution, etc. But what 
had Africa? No Crown, no constitution, no flag, 
no rallying cry, no focal point - nothing! It was 
imperative, Nkrumah insisted, to develop a myth - 
some national symbol, somwhere ... Eventually, this 
symbol turned out to be Kwame Nkrumah himself and 
the whole African case, then assumed the form of 
a pyramid in his own mind. Africa was its base, 
Ghana was somewhere in the middle and at the top, 
Kwame Nkrumah ... " *^ )
Second, Nkrumah had been brought up as a child and 
was operating as a politician in a society where 
s high value is placed on human relations. Children 
in Ghana are taught to greet all whom they meet; 
even the stranger whom they may never meet again. 
It is more than courtesy. The greeting is considered 
to be an acknowledgement, a recognition of the other 
person as a fellow human being. If you passed him 
by without greeting him, you would be treating him 
as a thing - you would be implying that he did not 
share your humanity.
Therefore, to recognise one whom you passed as a 
fellow human being, is an obligation and a Ghanaian 
is deeply hurt when he is ignored without cause.
This explains, in part at least, why Dr. Nkrumah
felt able to declare on the ev*". of Ghana's indepen­
dence that: "The independence of Ghana is meaning­
less unless it is linked up with the total liberation 
and unity of the African continent." *51*
Indeed, the Ghana constitution provided for the 
surrender of Ghana’s political sovereignty in order 
to further Nkrumah1s objective of African political 
union, thus: "In the confident expectation of an
early surrender of sovereignty to a Union of African 
States and territories, the people now confer on 
Parliament the power to provide for the surrender 
of the whole or any part of the sovereignty of Gha-
Therefore, when, after his overthrow, foreign obser­
vers commented that Dr. Nkrumah had fallen from 
power because his foreign policies had made him 
a good African but a bad Ghanaian, they had missed 
an important point in that, certainly to the 
Akan-speaking Ghanaian foreign policy decision­
makers, who dominated the foreign office during 
the period, being a good African is the obligation 
of a good Ghanaian! It was such a domestic environment 
which encouraged Dr. Nkrumah in his grand pan- 
African designs.
Dr. Nkruman saw Ghana only as part of e United Sta-
tes of Africa. Nkrumah's government had some
notable achievements, which A.L. Adu, one of 
Ghana's most distinguished civil servants, has 
summarised thus: "Ghana succeeded in making the
impact of African diplomacy felt in international 
forums and international organizations. Ghana 
succeeded in mobilising Africa's efforts towards 
the emancipation of the dependent territories. 
Ghana succeeded agaisnt formidable obstacles
of inertia and opposition, in making the idea
and ideals of African unity accepted all over
Africa as the ulitmate ovjective for all African 
States, whatever disagreements there might be
on the ways and means of achieving this objective.
Ghana succeeded in making Africans everywhere 
proud of their Africanness and in a real sense 
in galvanising the spirit of 'African Personality’ 
in international organizations. Most of these
successes are duo to the sense of dedication, 
of purpose, of single-mindedness and the inspired
leadership of Dr. Nkrumah."
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C H A P T E R  F O U R
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL 
(NLC) 1966 - 1969
On 24th February 1966, a coup d'etat overthrew the 
constitutional government under President Kwame 
Nkrumah and brought to power an army-police coali­
tion, the National Liberation Council (NLC).
Although there are difficulties involved 3 n trying 
to determine the sources of the coup d'etat, it 
may be said that unresolved ethnic tensions, a worse­
ning economic situation and the absence of effec­
tive political choice, were among the background
factors that undermined the government's position. 
Yet another factor was that the government had tended 
to commit the country's limited resources to the 
pursuit of Pan-African unity. *1 *
The point has been made in the introductory chapter 
that an important factor determining the mili­
tary's foreign reference group identification 
has been the exposure to British military profes­
sionalism, procedures, organisation and personnel.
Many Ghanaian officers appear to have had great
respect for and worked readily under their British 
officers. Their common educational background, °cono-
mic status and sense of military professionalism 
rendered them a rather conservative social ground 
identifying not only with British military norms 
and values, but with British beliefs and life-styles 
as well as with their Ghanaian police, civil service 
and professional counterparts.
Although such identification can be overstres&ed 
(the army and police cannot be characterised as 
a caste remote from their own social roots) the
foreign (British) group identification of the NLC 
government induced a disdain for the Convention 
Peoples Party (CPP) and a consequent dismantling 
of the CPP's major policies. In the words of Dr. Nkru- 
mah, " The fact that Harlley and others found
it fairly easy to get support in the army may
also be explained by what has been called 'the
Sandhurst mentality' of certain officers. These 
men trained in various English military establish­
ments prided themselves on being more 'English' 
than Ghanaian, f; d tended to frown on everything 
in our Ghanaian way of life which did not conform 
with English customs and traditions.” ^
Soon after the coup, the NLC sought and was quickly 
offered the counsel of Ghana's significant professio­
nal and m: ’die class. These included former leading 
opposition United Party (Ur) politicians some of
whom emerged from detention, or, like Professor 
Kofi Busia, returned from exile. The NLC looked 
to the professional class, the majority of which 
had been educated in the West, for support and help 
and tended to regard its members as representatives 
of the public good and its political heirs. Jurists, 
many lawyers, civil servants and other professional 
class members were appointed to pr,minent positions: 
as members of the Commissions of Enquiry, delegations 
to Aricars (to restore vormal relations
soured undei umah's rule); some were appointed
to head the boards of fifty state corporations. 
Yet others were made heads of editorial boards of 
the government-owned newspapers. The NLC justified 
the coup in terms of democratic values but lacked 
many of the skills which were needed to rule a demo­
cratic state. The support of adequately trained 
people was indispsnsible. Hence the NLC was suscep­
tible to the demands made by the professional classes 
and the UP politicians.
In the beginning, all NLC members except General 
Joseph Ankrah, who was NLC Chairman, retained their 
ar:„y and police positions and met, at least, once 
a week to make decisions. Thus, the senior civil 
servants were thrust into an enormously powerful 
position on matters such as economic and educational 
problems.
The NLC's general performance was circumscribed 
by Ghana's economic conditions, the priority it 
gave to the economy ond the tools it used to restore 
economic health. Advised by senior civil servants, 
the government sought to end Ghana's drastic balance 
of payments problems through renegotiating its ex- 
cernal debts, a continuing task, cutting drastically 
Ghana's imports and rationalising the import license 
system. Other measures included securing foreign 
aid, de-valuing the Cedi by 30 percent in mid-1967 
and severly cutting the budget.
I.* 1966/ the investment budget was cut by 17 percent; 
in 1967 by 20 percent, and in this way budget sur­
pluses were achieved. By the end of 1368 Ghana also 
had a surplus on visible trade. ^  The basically 
sound rationale behind this severe retrenchment 
was that Ghana must and could utilize more produc­
tively, the investments it was making, but the fo­
reign policy implications of these and other measures 
in relation to the East (Moscow), the West and Africa 
bordered on a reversal of all major foreign policies 
pursued under President Kwame Nkrumah's government.
THE NLC AND AFRICA
Initial reactions to the coup, thi-nighout Africa, 
wore mixed.
tv* .
In general, Francophone Africa was either indifferent 
or clearly happy st the news of the coup. Guinea 
(under President Sekou Tours) and Mali (under Presi­
dent Modibo Kelts) were the only French-speaking 
African countries that condemned the NLC, ^  * Guinea 
and Mali both offered political asylum to Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah and broke diplomatic relations with Ghana. 
The three-nation Union of African States (UAS) was 
thus dissolved. Dr. Nkrumah later settled in Guinea 
and was made Co-President of Guinea.
In Bast Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda 
launched a campaign to isolate the NLC government 
in Africa. t5)
The response of the NLC to the flood of resentment 
and opposition in Africa was initially one of scorn. 
Speaking to newsmen in Accra after Guinea had recei­
ved Dr. Nkrumah, Major Afrifa, who later became 
chairman of the NLC said: "We are not bothered by 
vain threats from people who could not even mount 
guards at their Embassy in the Congo." ^  And Gene­
ral Ankrah, the first Chairman of the NLC and Head 
of State moc’;ingly told a newsman, "Toure (President 
of Guinea) might be mad to think of invading Ghana 
at the head of mothers and drunkards." ^
For some time, it appeared as though Ghana would 
remain in isolation in Africa. President Sekou 
Toure of Guinea sent the following message to 
President Nkrumah who was in Peking at the time: 
"The Political Bureau and the Government after a 
thorough analysis of the African situation following 
the seizure of power by the instruments of imperia­
lism have decided:
1 . To organize a national day of solidarity with 
the Ghanaian people next Sunday. Throughout 
the length and breadth of the country, there 
will take place popular demonstrations on the 
theme of anti-imperialism;
2. To call on all progressive African countries 
to hold a special conference and take adequate 
measures ... " *0 ^
Had the NLC continued to ignore the hostility, propa­
ganda and threats from Africa, the government would 
have been effectively isolated. However, tempered 
by the influence of the late President Tubman of 
Liberia, the NLC opted for diplomacy by sending 
delegations to African State capitals to explain 
the reasons for the coup and the policy of the new 
government towards Africa.
Mr. Alex Kwapong, the Vice-Chance]1 or of the Univer­
sity of Ghana, headed a delegation to a number of
African countries including Sierra Leone and Nigeria, 
both of which countries received his delegation
but appeared by their public silence to have 
adopted an initial policy of wait and see.
In East Africa, Mr. Edward Akuffo Addo's delegation 
was not even received in Kenya and Tanzania. In 
Uganda and Malawi, the Heads of State were not them­
selves available to the delegation but government 
officials met them.
Meanwhile, Ghana's borders along the frontiers, 
which had been closed since 1962 when allegations of 
subversion were made against Upper Volta and Ivory 
Coast governments, were immediately opened to 
travel and trade. Togo and Dahomey announced their in­
tention to purchase hydro-electric power from 
Ghana's Volta Dam.
The NLC's drive to gain acceptance in Africa reached 
its climax when it opened the floodgates to the 
secrets of Dr. Nkrumah's diplomacy. According to 
G.K. Bluwey, when Dr. Nkrumah failed in 1963 to 
get the African Heads of State assembled in Addis 
Ababa to support his programme for immediate poli­
tical Union of Africa, he decided upon political
assa"  ination and violence as the only other means
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The NLC'a drive to gain acceptance in Africa reached 
its climnx when it opened the floodgates to the 
secrets of Dr. Nkrumah's diplomacy. According to 
G.K. B’uwey, when Dr. Nkrumah failed in 1 963 to 
get the African Heads of Statu assembled in Addis 
Ababa to support his programme for immediate poli­
tical Union of Africa, ho dccidcd upon political 
assassinativ- and violcncc as the only other means
left to him. ^  The Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Insti­
tute at Winneba was expanded to take in more students 
from all over Africa. The African Affairs Secretariat 
opened research units on each of the 29 states ' n 
the Monrovia group of states. Obosomase Camp, a 
training centre for freedom fighters, was opened 
in the heart of the Ashanti Forest.
At the overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah1 s government, the 
objectives of all these institutions were made pub­
lic. ^  The Obosomase Camp consisted of some 500 
recruits from all parts of Africa. There were about 
a dozen instructors mainly from China and Cuba. 
The People’s Republic of China provided equipment 
for the camp.
Many of the participants at the Ideological Institu­
te and the Obosomase Camp made confessions about 
their training. The Ivory Coast, Liberia, Upper 
Volta and Gabon were the immediate targets of assault 
to pave the way for a Union of States in West Africa, 
which would embrace the rest with little trouble. 
Dr. Nkrumah had designs on Julius Nyerere1s Tanzania, 
Jomo Kenyata1s Kenya, Kenneth Kaunda's Zambia and 
on Mobutu Seae-Seko's Zaire.
These claims (cr revelations) resulted in far-rea­
ching diplomatic gains for the NLC government. At
the OAU Heads of State Meeting in 1 967, General 
Joseph Ankrah, the NLC Chairman’s contribution 
and impact resulted, partly at least, in the 
readiness with which the leaders of the rival 
factions in Nigeria's Civil War accepted his invi­
tation to the Aburi Conference in Ghana at which 
the federal gover: went delegation led by 
General Yakubu Gowon ana the Biafran delegation 
under Colonel Odumegu Ojuku attempceu lo ma c L  an 
amicable solution to the conflict. Ghana continued 
(under the NLC) to support legitimate nationalist 
movements in Africa. The NLC continued its financial 
support for African students from South Africa, 
Rhodesia and Portuguese Africa. By October 1969, 
when the NLC ceded political power to an elected 
government, Ghana was accepted in mainstream African 
politics. Ghana ranked among the first twenty member 
states of the OAU that had paid up their membership 
contributions. Refugees from all over Africa remai­
ned welcome in Ghana, but freedom fighters no longer 
received pt■ al cheques from the government. Before 
long, Guinea released the remaining J4 Ghanaians 
who had been held in Guinea. No diplomatic relations 
were restored however.
The main thrust of NLC policy in Africa was towards 
the development of Regional Groups to further econo­
mic development. That was a definite shift of policy
from the erstwhile Nkrumah stance. Ghana's policy 
in the era of NLC rule was therefore geared towards 
co-operation among the States of West Africa.
Trade between the Ivory Coast, Togo and Upper Volta 
on one hand, and Ghana on the other, received a 
boost. Restrictions on the movement of goods and
of people between Ghana and its neighbouring count­
ries were removed. Ghana could once again import
cattle and poultry from the Ivory Coast and export 
textiles from its Textile factory at Tema. Ghanaians 
bought French goods from the Ivory Coast and sold 
them in Ghana. Ghana’s farmers regained access to 
their farms across the borders and free contact
among the various ethnic groups along the frontiers 
was restored. In the end, Ghana was at peace with 
all but one State in West Africa, Guinea.
In the light of the Foreign Reference Group theory, 
this shift in emphasis from Pan-African to Regional 
(i.e. West African) co-operation and diplomacy is
understandable. The shift was not simply a question 
of a return to rationality as was suggested by com­
mentators on Radio Ghana. During the colonial period, 
the British authorities had stressed regional rather 
than continental co-operation in Africa. Thus regio­
nal institutions had been established to provide 
institutional support to their policies. The West
African Cocoa Board, the West African Currency Board, 
the West African Examinations Council are all examp­
les of such regional institutions. At independence 
in 1957, such regional institutions were dissolved 
as a result of Dr. Nkrumah1 s policies. When the 
NLC assumed power they returned to regional diplo­
macy, partly as a matter of national self-interest 
but mainly to conform to what the NLC leaders, in 
their identification with British practice, consi­
dered the "correct” stance.
THIS NLC AND THE EASTERN BLOC OF STATES
For all the homage paid to non-alignment, Ghana's 
policy immediately before the 1 966 coup wa one 
of indifference and hostility to the Western World 
in word and deed as was reflected in radio anrl press 
criticisms. The anti-West stance and pro-communist 
rhetoric was crowned with the launching of Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah1s book, Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage 
of Imperialism in 1965. Thenceforth, the Ghanaian 
Times and the Evening News (both owned by the govern­
ment) carried on their front pages cartoons, that 
showed the American President, Lyndon Baines Johnson, 
as a hound devouring skinny Africans. The name of 
the hound was "John D. Imperialism" and its teeth 
were filled with rolls of American Dollar bills!
In June 1965, the CPP, the only party, sent delegates 
to the Conference of Communist States held in Moscow. 
The CPP was also represented at the Congress of 
the Chinese Communist Party which was held in Peking 
in July that year.
All that was to change when the NLC assumed political 
power. The new government returned the 29 Rus«ian- 
built fishing trawlers which had been lying idle 
since the departure of the Soviet technicians. Some 
2500 Russian and Chinese experts were expelled from 
Ghana by the NLC. Ghanaian students in Eastern
bloc countries were either recalled or sent to edu­
cational institutions in the West. Russian-trained 
medical doctors were re-trained and re-tested by 
the medical authorities in Accra. All projects or 
schemes developed by Soviet or Chinese experts as 
well as several others undertaken by specialists 
from other socialist countries were either suspended, 
abandoned entirely or sold to foreign investors. 
The British Daily Telegraph newspaper of 10th March 
1966, commented thus: "The new regime is pledged
to pursue a policy of non-alignment while being 
friendly with all. But there is no mistaking the 
fair breeze blowing towards the Western camp at 
the moment." The identification with West's anti­
communist stance was unmistakable.
a&T.,-
The character of the NLC's policy toward the East, 
and Russia in particular, was determined in part by 
the circumstances in which the 1 966 coup was carried 
out. Revelations by former CIA Colonel (G.S.14) 
John StockwelL ^  ^  indicate that the NLC coup was 
coordinated by the American CIA operatives. John 
Stockwell further alleged that the CIA staff chief 
in Accra at the time, Howard Banes, was prepared 
to leave Ghana immediately if the coup against Nkru- 
mah had failed. Stockwell said that the CIA group 
led by Banes got permission to purchase some Soviet 
intelligence materials that had been confiscated 
by the Ghanaian troops during the coup. Banes, 
though, was said to have been enraged by his supe­
riors' plans to use the coup as an excuse to raid 
the Chinese Embassy in Accra and ihen blow it up. 
On Banes' insistence, this plan was shelved, accord- 
ding to Stockwell.
For his part Dr. Nkrumah had no doubt that he was 
overthrown by agents of the same CIA. His only re­
gret was that "... it should have been an Afro-
American ambassador (Franklin Williams) who sold
himself out to the imperialists and allowed himself
to be used in this way." ^ 4 * In Ghana, according
to Nkruman, Harlley, Kotoka, Mrifa and Reku were 
just the kind of men they were looking for.
This writer recalls quite clearly, the large numbers
of boxes of what the American Embassy in Accra called 
"food and essential medical aid" that were delivered 
to the military authorities during the Zirst two 
weeks after the NLC coup. Rumours were rife in Accra 
that the boxes, in fact, contained arms and ammuni-
Western involvement with and, in particular, CIA 
support for ths NLC coup plotters has yet to be 
formally proved but the fact of the matter is Pro­
fessor W. Scott Thompson's corn ct view that the 
officers and police officials, who joined forces 
to overthrow Dr. Nkrumah's government, felt threa­
tened by the Soviet Union and China and by their 
adherents in Ghana. ^  ^  These officers were, there­
fore, emotional in expressing their gratitude to 
the Western powers for their prompt offers of 
support. Relations with the socialist eastern states 
were not completely severed, thanks to the economic 
and diplomatic advisors of the regime. These rela­
tions were, however, scaled down and remained cool. 
Suspicions of Soviet intentions in West -'riea re­
mained resulting in a crisis in October 1 968 when 
two Soviet fishing trawlers were seized and their 
crews detained for some four months. Although Ghana's 
professional diplomats counselled against overreac­
tion, the NLC stuck to its ground thus serving notice 
that Soviet probes would not be tolerated.
. _ K±.
THE NLC. THE WEST AND THE COMMONWEALTH
As was to be expected, the NLC sought, energetically, 
to re-build Ghana’s relations with the West. In 
this connection, general lines of policy were set 
by the NLC as a collective unit but the detailed 
day-to-day operations of the Foreign Ministry were 
left to the career diplomats. These, as well as 
other professionals (economists), played a major 
role in the NLC foreign policy. The Foreign Ministry 
became more streamlined and better used than was 
the case under Nkrumah. Ghana's foreign missions 
were reduced in number to conform to the country's 
needs. Ghana's diplomats and Embassies became more 
active and morale was generally high. Both Britain 
and America re-established their influence under 
the NLC regime.
Perhaps the most accurate description of the impact 
which Ghana and other African states made on the 
Commonwealth is provided by Dr. John Holmes, Presi­
dent of the Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs. According to him, "The arrival at the Com­
monwealth table by Ghana, followed by Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone and Tanzania (Tanganyika) made uhe Common­
wealth genuinely multi-rac’ ttorcontinental,
strengthening thereby its rc / more than ever
emphasised, as a bridge between East and West, North 
and South, a fraternity which links regions and 
blocs in a continent and in another dimension, a 
new force within the Commonwealth to help relieve 
old tensions. The whole structure became grander, 
more significant of its purpose and at the same 
time, more flexible." ^  ^
So deep was the country's attachment to the Common­
wealth that when Ghana and other Commonwealth coun­
tries broke diplomatic relations with Britain over 
the Rhodesia issue, the only significant action 
' that followed the action was the closing down of 
the United Kingdom High Commission xn Accra and 
the lowering of the Union Jack. British High Com­
mission officials were still in Accra and Ghana's 
officials were still in London when Dr. Nkrumah 
was overthrown five months afterwards.
Major (later, General) Atrxfa expressed the attach­
ment of the new regime to the Commonwealth thus: 
"One of the reasons for my bitterness against Kwame 
Nkrumah's rule was that he paid only lip-service 
to our membership of the Commonwealth of Nations 
and proceeded to undermine the bonds that bind us 
in this great union of people ... ; so far as this 
Commonwealth is concerned, Ghana should not be diffe­
rent from Canada, Australia or New Zealand. For
we have to learn to solve our problems like a family. 
Nkrumah made a mockery of this organization and, 
under the mask of African Unity and non-alignment, 
proceeded to discredit the Commonwealth and to put 
difficulties in its way." ^1
In order to show its profound attachment to the 
Commonwealth, the NLC regime sent the most distingu­
ished among Ghanaian diplomats as High Commissioners 
to Commonwealth countries. Major Seth Anthony, a 
veteran diplomat and recipient of the Queen's Civil 
title, QBE, went to London. Mr. Justi-- William 
Van Lare, a member of the Supreme v .,d also
and OBB, went to Canada, while General Nathaniel 
Aferi, a product of Sandhurst, went to Australia. 
A paramount chief, Nana Anniesie Bissiaku X was 
sent to 'f.dia, while General Samuel Otu was sent 
to Lagos.
Ghana also showed keen interest in the Conferences 
of Commonwealth Heads of Goven.rent which were held 
during the period of KLC rule, .'he Ghana delegation 
to the Ottawa Conference (19C '; was led by J.W.K. 
Harlley, Vice-Chairman of the ) i:. ■ . ■ NLC, while Gene­
ral Albert Ocran, a ranking ; ■ ;r of the Council,
led the delegation to the '.jn^apore Conference. 
Major Afrifa twice represented the Government at
conferences of Commonwealth Finance Ministers held 
in London and Canberra.
Canada and Britain stepped up technical assistance 
in various forms to the Ghana Armed Forces. Between 
1966 and 1970, over fifty Canadian Air Force engi­
neers spent periods of time training Ghanaian figh­
ters. Canada also donated six jet fighter planes 
and six "chipmunk"training aircraft to Ghana during 
the period. The Ghana Navy took delivery of '•wo 
vessels donated for training and coast-guard duties 
from the United Kingdom government. A group of fif­
teen military officers spent time with troops in 
India. Britain and Ghana also exchanged a battalion 
each for training in warfare iri each other's coun­
try. The Judiciary in Ghana played host to
several distinguished jurists from Britain. Pro­
fessor W.B, Harvey, then at Cambridge University, 
returned for a brief period to the Faculty of Law 
at the University of Ghana.
Trade also received a boost. The world price of 
cocoa rose by 42 % a day after the coup and Britain, 
Canada and Australia .increased their purchases from 
Ghanaj^bhana1 s exports to Commonwealth countries 
rose by 47 % while its imports rose by only 15 %. 
For the first time in many years, Ghana was thus 
able to register a trade surplus of $ 115 million 
in the fiscal year 1 966-67. (21 1
Ghana's educational institutions also benefitted 
greatly from the newly formed Commonwealth Technical 
Assistance programme. In order to improve the tea­
ching of the English language in Ghanaian schools, 
Britaii agreed to send 200 qualified teachers to 
Ghana each year foi five years. That was to anticipa­
te the prodv\cti.'ii oi the required number of language 
teachers from th« University of Cape Coast. Lord 
Todd, a distinguished British Scientist at Cambridge 
University, spent a year at the Ghana Atomic Research 
Centre to organise its programme. Cocoa, the main 
cash-crop, and the major element in Ghana's foreign 
exchange earning capability, received a good deal 
of attention. The Cocoa Research institute, which 
had since 1961 ceased to be involved in any research 
work, was re-activated vxth the secondment of _ Dr. 
J.R. Thompson from Cambridge to the Institute. A 
grant totalling £ 150 000 came from Britain, Canada 
and Australia to further research in animal husbandry 
at the University of Ghana. ^ )
At the end of its rule in 1969, the NLC had entren­
ched Ghana in the mainstream of Commonwealth affairs. 
Ghana continued to join in efforts aimed at putting 
pressure on Mr. Ian Smith's illegal government in 
Rhodesia. However, Ghana, like Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone, retained diplomatic relations with Britain 
and the other white nations of the Commonwealth.
When Zambia suggested that Britain be expelled from 
the C.mmonwealth, Ghana let it be known that such 
an action was unreasonable and would not therefore 
be supported. Throughout the period, the NLC consi­
dered the Commonwealth as a great institution from 
which Ghana could not separate itself.
THE NLC AND THE UNITED NATIONS (UN)
The policy of the NLC towards the UNO was outlined 
in part, at a news conference held by the Council 
in Burma Hall in Accra on March 2, 1966. General
Joseph Ankrah, Chairman of the NLC, announced that 
the new government would remain in the UN and would 
scrupulously adhere to the principles of the Char­
ter, Ghana, henceforth, Ankrah said, would respect 
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of all nations. Ghana would also subscribe to the 
United Nations principle of settling all inten.u- 
tional disputes through negotiations and by other 
peaceful means. On finance, the General promised 
that Ghana would pay up its contribution to every 
agency of the organisation to which it belonged. 
The General concluded by saying that although the 
new government believed that a world body with power 
to enforce its own decisions was desirable, Ghana 
would not press for an immediate establishment 
of such a body but would join all other nations
in any meaningful effort towards the attainment 
of that end.
The last point marks a significant departure from 
the policy of Dr. Nkrumah1s government towards the 
UN. Dr. Nkrumah sought support at various times 
to invest the UN with powers to enforce its deci­
sions even against the claims of sovereign member 
states. During the Congo crisis. Dr. Nkrumah called 
on the world body to establish a political mandate 
over the young Republic in ordar to restore order 
to the Congo. * * The implications for member states
and their national sovereignties would have been 
serious in view of the organisation's Charter. Again, 
when Dr. Nkrumah as President of Ghana, addressed 
the General Assembly in 1962, he called on the world 
body to establish a standing armed force which, at 
the command of the Secretary-General and the Security 
Council, could move into any conflict area of the 
world to avert any confrontations. President Nkrumah 
also advocated the abolition of the veto powers 
of the five permanent members of the Security Coun­
cil . In his view, the removal of the veto would 
enable all issues to get a fair hearing and all 
decisions to be taken by all parties concerned openly 
and democratically.
The NLC mode it clear that such demands were unrea­
listic. Ghana’s team in New York included veteran 
bureaucrats in Diplomatic Service. Among them were 
Mr. E.L.A. Mintah and L.C.Y. Senoo, both of whom 
joined the service in 1958. Contrary to its experien­
ce at the OAU meeting at Addis Ababa, the Ghanaian 
delegation had no difficulty in presenting its cre­
dentials. The mission voted consistently with the 
African and the Afro-Asian group.
General Emmanuel Kwasi Kotoka, the real leader of 
the coup that toppled the Nkrumah government, led 
the first Ghana delegation to the organisation in 
August 1966. His speech was an affirmation of General 
Ankrah's pronouncements at heme. Ghana would hence­
forth remain positively non-aligned and would vote 
on issues that came before the General Assembly 
solely on the basis of the facts as seen by its 
delegation and not on the basis of ideolov - 1 affi­
nity with any power bloc. That was also a departure 
from the voting pattern of the previous delegations 
when Dr. Nkrumah1s government showed a lot of sympa­
thy for the Eastern bloc of states. Ghana, between 
1966 and 1969, sought no leading place at the United 
Nations and its delegations remained mild in their 
pronouncements on major issues.
CONCLUSION
What; then, were the major achievements of the NLC 
regime? An answer may be found at two levels. First, 
the regime's performance may be assessed in terms 
of some ger.eralizable criteria according to which 
its effectiveness in attaining some intrinsically 
valuable goals is judged. Second, regime-specific 
criteria according to which the regime's performance 
will be evaluated in accordance with the goals and 
objectives set out by the regime itself.
The two sets of criteria be mutually exclu­
sive. Generalizable criteria ,s that are intrin­
sically good) might coincide with regime-specific 
criteria (goals, a regime sets itself}. The dichotomy 
is necessary for discussion only.
As a small developing country, what Ghana needs
above all else is steady economic development that 
would result in increased prosperity for the Ghanaian 
people as a whole. Government and opposition groups, 
whether civilian or military, all accept this as 
being an intrinsically desirable national objective. 
In this regard, Ghana's economic relations with 
foreign countries should be such that Ghana works
with but not for its neighbours as well as the Wes­
tern and Eastern groups of economies.
A second national goal is active participation in 
Pan-African concerns, the belief being that African 
decolonisation history and national character demand 
it.
It may now be asked whether the NLC regime, by its 
foreign policy in the r ’riod 1966-1969, was effective 
in pursuing those national and other goals it set 
itself.
The point has been made that many of the policies 
and much of the quality and character of military 
rule in Ghana, is produced by, and therefore can
be understood in terms of the extra-national reference 
group identifications of the officers in power.
Such foreign reference group identifications tend 
to produce non-nationalistic policies. During 
their rule the officers of the NLC pursued economic 
and other policies that adhered in a number of
significant ways to this proposition. Indeed, 
the absence of economic nationalism displayed 
by the policies of the NLC was a major source
of tension between the military and the civilian
intelligentsia. The general policy of the
NLC in regard to the economic difficulties it
had inherited from Vie Nkrwmah government was
to rely extensively on tho managerial and financial
capacities of European and North American govern­
ments and businesses. Symbolic of the extent of 
this reliance is the fact that even the job of 
cleaning the streets of Accra was given to a foreign 
firm. The Ghanaian Times, under the headline "UK 
Firm to Clean Accra", noted that "a British company,
Shelvoke and Drewry of Letchworth, South East
England, has undertaken to clean up the present 
refuse problem facing Accra and that the firm 
was confident to clean all the garbage in a number 
of weeks." 2^6 ^
The particular aspect of the general reliance
on foreign economic and managerial assistance
that was most resented within Ghana was the NLC's 
handling of the State enterprises situation. The 
leaders of the coup had inherited fvom the Nkrumah 
government fifty-four state-owned enterprises, 
most of which were running at a loss. There were 
three ways in which the NLC attempted to deal
with this inheritance: by engaging private business
organizations to purchase the state enterprise; 
by entering into joint state-privato ownership 
agreements; or by leasing the enterprise to a
private business concern for a period of years. 
Naturally, in the case of the more substantial 
state enterprises, the business firms in question 
were foreign wince only they had the requisite
capital. It should also be noted that this policy 
meant first, the "de-nationalization'1 of only 
the more profitable or potentially profitable 
enterprises, since these wore the ones to which 
private entrepreneurs could be attracted; and 
second, the granting of import concessions to 
private firms so as to make up for the lack of
financial attractiveness in the enterprises themselves.
One of the agreements signed under this policy,
that with Abbott Laboratories of the United States
to participate in the State Pharmaceutical corpora­
tion, led to widespread criticism that the NLC
had failed to protect and foster Ghana's national 
interests and was part of the general pattern
of events that led to disenchantment with military
rule on the part of sectors of the population 
that had at first actively welcomed the military
intervention against Dr. Nkrumah1s government.
Under the "Abbott Agreement" the State Pharmaceutical 
Corporation was abolished and a new corporation, 
jointly owned by the Ghana government and the
American Corrpany, was formed in its place. The 
share capital of the now company was to be NC
1 000 000 (equivalent to one million dollars),
with Abbott (Illinois) holding 45 percent of the 
shares through a contribution of $ 450 000 and
the Ghana government holding 55 percent of the 
shares through the contribution of the existing 
phaj maceutical facility.
This portion of the agreement was the subject
of strong criticism, since Ghanaian authorities 
had put the value of the pharmaceutical facility 
at not less than $ 5 000 000. * 27) Thus ^ Ghana
could be said to be contributing almost seven 
times the amount that Abbott was contributing
and was receiving only 10 percent more of the
shares. Additional cause for complaint was the
fact that the agreement gave Abbott-Ghana a ninety-
nine-year It’.se i-i the property upon which the 
pharmaceutical plant was located at an annual
rent of NC 1 (S 1). Further, the agreement stated 
that "there shall be no increase in the annual
rental at any time" and that the loase is "subject
to renewal at the option of Abbott for an additional 
ninety-nine years". * Despite the fact that
the Ghana government owned 55 percent of the corpo­
ration, the Abbott-Ghana agreement stated that
the American partner was "assured of complete 
control of the management", (^9) ant3 specified
that it would have the power to appoint the company's 
Managing Director, the Chairman and a majority
of the Board of Directors, and have complete respon­
sibility and control in the areas of accounting,
p-. • 'mnel and marketing, in the later area, the 
agre ."it granted the American company a virtual 
monopoly to market in Ghana, products it manufactured 
in the United States.
With the foregoing as background, it is not difficult 
to understand why Ghana's generally pro-government 
and moderate journal, the Legon Observer, stated 
that " ... it would appear incontestable that
the agreement turns the State Pharmaceutical Corpora­
tion into a subsidiary of Abbott. This is considered 
unnecessary, humiliating and dangerous." (31)
The announcement of the agreement was met by a 
torrent of economic nationalism from the mass 
media. Typical is this passage from an editorial 
in the Legon Observer: "In post-coup Ghana we
are not only relying heavily on foreign investments, 
but seem to be doing so on the most flesh-creeping 
economic terms ... The terms of the (Abbott) contract 
are so inimical to the long term inerests of Ghana 
that, o.i reading it, one begins to wonder whether 
the legal and economic advisers of the NLC have 
the economic interests of the country at heart.
The Military rulers met such nationalistic criticism 
by dismissing the editors of the two government- 
owned newspapers, intimidating the editor of the 
Legon Observer and declaring that they would sign 
the agreement "ten times over". ) Abbott, for
its part, sensing the existence of a hostile environ­
ment , backed out of the agreement.
The absence of a nationalistic orientation in 
the economic sphere can also be observed in the 
NLC's handling of Ghana's debts. At the time of 
the coup Ghana had one of the worst foreign-debt 
servicing structures of any developing country, with 
payment of over 51 % of its external debt coming 
due within five years. The mason for this
situation was the reliance of the Nkrumah government 
on what are termed supplier credits to finance econo­
mic development. As his alternative sources of in­
vestment capital dried up, Nkrumah turned increasing­
ly to the supplier-credit method of obtaining capi­
tal. Under this system, private companies lend capi­
tal directly to the recipient government in order 
to finance a project that the company itself will 
carry ont. Often the loan is guaranteed by the go­
vernment of the donor company. Such an arrangement 
lends itself naturally to "hard-sell11 efforts by 
private businesses or capital-exporting countries 
attempting to increase their own profits or export 
earnings regardless of the economic implications 
for the borrower. Under the supplier-credit
arrangement, it is to the advantage of businesses 
to "sell" unneeded and even non-viable projects 
to the government of a developing country, since
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the businesses will benefit not only from receiving 
the contract to execute the project but also from 
the inter' on the risk-free loan it has given 
to finance 't. Thus Ghana found itself saddled with 
a huge debt, a good proportion of which was made 
up of supplier-credit high-interest/short-term loans 
for numerous economic ventures of dubious viabili- 
ty.
When the NLC assumed power it was faced with essen­
tially two choices in regard to the country's foreign 
indebtedness. It could default on a good number 
of the debts, especially those involving supplier 
credits or it could ask the lending businesses and 
their national governments to negotiate a reschedu­
ling of the debts to allow Ghana to improve its 
foreign-reserve position before having to assume 
the major burden of the debt.
The case for defaulting was a strong one and was 
favoured by many Ghanaian civilians as well as by 
some foreign economists advising the NLC at the 
time. It was argued that many of the supplier-credit 
loans had been arranged under corrupt and deceitful 
conditions involving the bribing of Ghana government 
officials by foreign businesses and the submission 
of misleading feasibility studies. ^  * In addition, 
the political situation at the time of the coup
It-*-
appeared to preclude significant adverse reaction 
on the part of the Western governments who had gua­
ranteed the loa,s, because they, and particularly 
the Americans, were hardly likely to turn on the 
avowedly pro-Western NLC officers who had just over­
thrown Kwame Nkrumah's government.
The new military rulers, however, did not opt for 
such a nationalistic alternative, but instead deci­
ded to attempt to reschedule the debts. The reasoning 
behind the decision is not clear although Foreign 
Ministry sources say that the major reason was the 
notion that "a gentleman pays his debts". Whether
a gentleman (supplier-credit donor) should cheat 
appears to be a different matter! The long-term
consequences of the NLC's decision have been serious 
on Ghana's economic development.
As for Pan-Africanism, the NLC was lukewarm in its 
attitude. The regime's acceptance in Africa was 
not without difficulty. Indeed, the little African 
support it enjoyed came only after it hnd revealed 
the details of Nkrumah's so-called subversion in 
Africa. The main thrust of NLC policy in Africa
was towards the development o£ Regional Groups to
further economic development. But then, by deporting 
thousands of African nationals from Ghana, the regime 
did little to further that objective and indeed 
did much to provoke retaliation.
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Ghana under the NLC foreign policy may have become 
a more acceptable friend of the West but the coun­
try's position in the East and in Africa was dimi­
nished.
As noted sarlier, Ghana's trade with the West increa­
sed and the regime had some measure of success with 
its retrenchment and rationalisation policy at home. 
The effect of its foreign policy was, however, not 
outstanding.
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C H A P T E R  F I V E  
GHANA BETWEEN THE COUPS. 1969 - 1972
The National Liberation Council (NLC), formed by 
the officers responsible for the February 24, 1 966, 
coup d'etat in Ghana, handed over the reigns of 
power to the Progress Party government led by Pro­
fessor Kofi Busia in October 1969. That this dis­
engagement from politics was the most complete ever 
undertaken by a ruling military force is evidenced 
by the retirement of all the military members of 
the NLC once power was firmly in the hands of the 
Busia government. The Progress Party leadership 
was "almost wholly merchant-professional middle 
class in composition". *1 * In ethnic terms, the
supporters of the Progress Party (PP) were primarily 
Akan - particularly those in Brong/Ahafo, Ashanti 
and Central Regions. The opponents of the PP were 
mainly Ewe and non-Akans living in areas directly 
adjacent to the Akans.
The Busia government took office with the support 
of the civil servants, the students, the cocoa far­
mers and the top military leaders. The only groups 
which may have viewed the accession to power of 
the new government with trepidation were the trade 
unionists and the urban unemployed, since it was
the avowed aim of the PP to develop the rural areas 
which the party claimed (with some justification) 
had been ignored by the CPP under the leadership 
of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. At the time of the 1969 elec­
tion, 25 percent of the wage-labour foi-e was unem­
ployed.
Although Ghana's substantial external debt had not 
been paid in the intervening years, the time when 
Ghana would have to begin to make payments on the 
debt was postponed as a result of the two re-schedu­
ling conferences which had been held in 1 966 and 
again in 1968 and 1 970. An addition to the Busia 
government's financial difficulties was the fact 
that Ghana had no foreign exchange reserves in 1969. 
In December of that year, the net foreign exchange 
holding of the Central Bank was approximately NC 11 
..lillion (in 1 969, E 1 = NC 2,4). Ghana's major earner 
of foreign exchange was cocoaj the price of that 
commodity had risen dramatically between 1 966 and 
1969. ^  Consequently the outlook was more favourab­
le for Ghana to bring its imports and exports into 
balance and to acquire enough hard currency to make 
the payments on the debt which would start falling 
due in 1970. However, none of the economic predic­
tions came to pass, leading to the erosion of support 
far the government because it was forced to retrench 
sharply to stem the tide of bankruptcy.
THE GROWTH OF ECONOMIC DECAY IN GHANA
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah1 s government left Ghana a mixed 
record of economic accomplishment and failure. In 
terms of domestic savings, Ghana had moved in nine 
years from the position of holding substantial exter­
nal assets to a negative position. In 1957, external 
assets totalled approximately $ 450 million; by
1966, liabilities amounted to approximately $ 550 
million. * *
Ghana, under Nkrumah1s government, was dependent 
on external financing. "Gross domestic savings in 
1957-59 exceeded gross public investment; by 1963- 
65 very little of gross investment was being covered 
by domestic resources. In the public sector, less 
than 15 % of budgeted investment expenditure in
1963-65 was financed out of government savings.
Export growth had low priority in the 1957-66 period. 
Diversification of agricultural exports was non­
existent. Nevertheless, lacking external reserves 
or expanding exports, Ghana continued to spend on 
development and domestic investment. Foreign borro­
wing, aid, or investment were the means chosen to 
continue development programmes. After 1962 suppliers' 
credits became the major form of borrowing.
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The quality of economic decision-making in the 
1961-66 period was rather low by all accounts, "The 
economy suffered periodic scarcities of raw material 
inputs and spare parts, particularly in 1965. Accor­
ding to some observers in Ghana at the time, about 
70 % of the total manufacturing capacity of the
country was utilized in 1965 because of lack of 
inputs and spares." ^  The growth of the public 
sector placed severe strains on the country's admini­
strators who had not been trained to evaluate, select 
and manage development projects. Added to all ttiese 
difficulties was the declining price of cocoa on 
the world market. Cocoa provided approximately 60 % 
of Ghana's export earnings: although cocoa exports 
doubled between 1 957 and 1 965, the average earning 
at the beginning and at the end of the period was 
the same.
The NLC retrenched Ghana's economy on several fronts. 
Rampant borrowing ceased, public investment declined, 
the national currency, the cedic, was de-valued, 
and debts were re-scheduled. The NLC did not reduce 
consumption or budgetary increases (most of which 
went to salaries). In the opinion of one observer, 
the NLC period represented "at best a breathing 
space with a partial consolidation but little posi­
tive action and less long-term politico-economic 
rethinking." ^  The Busia government, for the most
part, continued the economic policies of the NLC. 
ECONOMIC DECAY UNDER BUSIA
The PP government under Dr. Busia continued to seek 
a resolution to the debt problem. The UK sponsored 
meetings of Ghana's major creditors in 1966, 1968 
and again in 1970. At each of these meetings (which 
were also attended by representatives from the 
IMF and the World Bank) the creditors were able 
to agree merely on a delay of payments for a year 
or two. In exchange for these delays a moratorium 
interest charge was added to the principal amount. 
The moratorium interest added about £ 35 million
to the original debt. As a result of the re-schedu­
ling, Ghana had been paying only about 10 percent 
of the amounts falling due on the medium term debts. 
The 1970 Conference decided that between 1970 and 
1972, Ghana would be granted relief on 50 % of the 
amount due, both on principal and interest. Even 
with the delays, Ghana f till made $ 23,5 million 
debt payments in the year 1970-71 and was scheduled 
to pay $ 36,3 million in 1971-72. The latter figure 
did not represent any increased ability to pay on 
the part of Ghana. It was simply the result of the 
formula used by the re-financing conferences. The 
debt repayments were substantial when seen against 
the background of Ghana's total budget for 1971-72
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which budget totalled NC 4 59 million. ^ *
The PP government, realizing the inability of the 
country to meet the payments, pressed for a compo­
site re-financing loan which would have provided 
for a fifty-year repayment period, including a ten- 
year grace period with only a 2 % moratorium inte­
rest charge. But the creditors would not accept 
the proposal.
In November 1971 the IMF' again sent a team to Ghana, 
which recommended another delay in the repayment 
of the debt, in exchange for a display of action 
by the Ghanaian government, proving that it intended 
to deal realistically with its deficit in foreign 
trade through import restrictions, de-valuation 
and increased exportation.
It may be observed that the CPP government debts 
were not the basis for the financial crisis in the 
Iasi- months of the PP government under Dr. Busia. 
That crisis was, instead, due to the size of Ghana's 
internal debt and its short-term debt which had 
increased under PP government. In 1970-71, Ghana's 
internal indebtedness stood at NC G26,2 million, 
a figure much greater than the country's total ex­
ternal debt. This figure included National Deve­
lopment Bonds, Treasury Bills, Cocoa Marketing Board
loans and Bank of Ghana loans. Internal debts do 
not have to be paid in hard currency and at first 
glance appear to be extraneous to Ghana's economic 
problems. But the printing of new money to pay domes­
tic debts led to increased inflation. In 1969, the 
previous year, the servicing on Ghana's internal 
debt amounted to NC 40 million.
The really pressing debts, however, were short-term 
ones. Ghana owed NC 200 million in commercial cre­
dits (mostly 180 day credits) and NC 60 million 
in arrears on dividends and profits from foreign 
investments. ^  Many of Ghana's commercial suppliers 
were insured under the UK Export Credit Guarantees 
Department. Under such a plan, creditors would be 
paid by the Department if the debtor failed to repay 
after 120 days. Ghana had been keeping precisely 
120 days behind, not testing the principles. But 
to have continued to do that would have involved 
borrowing more money. Ghana's foreign.exchange posi­
tion did not improve under the PP government. Whereas 
at the end of 1970, Ghana's net foreign exchange 
holdings stood at NC 26 million, by December 1971 
that figure had fallen to NC 8,5 million. The
deficit represented money owed to foreign banks. 
The only substantial new foreign investment in Ghana 
since Nkrumah’s overthrow had been the building 
of a brewery.
t-*
Although Ghana was getting small amounts of foreign 
aid, a significant share of that aid went to debt 
servicing. After the 1972 coup, Dr. Busia admitted 
that Ghana was "utterly bankrupt" and unable to 
buy imports from suppliers who obviously cannot 
be paid from Ghana's own resources." In an
attempt to solve the problem of the short-term debt. 
Dr. Busia, Hr. J.H. Mensah, the Minister of Finance, 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, William Ofori- 
Atta, visited the US, the UK and Mexico. In addition, 
an IMF team came to Accra. Details of the arrange­
ments worked out at the time, sere not revealed, 
but they seem to have included a plan for Ghana 
to go on a cash basis in its foreign dealings. The 
plan involved borrowing between $ 170 and $ 270
million (two-thirds of it in the UK and the rest 
in the US). Such a loan would have enabled Ghana 
to transfer most of the short-term debt to medium- 
term debt at much more favourable interest rates. 
In return, Ghana was to de-value the cedi and thus 
reduce the level of imports. The import deficit 
for 1970 was only NC 15 million, but the figure 
was artificially low and could not have been conti­
nued without greatly increasing the rate of smugg­
ling across the country's borders. A year later, 
the deficit had risen to NC 70 million.
THE PP GOVERNMENT AND COCOA
The PP government's inability to pay Ghana's debts 
was compounded by problems experienced with the 
country's major export and foreign exchange earner, 
cocoa. The CPP government under Dr. Nkrumah encoura­
ged increased cocoa production to increase foreign 
exchange earning. In 1964-65 Ghana experienced a
record cocoa crop of 567 000 tons which- gave the
country almost 40 % of the world cocoa market. Since 
that date, Ghana's cocoa output has fluctuated be­
tween 325 000 and 415 000 tons. The over-supply 
of cocoa that resulted from the large 1964-65 crop 
pushed cocoa prices down from $ 840 per ton in 1958
to an all-time low of $ 204 in July 1965, ^  ^  Gha­
na's cocoa production for 1968-71 is presented in 
the following table.
At the same time that the PP government was unable 
to increase cocoa production, the world price of
cocoa had been falling, in 1 970, the average price 
of cocoa was $ 790 a ton; in 1971 it was $ 470 a 
ton and in 1 972 market price fell as low as $ 360, 
as a result of the large crops in all of the major 
producing areas. It was the Ghanaian budget, rather 
than the Ghanaian cocoa farmers who suffered from 
the declining cocoa prices. The prices paid to the 
cocoa farmers were stable during the Busia regime. 
In 1969, Ghanaian cocoa farmers received NC 8 per 
load for their cocoa (up from NC 7 the previous 
year). Cocoa prices remained constant for the next 
two years, rising in 1972 to NC 10. ^  ^  The drop 
in cocoa prices was absorbed by the cocoa Marketing
Before the 1971 harvesting season, a new cocoa pur­
chasing scheme was introduced which led to delays 
in payments to the cocoa farmers. One month after 
the cocoa buying season opened, the Cabinet appro­
ved a sum of NC 10 million to pay for purchases 
in the \shanti region which supplied most of the 
cocoa and the PP's supporters.
Declining cocoa prices exacerbated both Ghana’s 
balance-of-payment difficulties and increased budget 
deficit. The decision to do-value the cedi by 44 
percent in December 1971 (a decision which immediate­
ly provoked the 1 972 coup) was supposed to be an
answer to these difficulties.
iCi
1. Kraus, Jon, "Arms and Politics in Ghana" in
Welch, op. cit., p. 218.
2. Cocoa prices in London had fluctuated between
a low of £ 98 per ton in September 1 965 and
a high of E 376 per ton in March 1969. See Eco­
nomist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic
Review for Ghana. No. 2, 1 969 and No. 3, 1970.
3. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah hss explained that the external 
debt results^ from the rapid industrialisation 
programme of his government. See Dark days in
Ghana, op. cit.
4. Berg, Elliot, in Aristide Zolberg and Philip
Foster, (eds.), Ghana and the Ivory Cost: Per­
spectives on Modernization, the University of
Chicago Press, Chicago 1971, p. 193.
5. Berg, Elliot, op. cit., p. 204.
7. See United Nations, Economic Commission on Afri­
ca, Data No. 41, p. 21.
9. Much of the latter figure involved repatriation 
of assets by British firms. See Nkrumah, Kwame, 
Dark Pays in Ghana, op. cit.
10. International Monetary Fund, International Fin­
ancial Statistics. July 25, 1972, No. 7, p. 153.
11. See Ghanaian Times, January 22, 1 972.
12. These figures are derived from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review 
for Ghana, op. cit.
13. Ibid.
14. See West Africa. January 21, 1972, p. 58.
C H A P T E R  S I X
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NATIONAL REDEMPTION COUNCIL/ 
SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL (NRC/SMC). 1972 - 1978
The National Liberation Council government voluntari­
ly surrendered political power to an elected civi­
lian government on October 1 , 1 969. Speaking at
a reception given in his honour by the Ghana Armed 
Forces during the celebrations to mark the inaugura­
tion of the Second Republic, General H.T. Alexander, 
the last of the succession of British Officers to 
command the Ghana Armed Forces, welcomed the inaugu­
ration as "one more manifestation of Sandhurst dis­
cipline in loyalty to constituted authority." *1 *
Such "loyalty to constituted authority" by the armed 
forces was, however, short-lived. The rapid expansion 
of the army and officer corps after 1961 may well 
have created a new officer generation, one which 
had experienced much less British influence in trai­
ning and so tended to be overtly more nationalistic 
and self-reliant in its policies.
On 13 February 1972, only twenty six months after 
the inauguration of the Second Republic, a detach­
ment of the Ghana Army stationed in Accra, took 
advantage of the visit to Britain by the Prime Minis­
ter, Dr. Kofi Busia, to overthrow the government, 
suspend the constitution and invest itself with 
sole authority to administer the country.
Supreme political and legal authority thence rested 
with the NRC. It \as initially composed of nine 
military officers and one policeman. Lieutenant 
Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, Commander of the 
First Infantry Brigade, bccame its Chairman and 
Head of State. The heads of the three wings of the 
Ghana armed fovees, the Air Force, the Navy and 
Army were members. Two officers at the Joint Forces 
Headquarters were also included. Three other offi­
cers, all of the rank of Ma_or who supported Lieu­
tenant Colonel Acheampong in the take-over exercise, 
were included in the Council. It is significant
to note that the new government accused the Busia 
government before it, of showing no interest in 
Pan-African affaire.
THE CAUSES OF THE COUP D ’ETAT
The salient factor leading to tho coup d'etat appears 
to have been the rsfusal of the government, in the 
face of deepening economic crisis, to accede to 
the financial demands of the military.
THE MILITARY AND THE Jig.? BUDGET
The July 1971 Budget was meant to be an austerity 
budge t , a signal to both the extravagant Ghanaian 
elite and international financiers, that the go­
vernment was going to make an effort to deal rea­
listically with Ghana's economic problems. The budget 
provided for a ban on all imports of cars, televi­
sion sets, cigarettes, soda, aluminium sheeting, 
fruit, poultry and crude rubber. There was also 
an increase in petrol duty. Vehicle maintenance 
allowances for civil servants and army officers 
were to be abolished from the first of August and 
the National Development Levy reduced further, pub­
lic officials' take-homa pay.
In the July Budget, the PP government further increa­
sed military resentment by attempting to cut mili­
tary costs and to increase the productivity of the 
forces. Tne military suffered corporately under 
the new budget because the expenditures of the Minis­
try of Defence were reduced from NC 45 million in 
the 1 970 budget (which was a reductic from the 
1969 figure of NC 49,1 million), to NC 40,4 million. 
(NC 31,4 million for recurrent expenditure and NC 9 
million for capital expenditure). When the Finance 
Minister, J.H. Menaah, introduced the new budget, 
he reminded the Assembly that the government had
been faced "with the problem of what to do about 
a level of Defence expenditure which was clearly 
onerous for a small country such as ours." ^
J.H. M. . ah's statement was motivated as much by
expediency as by budgetary realities. Reductions
in defence expenditure would satisfy the demands 
of Ghana’-. jor international creditors to effect 
selective cuts in government expenditures consistent 
with the programme of economic development. The 
most severe cuts were experienced by the Air Force 
and the Navy, both bodies clearly superfluous to 
Ghana's limited defence requirements.
The Navy had not expanded for several years ? its
ships were in need of refitting but there was no 
money available for that pu^pc-e. The ships were 
reported to be in such poor shape that they could
not be sailed for refitting. The "Achimota", the 
old Flag Ship of the Naval Chief of Staff, was de­
commissioned and was being offered for scrap. In 
addition, part of the Sekondi Naval Base was turned 
into a fishing harbour. The Air Force wis not ex­
panding either, no new planes had been bought for 
many years and very little flying time was logged 
on the planes already acquired because of the very 
high cost of fuel.
The army also had its share of cuts: the parachute 
battalion at Tamale was disbanded. It was later 
reformed as the Seventh Battalion at Takoradi to 
keep some airborne capability but, still too costly, 
the entire battalion was disbanded and the personnel 
absorbed into other units. There were also uncon­
firmed reports that the Seventh Battalion was suspec­
ted of plotting against the Busia government.
Under the new budget the military, like all other 
government importers, was expected to pay taxes 
or. .viLvros ordered from overseas, thus making repair 
and x-ep"1 acement a gre^ i. deal more expensive than 
previov ly.
Thv net result of cutting back the budget while 
maintaining the size of the establishment was that 
thtere was very little money for activities such 
as exercisi.sx, training and ammunition. Restriction 
on imports led to real supply and parts problems? 
as a result, many vehicles were simply not locally 
repairable. One knowledgeable observer estimated 
in the Fall 1971 that" half of the total number 
of military vsh.tclos were not road-worthy."
Another corpora'.9 problem faced by the Ghana military 
was the question of the role of forces. After almost 
fifteen years of independence, the ro2e of the mili-
tary was still unclear. The army itself saw its 
main (and possibly sole > role as one of guarding 
the nation against its foreign enemies. To the Busia 
government tViir role appeared either insufficient 
or non-existent. They found it difficult to justify 
enormous expenditure on an institution that contri­
buted so litile to the economic and social well­
being of the -dtion. Consequently, they sought new 
ways to utilize the forces. Since April 1970, the 
military had been supporting the police in an anti- 
smuggling campaign on the borders. In addition, 
in September 1970 joint police-military operations 
against crime began. The army medical corps was 
active in the anti-cholera drive and the air force 
provided flood relief aid in the north. But despite 
these activities, Ghanaians were still left with 
the feeling that the military could be more useful. 
The National Union of Ghana Students suggested, 
in the Summer of 1 970, t-’-’t the technical branch
of the Ghana army should be used in agricultural
and constructional work. The Minister of Defence, 
J. Kwesi Lamptey, said at that time that the Ghana 
army would only be used for defence purposes. But 
a year later, after the Ministry f Defence had
chanvjed hands, a Northcner, Alhaji B.K. Adama became
Defence Minister, and Ghana's financial conditions 
had worsened, the attitude toward reconstruction 
work changed. In the July budget, Mensah was able
to announce that ” ... it is possible to combine 
training with substantial contributions to natio­
nal development. Therefore during this financial 
year, it has been arranged that whenever units ... 
go out on training exercises they will seek to leave 
behind them some positive development project 
by way of roads or sanitary buildings." ^
But the corporate indignities of the new budget 
did not hurt the officers as much as the personal 
losses they experienced due to deprivation of income 
and perquisites. The Development Levy and the vehicle 
maintenance allowance have already been mentioned, 
but it is worth noting the impact of the vehicle 
maintenance allowance. A typical major who was taking 
home NC 215 a month under the old budget would only 
receive NC 125 under th- new budget. ^  The govern­
ment had also eliminated or curtail)1 the free water 
and electricity that had been supplied to the offi­
cers. In addition, the telephone allowance was cut 
and the percentage of their salaries withheld by 
the government for rent payments was increased from 
7,5 to 15 percent, previous to the introduction 
of the budget in July.
In addition to the cuts in allowances, an acute 
cut in pay scales was also rumoured. The final
blow to the financial wcll-1 'ing of the Ghanaian
elite came at the end of December when the Busia
government dramatically accounced that the cedi
would be devalued by 44 percent. In terms of real 
income for those living in western style in Ghana,
44 percent devaluation may have represented a loss
of as much as 25 percent of an individual's purcha­
sing power. The effect of the devaluation was imme­
diate, due to the danger of profiteering and hoarding.
The military's antagonism to a policy of retrench­
ment at their expense was so evident that after 
the coup Busia dismissed the event as "just (an) 
officers' amenities coup arising from their grievan­
ces at my efforts to save money." ^
The Busia government fully realized that the corporate 
and financial grievances of the officer corps were 
making it highly probable that the military would 
move against the government. In the words of Gamal 
Nasser, "a shabby army (is) a potentially disloyal 
army." ^  ^  To forestall the eventuality of a coup, 
numerous changes were made in top military appoint­
ments.
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE HIGH COMMAND
After the Busia government had taken over in 1 969, 
the military's internal command and control copabi-
lity had been damaged, according to Jon Kraus, "and 
ambitions and further plotting nurtured, by the 
break in the chain of command and the arrest of 
senior officers at the time of the 1 966 coup and 
during later attempts, and by the gradual elimina­
tion of many senior officers." The virtual
decimation of the high command came in three stages. 
First was the retirement of the officers associated 
with the Nkrumah regime (this group included General 
Aferi, Colonels Hassan Ashitey, Zanlerigu, Kuti 
and Assassie, and Majors S. Acquah, Achaab and Asan- 
te). Retired at a later date, were officers whose 
position at the time of the 1 967 abortive counter­
coup had been unclear: these included General Bruce, 
Admiral Hansen and several younger officers. The 
next group of retirements came wb-n the National 
Liberation Council handed over power to the Busia 
government, and all the military members of the 
NLC retired - Generals Afrifa, Ankrah and Ocran. 
Two top officers were killed in the two coups; Gene­
ral Barwah in the February coup and General Kotoka 
in that of April. The third group of officers lost 
to the army were those seconded to run other public 
bodies; this list included Colonel Ewa who became 
the director in charge of administration for the 
Ghana Legion; Major A.J. Cobbina, the chief transport 
officer of Omnibus Services Authority; Major-General 
D.C.K. Amcnu, director of the National Service Corps;
Colonel C.K. Yarbol, deputy-general manager for 
administration of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation; 
Colonel Sanni-Thomas to the State Protocol Section 
of the President's Office. Colonel Quaye became 
head of the Navy, and four officers not in special 
favour with the government became Military Attaches 
abroad (Bonsu, London; Okai, Washington? Kattah, 
New Delhi; and Coker-Appiah, Addis Ababa). The result 
of all these shifts was that one-half of those who 
held ranks of lieutenant-colonel, or above, at the 
time of the 1 966 coup were not available in 1 970. 
The command structure of the military was weak and 
inexperienced.
The retirement of the top officers meant rapid pro­
motions for those officers who were in the middle 
ranks and in the good graces of the NLC or the Busia 
government. The colonels and brigadiers were typi­
cally young and inexperienced and as a result there 
were serious promotion blockages facing the junior 
officers, particularly because the military estab­
lishment had not been expanding. ( By 1 970 the Ghana 
Military Academy which had intakes as large as 120 
inen in the early 1960s had cut back intakes to only 
25 men a year).
Scholars have "nng noted the fact that officers 
in developing countries have the administrative
skills needed to promote modernization. ^ 2 * The 
assignment of a sizable portion of the officer corps 
to bureaucratic functions may have a disintegrative 
effect on the military institution that has not 
been previously examined.
Further changes in the top command came in the Fall 
of 1971. Lieutenant-General Mike Otu had been appoin­
ted Chief of Defenc-' "-ff in March 1 968; he still 
held that positxo. • Summer of 1971, at which
time he strenuously vted to the cuts in the
military budget. There were reports that he objec­
ted to the diminished budget to the extent that 
he was considering resigning in protest. This never 
came to pass; instead, Otu quietly retired and was 
rewarded wi^h a new position by the Busia govern­
ment. Major-General D.K, Addo, the former Army Com­
mander, was appointed acting Chief of Defence Staff; 
Brigadier J.R.K. Acquah, the former Director of 
Military Intelligence, became acting Army Commander; 
and Lieutenant-Colonel 2.M. Usei-Owusu, acting Com­
mander of the Second Infantry Brigade- In mid-Novem­
ber another reorganization began; Brigadier Acquah 
was forced to resign after informing the government 
that he planned to retire early in 1 972, to enter 
the building industry "while he was still young." 
Due to the earlier retirement data he lost many 
of his retirement benefits. 11c was replaced by Bri­
gadier Twun-Barima, who had previously been head 
of the First Infantry Brigade in Accra. His position 
at First Infantry Brigade Headquarters was filled 
by Lieutenant-Colonel Acheampong. This appointment 
proved to be a fatal mistake lor the Busia govem-
THE PROCESS OF INTERVENTION
At about 2 a.m. on January 13 troops of the First 
Brigade began to move on key installations in the 
capital: these included the radio station, the air­
port, external communications and the castle. The 
logistics of the coup were relatively simple; all 
these installations were guarded by the Fifth Infan­
try Battalion which had been Acheampong's battalion 
command in 1 970. What has come to light from sub­
sequent interviews is that Acheampong had been thin­
king of engineering a coup in 1970? but only to 
the extent that he hod begun to plan what he would 
do if he were ever in con'rol of the First Infantry 
Brigade. His planning was interrupted when he was 
sent to Trinidad to serve on the court martial of 
officers who had mutinied against the goverrment 
of Eric Williams. Suddenly, however, in November 
he found himself in control of the First Brigade. 
The period between November and January w..s suffi­
cient for the short period of prc-coup conspiratorial
activity characteristic of non-ideological coups. 
In intervention based on ideological motivation, 
on the other hand, "the actual coup itself is often 
preceded by years of discussion and preparation. 
The Thai Promoters of 1932 grew out of the organized 
discussions of civilian students and younger mili­
tary officers in Paris in the 1920s. In Egypt the 
cadets at the military college organized discussions 
on "The Social and Political Unrest in 1938” ^  ^ .
Up until this point, Acheampong1s career had not 
been unusual. Born in Kumasi in September 1931, 
he earned the General Certificate of Education "0" 
level, and later worked as a teacher, secretary 
and school principal. In 1958, when he was 27, he 
joined the army. In March 1 959 he passed out of 
the Mons Officer Cadet Training Unit in Great Bri­
tain. In 1962-63 he served with the Ghana forces 
in the Congo. Later he attended Staff College at 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, although he never held 
a staff appointment. Acheampong served as a Chairman 
of the Administrative Commission of the Western 
Region under NLC. Fafore taking over the Fifth Batta­
lion he had been commanding officer of the Sixth 
Bai. M o n  at Takoradi.
Acheampong belongs to a class of officers who were 
shut out of promotions because they were not affilia-
ted with the group that brought off the 1 966 coup. 
As Acheampong so plaintively explained, Afrifa had
been a company commander of his, and now Afrifa
was a retired Lieutenant-General. *14 ^ Men such
as Twum-Barima, who like Acheampong had been Lieuten- 
ant-Colonels in 1967, were Brigadiers while the
latter remained only a Colonel. Colonel Bernasko, 
one of the Regional Commissioners under the new 
military government, assured a group of Ghanaian 
students after the coup that "escalating promotions", 
which had characterized the NLC period, "is unlikely 
to be heard of this time." ^  ^
Acheampong and the few majors who had served under 
him in previous postings - the only people he trusted 
with the plans for the coup - can best be described 
as the non-politicians of the army. These were the 
line rather than the staff officers. *1 ® * The small 
group instrumental in the coup seems to have included 
Major Baah, the Deputy Commander of the Fifth Infant­
ry Battalion, Accra, and Acheampong’s former second 
in command; Major K.B. Agbo, the Commander of the 
First Infantry Battalion, Tema? Major A. Selormey, 
the Commander of the Cavalry Regiment; and Major 
R. Felli, the Commander of the First Signals Regi­
ment. The group may also have included Lieutenant- 
Colonel C.D. Benni, the Commander of the Third Batta­
lion at Sunyani. All these men wore junior to Acheam-
pong; having served under him in the pas*-. In terms 
of ethnic affiliations, Acheampong is an Ashanti; 
Baah a Brong; Selormey and Agbo, Ewes; Benni ie 
a Dagarti; and Felli a Northener. Friendships based 
on career patterns seem to have been more important 
than ethnic considerations; however, many Ewe offi­
cers had felt that they were badly treated by the 
Busia government. According to Philippe Decraene, 
the opposition to the PP government centred among 
the Ewes: "the Ewes had a big hand in bringing about 
Kwame Nkrumah's downfall in February 1966, and they 
considered that they have been inadequately rewar­
ded for their part in spearheading the drive against 
Osagyefo.*1 Several Ewe officers had either
been stripped of their ranks or assigned to less 
vital functions, according to the same report. 
In 1 967 there were five high-ranking Ewe army offi­
cers; Kotoka's death in the 1967 abortive coup and 
the transfer of Quaye to the Navy left three. Amenu, 
who had been Deputy Chief of Defence Staff when 
the Busia government came to power was pushed out 
and transferred to the National Service Corps against 
his will. Kattah had been exiled as military attache 
in New Delhi, but he was called back to Ghana a 
few months before the coup to face charges of theft 
arising out of the 1 966 coup. Instead of a court 
martial, he was given a pub]j c trial. As a result 
of these changes Tcvic was the only high-ranking
Ewe officer at the time of the 1972 coup.
Busia was in London at the time of the coup. As 
Luttwak has observed, coup makers often wait until 
the head of government is unavailable. His
Cabinet Ministers were easily arrested, along vLth 
President Akufo-Addo and Chief of Staff Addo, the 
Head of the Army, Twum Barima, and the Head of Mili­
tary Intelligence, Hamidu. The most pressing problem 
for the conspirators in the first hours after the
coup was whether the Second Infantry Brigade Group
in Kumasi (the centre of Busia's support) would 
accept the coup. The Chief Regional Executive in
Ashanti, Maxwell Owusu, went on radio to aay that 
the coup had failed, but the third in command. 
Captain David Weir of the Fourth Battalion, later 
denounced Mr.owusu's statement. The same day Lieu­
tenant General Afrifa visited Acheampong to dec­
lare that he supported the coup and considered 
himself a friend. But Afrifa was arrested on the 
morning of the fifteenth for plotting with Colonel 
Osei-Owusu, the head of the Second Brigade, to
overthrow Acheampong by bringing troops down from 
Kumasi to challenr,'? the troops in control of Accra. 
This plan was in some respects similar to Afrifa's
The remarkable thing about the small group of offi­
cers arrested in the first days of the coup (Gene­
rals Afrifa and Artdo , Brigadierr Twum-Barima, Ha- 
midu and Osei-Owusu) is that they were all Sand­
hurst men. Regardless of ethnicity or politics these 
men appear to have been loyal to the Busia govern­
ment. For this loyalty they had been rewarded by 
rapid promotion. Osei-Owusu, for example, was a 
brigadier while his former peers were still colo-
Acneampong was faced with the difficulties inherent 
in naming a ruling council. The first broadcast 
gave the cor nusi tion of the newly formed National 
Redemption Council (NRC) as: Colonel Acheampong,
Major Kwame Baah, Commander Boham, Major Selorney, 
Lieutenant Colonel Banor, Lieutenant Colonel Benni, 
and Mr E.N. Moore (Attorney-General). New regional 
commissioners were also named:
REGION ETHNIC ORIGIN AGE
COLONEL AUJBTEY 
COLONEL NYANTE 
COLONEL ACYBKUM 
LIBUTENANT-COLONEL BAIDOO 
MAJOR KABADAH 
COMMANDER KYEHEMA1I 
LIBUTENANT-COLONEL IDR1SSA 
LIBUTENANT-COLONEL MINYILA 
COLONEL UBRNASKO
GREATER ACCRA 
EASTERN 
WESTERN 
ASHANTI
HRONG/AHAEO
NORTHERN
AKWAP1M
DUONG
There is no single career pattern uniting the new
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commissioners. Five of the regional commissioners 
had received their military education in Great 
Britain; Idrissa and Minyila at Sandhurst, Baidoo 
at Mons, Kyeremah at Dartmouth Naval College, Nyante 
at Eaton Hall. Two of the commissioners had held 
administrative posts under the NLC, two held staff 
appointments betorp tne coup, one is a university 
graduate, and two had served in pre-indp^fndance 
army as enlisted men.
At 6 a.m. on the thirteenth, Acheampong announced 
the reasons for the coup over the air. He first 
charged that the corruption, economic mismanage­
ment, and other malpractices that had characterized 
the Nkrumah government had been equally in evidence 
in the Busi.a government. He then cited what were, 
in fact, the essential motivating factors:
"The first people which Busia put his eyes, on were 
the armed forces and police. Some army and police 
officers we.'< ismissed under the pretext of retire­
ment. Some officers were put in certain positions 
to suit the whims of Busia and his colleages. Then 
he started taking from us the few amenities and 
facilities which we in the armed forces and the 
police enjoyed even under the Nkrumah regime. Having 
lowered morale in the armed forcos and the police 
to the extent that officers could not exert any
meaningful influence over their men, so that by 
this strategy coming together to overthrow his 
government was to him impossible, he turned his 
eyes on the civilians." ^1^
It was clear that Acheampong, as the leader of 
a coup motivated by the self-interest of the military, 
had no real political objectives; he suggested 
no new policies or dramatic changes. He merely 
called for a review of the important decisions
taken by the Busia governmenti the Cocoa Purchasing 
Scheme; the Development Levy; the Rural Development 
Programme; the Devaluation of the Cedi; and the
expulsion of the aliens. The only positive
suggestion made, dealt with the unemployment problem; 
he called for the re-introduction of the Workers' 
Brigade and the State Farms. (21)
In a broadcast a few hours later, Acheampong stated 
that the Progress Party had been banned along
with all the opposition parties, Dr. Busia had 
been removed from office, and the leader of the
opposition would also be dismissed. Since Acheampong 
had shared his secret with few people, new appoint­
ments had not been ironed out in secret before 
the coup; it was now that the jockeying for positions 
began. The next few days saw incredible activity
as army, naval and air force officers all attempted
to gain positions on the NRC, ministerial portfolio, 
and the remaining military positions that were 
vacated by the successful claimants. The day after 
the coup the composition of the NRC was substantially 
changed; only Acheampong and the three majors
remained from the first list. The new NRC was
almost half Ev?e, although the new list was meant 
to broaden the base of the NRC by including represen­
tatives from each of the services and the police. 
Two days later Lieutenant-colonel Benni was reinsta­
ted. On January 22, a fourth list added Major 
Felli of the Signals Regiment. On the thirtieth, 
ministerial portfolios were assigned, only seven
of the twelve members of the NRC received port­
folios. Five raw officers were added to the 3vern- 
ment. That the new government was a coalition 
of the neglected elements of the NLC and Busia
periods was indicated by the return of Coker-
Appiah from Ac: •’is, of Afcri from Legos, along
with Menu from the National Service Corps, and
Asante from the retirement forced upon him after 
the 1966 coup. The NRC found many collaborators 
among those officers whose careers had either
languished or been permanently ended because of
their association with the Nkrumah government.
Whereas the regional commissioners were drawn
from Acheampong1s ago group (thoir average age
Aau._i
was about 40; Achcampong was 41), the NRC and 
the new ministers were composed of two distinct 
age groups , the most senior officers, Addo, Aferi,
Ashley-Lassen, Beausoleil and Quaye who represented 
corporate power; and the junior officers who were
instrumental in the coup, Baah, Selormey, Felli
and Agbo representing the conspirators. In terms 
of ethnic origins the regional commissioners were 
a well-balanced group, while the NRC members were 
almost entirely southerners ? in the former, Fantis 
represented the largest group, while in the latter 
Ewes were the most: over-represented.
All these changes were indicative cf the small 
size and hasty organization of the conspiratorial
The 1972 coup in Ghana brings into question the 
validity of some of the current literature on 
the preconditions and motivation for military 
intervention in ' developing countries. Previous
scholars have argued that political decay precedes 
military intervention; and that officers intervene 
in politics either to change or to preserve the 
class or status stratification of society at largo. 
Events in Ghana seem to show that economic crisis 
in and by itself, may bo the only precondition 
necessary for intervention. In addition, changes
in the conditions of service and extent of military 
influence can cause the military to intervene 
although the level of politicization of the conspi­
rators may be very low. Particularly, in new nations 
which suffer from the absence of political institu­
tionalization, tne motives for military intervention 
do not have to be acceptable to the public at 
large in order for the military to be able to 
bring down a civilian government. In countries 
whose governments are of low legitimacy, quarrels 
between the military and the government can lead 
to military intervention. In polities whose institu­
tions enjoy wide legitimacy, these clashes would 
be settled by interest group bargaining processes, 
not a coup d'etat.
THE NRC AND AFRICA
The point has been made that the National Liberation 
Council Regime displayed by its policies an intense 
political allegiance to the Commonwealth besides 
personal identification with Britain. Four days 
after assuming the reigns of government in Ghana, 
Colonel (later General) I.K. Acheampong, as Chairman 
of the NRC and Head of State, went over radio 
and television to declare the new government's 
policy. The 17th January .".972 speech made it clear 
that intense Pan-Africanism and noo-Nkrumahism
were to bo the cornerstones of the regime's foreign 
policy.  ^^  * Among other things, Colonel Acheampong 
said s "Our foreign policy will first of all be 
based on a vigourous and dynamic African policy. 
We intend to foster the closest and most cordial 
relations with all African brothers still not 
free and who suffer deprivations, degradation
and indignity on the continent of their birth. 
Accordingly, we shal] vigorously support the eradi­
cation of the lost remnants of colonialism and 
racial discrimination from the African continent ... 
We subscribe unreservedly to the Charter of the 
OAU and it is our resolve to lend effective support 
to all efforts aimed at making it an effective 
body for the expression and realisation of African
aspirations." 123*
The NRC replaced the erstwhile elected Ministers 
with Commissioners drawn almost exclusively from 
the Armed Forces. The Commissioner for Foreign
Affairs was Major Kwame Baah, who like all his 
colleagues in the Council (except Colonel ■■ uheampong 
and the Attorney General, Mr. K.N. Moore), received 
their regular officer training at the Ghana Military 
Academy, Teshie near Accra. Neither at the personal 
nor political level did they show an intense identi­
fication with Britain, a major characteristic
of the erstwhile NLC.
Whereas the NLC was never quite warmly accepted 
in Africa, ant' in fact, re-established Ghana in 
mainstream African politics with difficulty, the 
NRC was recognised and warmly accepted. A mark 
of Africa's acceptance was that, at the invitation 
of the government, the Co-ordinating Committee 
for African Liberation held its 21st Session in 
Accra. At the end of the Session, a 26 point "Accra 
Declaration on African Liberation" was issued.
The NRC successfully negotiated the return from 
Guinea of the remains of ex-President Nkrumah
for national burial. At the ideological level, 
the NRC launched for distribution in Africa, a 
book of selected speeches by the late President 
Nkrumah. The regime also launched a 19 page "Charter 
of Redemption" which denounced all forms of imperia­
lism and exploitation and reaffirmed Ghana's commit­
ment to the African 'liberation struggle, African 
Unity and the realisation of a continental union 
government. The regime quickly paid all of Ghana's 
outstanding contributions to the finances of the
Early in January 1973, th .mo announced its
intention to form on African Youth High Command
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and an African Liberation Information Centre in 
Accra. (24) ip^ g African High Command had been 
the brain-child of ex-President Nkrumah. The idea 
was to establish a continental fighting force 
of troops donated by all African States to support 
and defend the sovereignty of the projected "United 
States of Africa". The idea never got off the 
ground because of opposition or indifference from 
OAU member states who feared that it might, if 
established, compromise their independence. The 
Acheampong regime revived the idea with little 
success however.
In March 1973, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs 
launched an African Liberation Information Centre 
in the main lobby of the George Padmore Memorial 
Library in Accra. Picture exhibitions of liberation 
armies in training and in combat wore on display. 
Other pictures showed . 'enes of confrontation 
between individual Africans and law enforcement 
officers in South Africa, Rhodesia and South West 
Africa. Maps and short stories illustrating the 
histories of the various territories were on display. 
The main objective of the Centre was to inform 
Ghanaians about ovonts in those areas of Africa 
and so build up public support for African liberntion 
activities.
The main thrust of the regime's African policy 
was with neighbouring states of West Africa. Here, 
the regime of Acheampong, soon after inauguration, 
indicated total commitment to the Economic Community 
of West Africa {ECOWAS), which was only a project 
at the time but has since become a reality. The 
regime thus demonstrated for West Africans in 
particular, that through economic and socio-cultural 
co-operation, continental government of Africa 
is poss-iole.
The significance of the NRC's Africa policy is per­
haps best appreciated if it is contrat.. that
of the Busia government before it.
The PP government's foreign policy, like that 
of the NIr before it, had come to be perceived 
in Ghana • 1 elsewhere, as anti-NKrwmah and patently
pro-West. In Africa the government of Dr. Kofi Busia 
openly decided to keep Ghana on the fringes of 
African issues. The government, though not hostile 
to African expectations on the .i-.;ue of de-coloni­
sation, nevertheless thought 1 ,'iat confrontation 
was an ineffective and hostiJ i Qtegy. In this 
Dr. Busia felt and shared commor "'"r;5 with President 
Houphouet Boigny of the Ivov-j (Mast. To Busia, 
Ghana's interests as well o$, ’.he interests of 
the people in those territories still under colonial
rule, would not be served by continued armed conflict. 
The policy of his government was therefore based 
on negotiation, co-operation and conciliation 
with all states in Africa including Rhodesia, 
South Africa and Portugal.
Thus, for the first time since the beginning of
the militant African nationalism in the post-
World War II era, Ghana officially sounded ►.he
voice of moderation, dialogue and gradualism in 
African affairs. ^ T h e  swing to the right represen­
ted Dr. Kofi Busia's conviction that the quest
for a continental unity of Africa is a historical 
phenomenon which should be carefully studied and 
need not be pursued in view of Africa's problems 
and differences. He told Parliament in his
inaugural speech that: " ... our first consideration
in foreign policy must be our own country, Ghona, 
whose interest we must put abrvo all others. We 
will participate fully in the movement for a West 
African political and economic community; take 
an active part in the work of the OAU and support 
genuine freedom fighters who wish to bring the 
fruits of freedom, justice and human dinnity to 
their own people."
In spite of this declaration Busia's African policies
were never completely accepted. Ur, Nkrumah's 
government had pursued a policy by which, in practice, 
no African was considered an alien in Ghana. Dr. 
Busia's government on the other hand had, by the 
Aliens Compliance Order of 3970. introduced immigra­
tion laws which resulted in the deportation of 
thousands of West African national . from Ghana 
and the exclusion of foreigners from certain sectors 
of Ghanaian business, thus souring the efforts 
for the pursuit of the projected West African
Economic community.
THE NRC AND THE EAST
When the late President NXrumah was overthrown 
in 1966, Ghana's links with Rvssia, the East European 
countries and the People's Republic of Chino were 
virtually broken. The leadership, trained in the
West and negatively oriented to the East, were 
in no mood to identify with Eastern countries 
as noted earlier on. The NRC regime reversed all
To give effect to the desire for tin* now policy, 
a Committee for Economic Co-operation with the
Socialist Countries (C15SEC) was formed jn oarJy 
3 973. * The CfiSEC was made up of ten members
drawn from the ranks of bureaucrats in the public 
services and was under the Chairmanship of the
Commisrlouer for Foreign Affairs. The Committee 
was charged with responsibility for "promoting 
trade, scientific and technical co-operation between 
Ghana and Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Romania for the development of wood processing 
industries in parts of Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo and 
Western Regions of Ghana. Relations were established 
with the People's Republic of China and the Embassy 
of the Soviet Union in Accra regained its considerable 
influence.
It may be noted that the return of East European 
government-sponsored trade missions to Ghana, 
led to a slow down of investment activity by Western 
entrepreneurs. In 1970, a team of Japanese geologists 
started prospecting for manganese ore in the Volta 
basin near Alcin. The new government granted pro­
specting rights to another team from Hungary in 
late 1972. The Japanese withdrew so that the Hunga­
rians had to start all over again. Similarly, 
Shell, British Petroleum and Mobil halted their 
prospecting for oil and natural gas in protest 
against the arrival of Eastern European geologists. 
These did not resume thoir activities until April, 
1975, when the government of Ghana agreed to grant 
sole rights to prospect for oil to the Western 
entrepreneurs.
THE NRC AND THE WEST
Some three weeks after the formation of the NRG, 
the Chairman, Colonel (later General) I.K. Acheampong 
announced on 5th February 1 972 that the NRC would 
not follow the economic policies of the NLC regime. 
Accordingly, the regime quickly repudiated a sub­
stantial portion of "fainted" debts owed to Western 
countries and proclaimed a policy of economic "self- 
reliance" and economic nationalism. In essence, 
Ghana was not to repay to certain Western creditors 
pre-1966 supplier-credits amounting to £ 21 million 
because, the NRC argued, the credits were fraudulent. 
Ghana was to re-examine other credits unilaterally 
and repudiate those that in its judgement, were 
illegal. Where negotiation was sought, the burden 
of proof of legality of a credit was to fall on 
the creditors. Ghana was to make payments on debts 
accruing after 1 966 as conditions allowed. Ghana 
also renounced decisions taken at previous debt 
scheduling conferences. Certain German creditors
also lost their investments subsequently. Since 
the creditors who became victims of the policy were 
of the Western bloc, relations with them remained 
cool and correct but never warm throughout the NRC's
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Although no formal joint action by way of reprisals 
came from the West, the action appeared to have 
warned off prospective creditors to be wary of giving 
credit to Ghana. The result was that Ghana had to 
buy every item of import strictly on cash-down basis.
Spurned by the West, the NRC regime turned increa­
singly to the East as indicated and to the Arabs 
for whose sake the NRC joined other African countries 
in breaking off diplomatic relations with Israel 
in 1974.
THE NRC AND THE COMMONWEALTH
The regime of the NRC continued to maintain steady 
support for the Commonweelth of Nations. Ghana, 
under the NRC, maintained diplomatic representations 
in every one of the Commonwealth countries . was 
represented at oil meetings of the Commonwealth 
Heads of State, in spite of the unilateral repudia­
tion of debts owed to British firms, Ghana continued 
to use London as its base for contact with the out­
side world. The Ghana Public Service Commission 
still has a recruiting office in London. London 
has also remained the centre for recruiting Pro­
fessors for Ghana's Universities. The Cocoa Marketing 
Board, the Timber Board and the Bank of Ghana all
retained and continue to retain their London opera-
In short, neither the NRC's unilateral repudiation 
of debts owed to a few British and Canadian firms, 
nor its condemnation of colonialists had any adverse 
effects on its position in the Commonwealth. It
is significant to note that the regime never sought 
to advance any proposals for changing the Common­
wealth. It sought to remain m  the Commonwealth
for as long as other African countries remained
in it. In the words of Mr. gvarm, the Chief
Foreign Policy Adviser to th ; . "We have found
it advantageous to continue to i.-.main in the Common­
wealth. We adhere to its principles and we are
very much involved in the affairs of the Common­
wealth." <30)
THE NRC AND THE UNITED NATIONS
As with the Commonwealth, so it was with the UN.
Ghana under the regime of Colonel Acheampong remained 
steady in its support of the organisation.
Ghana was represented at the annual formal open­
ings of the General Assembly by ministerial dele­
gations from Accra. The regime of Colonel Acheam- 
pong was more conformist than revolutionary in 
its attitude towards the structure of the World 
body. Ghana never called for a removal of the veto 
powers of the permanent members of the Security 
Council nor did it call cor a rewriting of the Char­
ter of the organisation. It is probable, however, 
that had such a measure been sponsored by an African 
member state, the Ghanaian delegation would have 
supported it.
Within Ghana itself, there was considerable, posi­
tive sentiment for the UN. The Ghana United Nations 
Students Association continued to observe the annual 
United Nations Day with pomp and pageantry. The 
Universal Declaration of Humand Rights Day was also 
observed annually by the Ghana Council for Peace. 
The Ghana Trades Union Congress (TUC) remained affi­
liated to the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) while the Ghana Bench and Bar continued its 
membership of the International Commission of Ju-
CONCLUSION
Measured in terms of the two generaltzable criteria 
(i.e. economic development and active Pan-Africanism), 
the NRC's performance was mixed.
The NRG was clearly pragmatic, Pan-African and pro- 
Nkrumahist, This assessment is based on several 
factors. One is an analysis of domestic and foreign 
policy decisions. Another is the regime's recruitment 
of ex-CPP ministers and members to the regime's 
special committees, and the return of many former 
CPP activists from their self-imposed exile.
There is also the successful negotiation of the 
return from Guinea of the remains of ex-President 
Nkrumah for national burial as well as the Nkrumahist 
substance of the 27 point "Accra Declaration on 
African Liberation" issued by the Co-ordinating 
Committee for African Liberation which held its 
21st session in Accra at the invitation of the NRC 
government. Also significant is the launching of 
a book of selected speeches by the lute President 
Nkrumah with a foreword by Colonel Acheampong, and 
the 19 page NRC "Charter of Redemption" which de­
nounced all forms of imperialism and racist exploi­
tation and reaffirmed Ghana's commitments to the 
African liberation struggle, African unity and the 
realization of a continental union government.
In the economic field however, the NRC did poorly. 
A reading of the Budget Statement, 1978-79 as printed 
by the Government Printer, Accra, makes it clear 
that in terms of such aggregate economic indicators 
as real GDP, rate of inflation, money supply, budget 
deficits and so forth, the NRC regime's performance 
was little short of a disaster, leaving behind a 
legacy of economic and fiscal disequilibrium for 
successor regimes.
The regime, however, set itself other tasks such 
as self reliance, correction of existing imbalances 
in regional development and equitable distribution 
of the nation's wealth. By nature these were domestic 
policies intended to reduce sectionalism, regiona­
lism and other forms of economic self-interest and 
to bring into being a viable sense of nationalism. 
Only a small measure of success was achieved with 
these goals so that by July 1 978, when Acheampong 
was removed as Head of State, Ghana was more divided 
than ever.
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C H A P T E R  S E V E N
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE ARMED FORCED REVOLUTIONARY 
COUNCIL (AFRO AND THE PROVISIONAL NATIONAL DEFENCE 
COUNCIL (PNDC)
Flight Lieutenant Rawlings has given as his reason 
for his seizures of political power, the need for 
a "revolution" within Ghana.
This chapter therefore examines this "revolution" 
as well as its foreign policy dimensions.
Flight Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings first seized power 
on June 4, 1979. On the face of it, it seemed that 
the intervention of Rawlings and his colleagues 
represented some respite from the unyielding effects 
of Lieutenant-General F.W.K. Akuffo's Supreme Mili­
tary Council (SMC) austerity programme. Rawlings, 
and the AFRC, offended by evidence of widespread 
corruption on the part of high military officers, 
sought to lighten burdens by means of a series of 
"house decking" measures.
To widespread acclaim, the AFRC put on a series 
of trials of senior officers (some of whom were 
convicted of corrupt acts, and were either executed 
or jailed), diciplined market traders and hoarders,
destroyed the Markola Number 1 Market in Accra (as 
an alleged centre for dishonest dealings), seized 
the assets of foreign firms charged with illegal 
types of transactions and dissolved the Cocoa Marke­
ting Board and the Ministry of Cocoa Affairs. Its 
economic "populism" was most evident in a contro­
versial decision to enforce price controls on a 
variety of consumer goods. The imposition of price 
controls and the attack on hoarding meant that what­
ever scarce consumer items existed, would be made 
available to the public at controlled prices. How­
ever, in a situation of high inflation, it also 
entailed a rapid rundown of existing stocks, Short­
term benefits were secured but at a high price for 
the successor government of President Limann, namely, 
the depletion of extremely limited goods. Thus,
despite the elements of idealism in Rawlings' revolu­
tion, his brief administration in fact achieved 
little in the way of coherent economic policy. And 
the government's disdain for consequences was disrup­
tive of both legal procedure and economic produc­
tivity.
There were several major consequences of Rawlings' 
rule. First, the miJitary virtually collapsed in 
the face of rank and file and non-commissioned offi­
cer attacks, the "trials" and prison terms and lower 
ranks and jjnior officer refusal to acknowledge
senior authority. Second, when AFRC attacked other 
state institutions - ranging from Ministries to 
public companies - subordinates there played a simi­
lar role. The attack on the managerial elite, and 
the investigations into the performance of most 
public institutions, disrupted their already enfee­
bled performance. Investigations into private busi­
ness practices generated widespread fear amongst 
the country's bourgeoisie. Third, while Rawlings 
became a folk hero, Ghanaiansi were horrified that 
the military continued to attack civilians, whipping 
market women for alleged hoarding or selling above 
officially controlled prices and for unleashing 
random violence. Increasingly split by dissensions 
and by suspicions of tribal-ethnic favouritism, 
the AFRC surrendered its rule to President Limann 
and the PNP on 24th September 1 979 after three and
That was not to be the end of Rawlings however. 
On December 31, 1981, a small group of military
and ex-military personnel seized power in Ghana, 
thus outsting President Limann's civilian government 
and the People's National Party (PNP) and propelling 
Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings into power for
the second time
The PNDC Leadership
Rawlings announced the leadership of the Provisional 
National Defence Council (PNDCl in early January, 
1982, and it vo :s significant for its stunningly 
non-representative quality. It was composed of Raw­
lings as Chairman; Brigadier-General Joseph Nunoo- 
Mensah; *  ^* Sergeant Alolga Akata-Pore, an articu­
late radical who was a military academy instructor; 
Warrant Officer J.A. Buadi who worked with the APRC 
Secretariat in 1979; the Reverend Kwabena Damuah, 
a defrocked Catholic priest (reinstated in 1980) 
who has always been politically outspoken; Joshua 
Amarte Kwei, a former local trade union leader; 
and Chris Bukari Atim, a former student leader, 
a radical and secretary to the June 4 Movement that 
Rawlings had created after his dismissal from the 
military in 1980.
The PNDC’s membership was distinctly different from 
that of any previous military regime. It lacked 
any significant active duty officer representation 
and almost half of it was civilian. Other former 
officers were closely linked with Rawlings and the 
PNDC and were later given offices, including Captain
Kojo Tsikata, an established radical as special 
adviser and Colonel J.M. Ewa (as Chief of Staff, 
PNDC office). Presumably, the civilians were to 
be the PNDC's links with potentially sympathetic 
groups: the Reverend Damuah with the Protestant
and Catholic Ministries which had been extremely 
active in the agita4 ion against the Acheampong mili­
tary regime; Chris Atim with students and, in parti­
cular, with the National Union of Ghana Students 
(NUGS) which quickly rallied to the support of the 
PNDC; and Joshua Amarte Kwei with dissident trade 
unionists whom, in fact, he helped to rally in at­
tacks against the established trade union leadership 
until it was forcibly displaced in late April.
By mid-December, only two of the original seven 
members remained, Rawlings and J.A. Buadi, Reverend 
Damuah resigned or was dismissed in mid-August, follo­
wing the murder of the High Court Judges, as he 
became increasingly critical of violence and condem­
ned the self-styled radicals who attacked and dama­
ged various fraternal lodges (Freemasons, Odd Fel­
lows) in Kumasi and Accra, to which bodies Ghanaian 
professionals belonged. Amarte Kwei resigned or 
was dismissed at the same time, possibly because 
of PNDC concern that the public was linking Kwei, 
a former GJHOC employee, with 'he murder of Major 
Sam Acquah, GIHOC Group Personnel Manager, along
with the High Court Judges. Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah 
resigned in late November, in despair at the PNDC's 
inability to deal with Ghana’s problems.
Rawlings and his associates selected from a broader 
base the government secretaries (the equivalent 
of Ministers) *  ^* though there were stiff protests 
from NUGS and the radical left for four of his ap­
pointments. It took five months to win approval 
for a candidate for Secretary for Finance and Econo­
mic Planning, reflecting intense conflict over the 
economic policies to be pursued by the PNDC regime.
Of 20 Cabinet posts (excluding Defence, controlled
by Rawlings), 7 positions were given to former Party 
Leaders, 4 from the left wing of the PNP; one to
an experienced Ambassador (a trade specialist), 
at least three to Professors, another four to ex­
perienced technocrats and managers and only one 
post to a military officer (retired). Many of the 
Secretaries were experienced and highly qualified.
The PNDC and Rawlings' political base rested on 
several groups or institutions: the military, espec- 
cially several units of the army and air force, 
notably the army's Reece Squadron (armoured cars); 
university students and NUGS; PDC'g and WDC's, whose 
high level of local activism was the PNDC's most
important grassroots link with the population, its
most critical potential for mobilising Ghanaians 
on behalf of the PNDC goals. Of more doubtful support 
was a renewed trade union movement, many of whose 
leaders were removed without members1 consent. The 
union spent 1982 re-organizing and selecting new 
leadership, trying to retain some autonomy from 
the PNDC, which promised non-interference in elec­
tions (and was under pressure from other African 
Unions to do so). There were also a few professional 
groups, mainly people with technical skills, who 
had responded to the PNDC1s appeal for skilled people 
and independent intellectuals. In addition, there 
were political groups; their resolutions and state­
ments appeared frequently in the government-owned 
press, but their membership was meager and included 
largely leftist intellectuals except for Rawlings1 
own June 4th Movement.
The key group in this coalition is the military, 
in which Rawlings retains significant support as 
evidenced by the failure of at least five attempted 
counter coups. Rawlings lives in Condor Barracks 
in Burma Camp, on Accra’s outskirts, a centre of 
PNDC activity.
Despite the absence of active duty officers in the 
PNDC or as heads of state corporations, sectors
of the military were entrusted with key responsibi­
lities, including the security of the regime. Ironi­
cally, the military also remains the PNDC's major
THE BACKGROUND TO THE REVOLUTION
The economic consequences of the military gover- 
ments during the period 1972 - 1 979, were a major 
contribution to the problems of the Limann govern­
ment. Economic growth was negative during 1970 -
1979. Gross domestic product per capita declined 
on average over 3 percent per year. Ghana had a 
deficit in its balance of payments during most of 
1972 - 1979 and managed to maintain a decent overall 
balance only by systematically choking off badly 
needed imports. It had persistent arrears in short­
term debts ($ 430,5 million in late 1979), reducing 
its ability to obtain private credit abroad.
The balance of payments problems, though aggravated 
by the oil price shocks of the mid-1 970' s and' the 
subsequent general inflation, can be traced to sharp 
declines in the production of its major exports 
- cocoal, gold, diamonds and timber. This drasti­
cally reduced its ability to import capital equipment, 
spare parts and essential consumer goods. Severe 
shortages sharply reduced Ghana's domestic production
and stimulated a pervasive black market in essential 
commodities.
Particularly important was the persistent decline 
in the volume of cocoa production available for 
purchase and export, largely because of the decline 
in real prices offered by the state monopoly buyer, 
the Cocoa Marketing Board, Average cocoa purchases 
declined by 31,3 percent during the four crop years, 
1976-1980, in comparison with 1969-1973. In 1972, 
cocoa farmers were paid 78 percent of what they 
were paid in 1 963 per load of 66 pounds. In 1979, 
they received only 49 percent. Hence cocoa smuggling 
to neighbouring countries grew, while many farmers 
shifted out of cocoa production into higher priced 
local foods.
Ghanaians also suffered a hyperinflation in the 
late 1970's: 53 percent in 1976, 116 percent in
1 977, 74 percent in 1 978, 54 percent in 1 979, an 
average annual increase of 46,6 percent during 1972-
1979. Inflation shifted incomes massively to traders, 
black marketeers and food farmers, who benefited 
from massive local food price increases. Local food 
production is estimated to Iiave declined 21 percent 
in the years 1 976-1 976 from the years 1 969-1 971 .*6 *
The causes of Ghana's economic plight compound one 
another. Some were external or beyond Ghana’s con­
trol: the oil price increase of the 1970's, severe 
droughts in northern Ghana in the 1974-1976 years, 
worldwide inflation (and thus increased costs in 
imports), and a deteriorating terms of trade after 
1977. Ghanaians have tended to blame incompetent 
and corrupt leadership and economic mismanagement 
for their problems, but they have been politically 
incapable of facing the effects of their economic 
demands. Populist pressures to keep down the costs 
of living, e.g. through price controls, have been 
important to Ghanaian leaders, despite the manifest 
failure of such efforts.
Nor is it simply a question of radical versus conser­
vative economic policies. Policymakers have felt 
compelled - in Ghana as in many other African count­
ries - to run large budget deficits in order to 
maintain nominally high levels of economic activity 
and employment, to retain overvalued exchange rates, 
when devaluation would increase the local costs 
of imports (i.e. generate a real wage decline for 
consumers of imports, who are disproportionately 
middle and upper class), to subsidise inefficient 
state corporations, to finance large-scale and 
mostly unproductive state farms or large private 
farmers rather than the fairly productive small
and medium-sized peasant farmers. The Acheampong 
regime undertook all these measures, generating 
inflation by colossal budget deficits necessitated 
partly by its failure to collect taxes from the 
wealthy.
The Limann government did little better. Thus Limann 
and the PNP government confronted enormous problems 
and policy dilemmas. The PNP managed for some months 
to contain the continued military violence against 
the police and the public. It tried to deal with 
the AFRC leaders and Rawlings by sending them out 
of the country or, failing that, (Rawlings refused 
to leave), by employing high levels of surveillance 
and repression.
Limann's government was under enormous public pres­
sure to increase economic activity, keep down infla­
tion, increase local food production and provide 
essential imported commodities. Its initial poli­
cies were tolerable, but it declined to acknowledge 
(as had Acheampong) the perverse impact of the un- 
realistically high value of the country's currency 
(the Cedi) and the impact of partially effective 
price controls on the distribution of resources 
and production. These contributed to the continuing 
collapse or underutilisation of existing industries, 
massive smuggling, shortages and a flourishing black
market. Over-valuation of the Cedi increased the 
incentive to con: ime imports (making them relatively 
cheap) and drastically reduced incentives to produce 
for export. '7*
The Limann government was moving slowly toward de­
valuation of the Cedi, which would have helped shift 
income from traders to producers and might have 
led to larger foreign government and international 
loans and aid. Higher levels of production in cocoa, 
coffee and rice (consumed locally) could have been 
achieved through increasing producer prices, which 
the government did not do until November 1981. By
1980, cocoa farmers were being paid, in real terms, 
33 percent of the price they received in 1 963; by
1981, only 14 percent. Ghana’s 1980-1981 cocoa crop 
of 258 000 metric tons was the lowest since the 
late 1950’s. Many farmers declined to harvest 
their crop, combined with sharply lower world cocoa 
prices, this led to an estimated 40 percent decline 
in Ghana's 1981 export earnings and a 32 percent 
decline in imports, which further aggravated shorta­
ges, black-marketing and inflation. The greed of 
PNP Members of Parliament in giving themselves high 
rates of pay generated renewed demands for large 
wage increases from workers and salaried employees 
(all of whom had suffered enormous losses in real
wages). The tripling of the minimum wage and other 
salaries in the late 1980‘s, sharply increased the 
government's budget deficit and hence inflationary 
tendencies. Inflation was contained at 50,1 percent 
in 1980, but grew to 116 percent in 1981. ^
The Limann government's crucial political problem 
was that it was partially controlled by different 
factions of the "old guard", CPP leaders whose alle­
ged propensities to corruption were widely known. 
Their struggle over control of the party exploded
into public view in late 1981 in court battles amidst 
accurate stories of corruption and a $ 1 million 
foreign loan to PNP leaders. Limann himself was 
a weak leader; he had become PNP President only
through "old guard" support and was dependent upon 
them. The public perception of squalid party leaders 
competing for the spoils of office, combined with 
rampant inflation and consumer shortages, endowed 
the government and democratic institutions with
scant legitimacy. Many Ghanaians including the most 
skilled and educated, were voting with their feet 
and leaving Ghana to work elsewhere, especially 
in Nigeria. At the same time, some units of the
military voted with their guns.
Populist Revolution
Under Flight-Lieutenant. Jerry Rawlings, the PNDC 
seized power in order to pursue revolutionary change, 
and it has done so in some areas, most critically 
in its encouragement of the creation of hundreds 
of People’s Defence Committees (PDC's) and in work­
places, Workers' Defence Committees (WDC's). The 
members of these committees attacked corruption 
and economic mismanagement in all public institutions, 
providing the kind of accountability that Rawlings 
demanded and mobilising the community in public 
tasks. By January 1982, the government of Ghana 
was almost without resources. It was generating 
an inordinate budget deficit and had negative foreign 
reserves and debt arrears of some $ • '8 million,
making it unable to obtain foreign t'ank credits. 
At the same time, it faced an oil boycott from Nige­
ria ^ , and confronted a desperate shortage of 
the spare parts and inputs needed to revive unused 
industrial capacity and to repair Ghana's eroded 
infrastructure. World prices for Ghana's exports 
(cocoa and gold) continued to fall and Ghana was 
devoting over 40 percent of its export earnings 
to oil import alone. Thus no short-term economic 
improvements were possible, except through better 
management of resources, more rational domestic 
economic policies and an expansion of exports.
The • PNDC tried to move to the ports the 40 percent 
of the previous year's cocoa crop that had not yet 
been shipped. It reasserted price controls over 
essential commodities and local foods, re-channeling 
their allocation procedures, reducing hoarding and 
smuggling to make more goods available and trying 
to enforce the reduction of other prices and costs. 
With the help of the PDC's, it established and ener­
getically implemented rent controls, previously 
untried in any se.ious way. The PNDC troze large 
bank accounts, while Citizens Vetting Committees 
(CVCs) required the owners of the accounts to appear 
and produce evidence of taxes paid on earnings. 
The individuals were 1,table and the taxes had to 
be paid within 48 hours or their assets were confis­
cated by the state. Major attacks were launched 
against many institutions, ^
The military presence during the period (January 
1982 to December 1982), was palpable in the major 
cities, at roadblocks and during night-long curfews. 
It was assigned responsibility for the distribution 
of essential commodities, the enforcement of price 
controls, the pursuit of hoarders, anti-smuggling 
exercises and border control. These activities led 
elements of the military into repeated instances 
of brutality against civilians throughout 1982, 
giving rise to continuous criticism. Officers at
the borders (especially at Aflao, on the border 
with Togo) and at the Accra Airport confiscated, 
on all sorts of pretexts, the possessions of retur­
ning Ghanaians. Those who protested were frequently 
beaten up. The confiscated goods were then sold 
at "Kalabule” prices to Ghanaians after curfew. 
The military is a fragile support base for revolu­
tionary change, first of all, when the coup leaders 
sought to overthrow the Limann government, many 
units in Accra were not interested? others subse­
quently resisted the coup with a; :,ts. Within the 
military, enthusiasm for Rawlings' coup was far 
from universal, not least among an officer corps 
whose declining numbers had just survived the as­
saults on its members and authority under AFRC. 
Thus support for the regime became a matter of pro­
longed negotiations. Second, the coup itself unlea­
shed violence between the officers and other ranks 
and renewed the potential for violence. In February, 
three naval officers in Sekondi were shot and killed 
by their men. The threatened erosion of authority 
has been increased by the deliberate politicisation 
of the other ranks and NCO's. This step was underta­
ken partly because Rawlings argued, perhaps correct­
ly, that the military has tended to be used in Africa 
as an instrument of coercion against the common man, 
and he insisted that this must not be repeated in
i
Third, the outbreak of the coup and the fighting 
on the 31st December 198",, led immediately to some 
looting and signalled the re-emergence of indisci­
pline in the ranks whose most frequent target has 
been civilians. The most outrageous case occured 
in Kumasi, the Ashanti regional capital in February 
1982. An army Major interrupted a church service 
and asked the congregation to leave and join a pot- 
hole-filling exercise. An incensed congregation 
apparently beat the major to death. A policewoman 
who was a member of the church was wounded and taken 
to a hospital. Soldiers removed her for questioning 
and she was found later badly beaten, returned to 
the hospital for surgery and later allegedly shot 
to death by soldiers. Troops later burned some chur­
ches, killed the minister of the offending congre­
gation and basisjed the Kumasi Police Station. *12*
This is certainly not typical of Ghana, but there 
were many instances of brutality and some murder.^ ^  ^ 
Lack of military discipline and brutality against 
civilians became major issues of the Catholic and 
Protestant churches. ^14 *
Fourth, it became clear that military factions had 
developed. Sergeant Akata-Pore1s apparent base of 
support among military personnel from th-u north 
was the source of his challenge to Rawlings in a
major confrontation on October 28-29, 1982, and
in the attempted coup of November 23, 1 982, which
was suppressed after some fighting. Such conflicts 
in the military raised the spectres of tribalism 
and ethnic favouritism, which became so pervasive 
in the AFRC in 1979. Significant numbers of military 
personnel apparently regarded the PNDC as Ewe-domina­
ted: Rawlings is half Ewe and Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah 
and Arnold Quainoo, the Army Commander, are both 
regarded as half Ewe.
NUGS, the university student group, was an early 
and enthusiastic supporter of the PNDC's radicalism. 
Universities were closed during January-April, 1982, 
while students helped in the movement of cocoa and 
other crops to the country's harbours. However, 
student support for the PNDC evaporated and students 
became strong critics of military brutality, as 
they were under Acheampong and the NRC/SMC regime. 
Students were eager to return to the universities. 
The most pro-PNDC presidential candidate for NUGS 
lost in the mid-1982 election and NUGS openly opposed 
the extension of the mandatory National Service 
Scheme from one to two years and the inclusion of 
six months of military training in the programme 
of National Service.
The regime's broadest base for revolutionary change 
emerged through the development of PDC's and WDC's. 
In many instances they rose against their managers 
and bosses, alleging corruption or mismanagement 
and demanding their removal. In some cases, managers 
and bosses were physically removed and replaced 
with others.
The PDC's and WDC's monitored activities in public 
bodies. As the conflicts between PDC's and WDC's 
and their managers and superiors increased, PNDC 
leaders mediated the disputes, shifting the PNDC 
emphasis somewhat from being watchdogs to increasing 
production. However, this did not greatly deter 
the PDC's and they asked the regime to give legal 
backing against some determined counterattacks by 
confident managers.
The PNDC and Rawlings stated that anyone who chal­
lenged the PDC's and WDC's challenged the legitimacy 
of the revolution, and the regime created a regional 
and national co-ordinating apparatus to link the 
PDC's and WDC's to the regime and to one another.
A National Defence Committee with representatives 
of leading sectors of the PDC's and WDC's was charged 
to supervise the activities of PDC.
Opposition to the regime grow although much of it
tended to be passive or non-overt. The most important 
public opposition to the regime came from the lawyers 
and other professionals. Within a month after the 
PNDC had seized power, the Ghana Bar Association 
(GBA) recommended that the PNDG create a broadly 
based government and prepare to restore civilian 
rule by September 1983. The opposition of the GBA 
and the Association of Recognised Professional Bodies 
(ARPB) to the PNDC was re-animated by the kidnapping 
and brutal murder of three High Court Judges and 
a retired Major. There was immediate speculation 
that persons close to the PNDC were motivated by 
revenge, because the three judges had all been invol­
ved either with appeals from AFRC sentences or adver­
se rulings on petitions for reinstating the dismissed 
GIHOC strikers.
The murders aroused widespread shock and indignation 
and were condemned by the regime which later launched 
investigations. The GBA and ARPB denounced the mur­
ders, the PNDC-supported "campaign of HATE" against 
the rich, PNDC failure to improve economic life, 
the curfew, the loss of press freedom, the collapse 
of military discipline and military brutality, and 
the lack of legal accountability. They reiterated 
the demand that the PNDC hand power to a broadly 
based government that would hold elections not later 
than September, 1983 - a call without the resonance
to Ghanaians that it had in 1977-78. The GBA boy­
cotted all courts, commissions of inquiry and tribu­
nals during a two-week mourning period. The state­
ments pr-mpted condemnations of the Bar Association 
and ARPB by the regime, the press and PNDC political 
support groups. Subsequently, PNDC activists raided 
and destroyed paraphernalia in various Masonic, 
Odd Fellows and other clubs.
The GBA also condemned and decided to boycott a 
PNDC system of public tribunals, membership in which 
would be open to Ghanaians by appointment by a board. 
Ghana's legal system has permitted many of the coun­
try's corrupt public officials and businessmen to 
escape the penalties of the law, a perception widely 
and strongly held in Ghana. Thus public tribunals 
were established as a separate legal system, with 
broad jurisdictions, no rights of appeal, nor any 
rights to counsel. Cases were to be brought by the 
public prosecutor and guidance in proceedings and 
decisions were to be by the rules of "natural justi­
ce" not "legal technicalities".
In late 1982, trials were open to the public and 
tended to be swift, with long sentences for the 
guilty, divided between work in night-soil collec­
tion and communal labour.
Between October and December 1982, coup plot announ­
cements and rumours abounded, and at least, one 
major coup effort was made against the regime. Bri­
gadier Nunoo-Mensah wrote in his letter of resigna­
tion from the PNDC: "If we are honest with oursel­
ves, we will be the first to admit that the going 
has been tough and chaotic and any hope of bringing 
aboui an improvement in the standard of living of 
our people remains doubtful." He observed that it 
was not clear who was governing Ghana because PNDC 
decisions were discarded or altered by anyone in 
the hierarchy. 5*
Nonetheless, the PNDC regime survived and its radical 
populist impulses were not altogether obscured by 
Rawlings' preoccupations with security. Its more 
important programmes for social and economic change 
could not possibly have borne fruit in 1 982? but 
by late 1 982 there were some indications that the 
regime would deal with the drastically overvalued 
Cedi. At the end of 1982, however, the future of 
revolutionary change in Ghana was an open questi- 
on.
Foreign Policy Dimensions of the AFRC/PNDC Revolution 
This section of the dissertation covers one and
a half years, of Rawlings' rule; the three and a 
half months when he first assumed power under AFRC 
and the first one year of his second coming under 
the PNDC.
Clearly, one and a half years under any government 
(military or civilian) is too brief a period for 
any significant foreign policy endeavours to make 
themselves felt. Nevertheless, the foreign policy 
implications and consequences of Rawlings' regimes 
may be isolated in the light of the foregoing dis­
cussion of the domestic system.
From the vantage point of reference group theory, 
the behaviour of the AFRC/PNDC leadership is under­
standable and predictable. Lacking in extensive 
exposure to foreign (British) values and political 
sensibilities, the regimes tended to be more nationa­
listic and domestic orientated. Once in power, Raw­
lings and his colleagues sought to bring about a 
revolution, a complete re-arrangement of the Ghanaian 
socio-political order. They were accordingly reluc­
tant to hand over power to an elected civilian go­
vernment. When asked to give some indication as 
to the date for a handing over of power to a civilian 
government, Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah (Chief 
of Defence Staff, CDS) asked the Nigerian journa­
list who had posed the question, "hand over to whom?"
To the regime, soldiers are civilians in tnili-
tary clothes. Therefon they have as much right 
as any Ghanaians to rule. When this attitude of 
military involvement in politics is contrasted with 
that of the NLC whose leadership was Western orien­
tated, the point of foreign reference group identi­
fication becomes very pertinent.
A reading of the memoirs of the two leading army 
members of the NLC, Generals Ocran and Afrifa, clear­
ly reveals their belief in the essential separa­
tion of the military from politics as part of a 
more general reference group identification with 
the British Officer corps. Afrifa for example, has 
written: "I have always felt it painful to associate 
myself with a coup to overthrow a constitutional 
government, however perverted that constitution 
may be.11 Ocran has stated the position even
more strongly: "Above all, our British training
has taught us to leave politics alone for those 
who want to play it; that is the civilians." *1
Thus the military intervention of February 1966 
should be seen an involving a violation of tjference- 
group norms on the part of the Ghanaian army offi­
cers, a violation of which, their memoirs reveal, 
Ocran and Afrifa were keenly aware. The PNDC leader- 
ohip clearly did not Chore ouch qualms.
The relinquishing of power to a civilian government 
could be seen then, as the bringing of behaviour 
and belief into consonance. Reference group identi­
fication with the British officer corps acted as 
a coun, force to the perquisites of political 
office, pushing or pulling the NLC military officers 
to give up the power they had earlier seized.
In ideological terms the PNDC (certainly jp to Decem­
ber 1982) was patently anti-elite. Since the elite 
in Ghana tends to be pro-West in its identification 
as outlined in earlier pages, one would expect the 
Western powers to be anti-PNDC in their policies. 
This was indeed the initial response.
Soon after the coup of 31 December 1981, Nigeria 
stopped its supplies of petroleum products to Ghana. 
Rawlings felt he had no choice but to turn to 
Libya for oil and to Cuba for other economic assis-
Since Libya was facing increasing isolation in Afri­
ca as well as in the Western world for its alleged 
encouragement of international terrorism, Ghana 
came, by association, to bo treated with suspicion 
by nearly all the neighbouring West African countries 
especially Liberia, Ivor/ Coast and Nigeria.
Matters were made worse by the domestic political 
harassment and military "trials" and imprisonment 
of opponents of the regime. The executions and perse­
cutions of opponents resulted in condemnations of 
the regime by foreign governments. Amnesty Internatio­
nal , the London-based human rights organization, 
called on the regime to either release or bring 
to trial all offenders that had been arrested and 
imprisoned by tne regime. *20*
Scores of Ghanaians took refuge in neighbouring 
muntries and thus sowed the sieds of suspicion 
find mutual distrust as the PNDC accused and was 
itf^lf accused by countries that felt threatened 
by developments across their ^orders. The PNDC regi­
me, fearing or suspecting invasion of Ghana by Gha­
naian .xiles in Togo, the Ivory Coast and Nigeria, 
closed Ghana1s national borders. *21* Meanwhile, 
the regime's preoccupation with internal security 
had crested a tense atmosphere which made the conduct 
of any fruitful international business almost im­
possible.
The mur.-lfci of the officer corps (largely trained 
in the West) meant that locally-trained officers 
cook over i.h-9 commanding heights of the armed forces. 
One result was a distinct movement away from the 
NLC's foreign refcrcnce group identification to
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an orientation towards nationalism, self-reliance 
and a general attitude of indifference towards out­
siders.
Understandably, the conduct of Ghana's foreign policy 
came to be subordinated to the defence of a legiti­
macy than has never ceased to be challenged since 
December 31, 1981. The PNDC regime, increasingly, 
came to have no perceptible foreign policy as it 
marshalled all its resources for the defence of 
its security and the pursuit of its "revolution1.1. 
The search for new allies of a revolutionary sort 
was, however, proceeding at the close of 1 982. Hence 
the numerous visits to Libya, Cuba, Russia and the 
Eastern block of Socialist states.
CONCLUSION
Rawlings' one year and three and a half months 
rule covered by this study was more domestic in 
orientation and less foreign in focus.
In the three and a half months f AFRC rule, des­
cribed in the first part of this chapter, the regime 
succeeded in creating more fear than in directly 
building the economy of the country. As noted above, 
there might have been elements of idealism in Raw­
lings' "revolution", but his brief rule achieved 
little by way of a coherent economic policy.
As for Pan-African concerns, the other generalizable 
criteria, there was hardly any time for them. What 
the brief rule did was to focus unfavourable world 
and African attention on Ghana. The public executions 
of leading citizens could not possibly create inter­
national confidence in the country. Neighbouring 
African states in -'•articular felt uneasy lest Raw­
lings' "revolution" might have a demonstration effect 
in the region.
The next one year of Rawlings' rule under the PNDC 
moreover served to confirm the general character 
of his policies under the AFRC regime. Perhaps the 
AFRC-PNDC regime should be evaluated according to 
the goals it set itself at home. These goals included 
the building of a new Ghana where there would be 
neither corruption, privilege, nor abuse of public 
office. In additio:,, the regime sought to end what 
it perceived as the exploitation of Ghana's natural 
resources by external interests end to introduce 
greater popular participation in the government 
of the country.
Not many people would quarrel with the validity 
of such goals. Whether and when they would infact, 
be achieved, is a legitimate question. At the end 
of 1982 (December 30, 1962) the PNDC announced a 
four-year programme for economic reconstruction 
and development. The Secrc ary for Finance and Econo-
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itiic Planning, Dr, Kwesi Botchwey, warned, at that 
time, of the hard road aheadt "Our recovery effort 
will demand the strictest discipline in every aspect 
of our national life", he said on television. It 
was not unfair to hope that the exercise of such 
strict discipline would include re-ordering Ghana's 
foreign relations in a way that would result in the 
restoration of confidence amongst those countries 
which have historically shown a willingness and 
the ability to worK with Ghana along the path of 
development.
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C H A P T E R  E I G H  T
CONCLUSION
This concluding chapter has two basic purposes: i
First, a comparison of the foreign policies of the 
three military regimes of the period, (NLC; NKC - ■
SMC: AFRC - PNDC); second, answers will be sought i
to two inter-related questions, namely j
As
a) what foreign policy outputs could, conceivably,
be expected from military governments in Ghana I
and !
b) whether domestic military rule in Ghana is compa- 1 
tible with the pursuit of a successful foreign
policy? V
As a corollary, a brief consideration will be given 
to the applicability and relevance of the Foreign : \
Reference Group theory as an approach to the study 
of foreign policy.
The domestic and international systemic conditions f
under which the foreign policies of the three mili­
tary governments were conducted differed significant­
ly from government to government, although degrees ;
and areas of similarity arc discernible.
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Dr. Nkrumah's optimism about Ghana's place in African 
and world affairs has been noted in chapter three 
of this work. Not only was Ghana considered free 
to conduct its own kind of foreign policy, but "... 
How we conduct ourselves will affect not only Ghana 
but the whole of Africa. If we can make a success 
of our independence we shall have made an incal­
culable contribution towards freedom and progress 
throughout Africa. We must show chat it is possible 
for Africans to rule themselves, to establish a
progressive and independent state and to preserve 
their national unity." ^
This optimism about Ghana's potential was widely 
shared, partly because the new country was relatively 
wealth;/?* At independence, Ghana had substantial 
external reserves. Moreover, sympathy for African 
aspirations was on the ascendency everywhere and 
the Great Powers' distrust of non-alignment was 
breaking down as the small states learned to use
their leverage advantageously in a bi-polar world. 
Then Ghana's trail-biasing of the route to indepen­
dence seemed to ensure a leadership role in the 
Afro-Asian world. The Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) through which current Pan-African diplomacy 
is channelled had not yot been formed. At home in
Ghana, there was near euphoria about Ghana being
the "authentic voice" of resurgent Africa.
To Nkrumah then, foreign policy was a proof of inde­
pendence, a means for the uniting of Africa and 
for influencing great power politics.
The foreign policy of the NLC was on the other hand, 
the reverse of Nkrumah's. Whereas Nkrumah was strate­
gically daring but tactically cautious, the NLC 
was tactically daring within a generally cautious 
overall strategy.
The foreign policy decision-maKers of all the three 
military governments were predominantly military 
men, at least during the initial stages of their 
respective rules. Not having been constitutionally 
elected, they had little to worry about regarding 
civilian elite claims for participation in the pro­
cesses of foreign policy formulation. The decision­
makers of the three regimes, however, displayed 
an awareness of a different sort of constituency. 
The NLC, through its leaders, showed a strong iden­
tification with Britain and the Commonwealth of 
Nations. The national interests of Ghana and of 
Africa received anomalous treatment. Civilian advi­
sers of the regime, such as Dr. Kofi Busia, had 
been trained in the West and, like the military 
officers, openly prided himself on his love of Wes­
tern values and ways of life. Dr. Busia, who later 
succ<=.'’8»d the NLC as Prime Minister, used the Centre
for Civic Education (CCE) to preach the virtues of 
western democratic government and the necessity 
for strong Anglo-Ghana relations.
The decision-makers of the NRC-SMC on the other 
hand, pursued a policy of national self-reliance 
and Pan-African unity. Having been locally trained 
and identifying more and more with national aspira­
tions, the leaders placed greater emphasis on natio­
nal economic welfare and strong relations with the 
Eastern bloc of socialist States with which, it
was said, Ghana had more in common.
The AFfU'-PNDC leadership showed even more concern 
for the interests of Ghana. Being junior officers 
of the armed forces and having had their training 
locally, the decision-makers of the regime placed 
emphasis on national economic and social reconstruc­
tion rather than on foreign issues. It was not for 
nothing that the regime sought strong relations
with developing states like Cuba, Nicaragua and
Burkina Faso, all countries struggling with new
economic and social systems of organization,
AS to the contributory causes of foreign policy, 
the Af'RC-PNDC regime's policies in 1979 and in 198?, 
were induced mainly by internal factors as was shown 
by the publ c executions of leading politicians
and military officers for economic and social crimes. 
Ghana's borders were closed to neighbouring countries 
for the same reasons. What the outside world thought 
of Ghana was of little consequence.
The difference between the policies of the NLC and 
the NRC-SMC turn cn direction and degree of commit­
ment. Both regimes perceived their policies as the 
fulfilment of previous commitments (i.e. commitment 
to Western values in the case of the NLC and commit­
ment to national values in the case of the NRC-SMC). 
In their actualisativn of national objectives, the 
NRC-SMC was prepared and willing to repudiate natio­
nal debts owed fc- Western financial bodies and also 
to appoint Ghanaians to the commanding heights of 
the national economy; whereas the NLC displayed 
an allegiance to Western economic interests, an 
allegiance which competed with Ghana as a reference
Accordingly, Ghana's foreign policy under the NLC 
was aimed largely at meeting t-.he expectations of 
Western government s and financial interests. To 
the NRC-SMC however, the African "environment" was 
of paramount importance. The AFRC-PNDC moreover, 
pursued its policies in the belief that a good fo­
reign policy, like charity, must begin at home. 
Hence the emphasis on problems of the immediate
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domestic environment and the pursuit of relations 
with foreign countries with which Ghana shared common 
concerns.
When Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings made his drama­
tic return to power during the early hours of New 
Year's eve in 1981, ne promised the people of Ghana 
a new country: the «nd of corruption, ; i-ivilege,
abuse of office; a stop to the expioiLcit-Z'm <-f Gha­
na's natural resources in the interests of external 
powers; accountability? and greater participation 
in the affairs of the nation by the majority of 
the population. In the early days, Rawlings' allies 
were men of known radical credentials.
At the close of 1982, it was clear that the regime 
favoured warm relations with Latin America including 
Nicaragua and Cuba. The belief was that the experien­
ces of those countries were of relevance to the 
developments underway in Ghana. The regime is repor­
ted to V.. claimed that Nicaragua and Cuba,both 
Third World countries, have refused to conform to any 
particular country's pattern of government. They 
have evolved and are still evolving their unique mo­
des of participatory democracy even under heavy eco­
nomic and political pressures. And whilst, doing 
this, they have made enormous strides in education.
health care and other basic needs. Their determina­
tion gives strength to other countries such as Ghana, 
seeking to achieve true independence and social 
justice.
The restrictive and inflexible approaches of the three 
military regimes resulted in near universal failures 
and obvious lack of major successes in their foreign 
policies. Military rulers, contrary to immediate 
post-coup rhetoric, are neither paragons of virtue 
nor selfless builders of successful modern nation­
states. As Claude Welch was led to ask: "Can a mili­
tary-based government cope more successfully with 
the difficulties civilian regimes encountered? Are 
some of these problems susceptible to solutions 
by means congenial to the governing military junta 
in ways that escaped the preceeding civilian re­
gime?" 131
In the case of Ghana's foreign policy during the 
period of the three military regimes, the answer 
must be no to both of these questions. As a small 
underdeveloped country, this study would suggest 
that, what the country needs is an appropriate 
foreign policy to back up the development effort. 
Such a policy would define national interests in 
terms of economic and social well-being but not 
in grand ideological posturings meant to satisfy
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foreign or domestic reference groups. It follows 
that the military, lacking political legitimacy 
and subject to chronic instability, cannot promote 
the set of circumstances needed to attract foreign 
investment and international political goodwill 
without which all hope of peace and orderly progress 
must be forlorn.
The military's particular kind of organization repre­
sents more of a barrier than a means to the pursuit 
of such a foreign policy, for, as Rustow has obser­
ved: "Vanguard, feet marching, ranks serried, battle­
ments, charges, the great objective: the imagery is 
the familiar one of the proving ground and the infant­
ry attack. Command and discipline, direct n and 
momentum count for everything ... Surely, if the ills 
of the body politic could have been cured so easily, 
the occasion for a military coup would never have 
arisen. The political arena is not a defile. Civil 
servants cannot administer laws by advancing in 
serried ranks. Economic planners cannot augment 
production by charging battlements ... Above all, 
the objectives in politics are always in question. 
Any junta of field-grade officers that expects to 
reach a sacred but unspecified goal - and to reach 
it by storm, in a few hours or even weeks - is in 
for an awakening.11 ^
The foreign reference group model b-s been used 
in this study of the foreign policies of three mili­
tary regimes of the period 1966-1982 because it 
provides a common framework within which the foreign 
policies of military regimes can be analysed and 
compared. However, this approach to the study of 
foreign policy has its limitations both in terms 
of its overall power of explanation and specifically 
in reference to its applicability to possible future 
military regimes. Essentially, the model serves 
an exploratory purpose and some of the concepts 
and assumptions wh^ch comprise it are general enough 
to permit conflicting interpretations of given histo­
rical data.
As an initial formulation rather than a final expla­
nation, the model is oriented toward describing 
and categorising a complex process rather than at­
tempting to explain and predict that process with 
unfailing accuracy.
However, on a general rather than specific level, 
the model is predictive in regard to such matters 
as the functional relationship between the professio­
nal socialisation processes through which military 
leaders have undergone during their training days 
(with their resultant psychological predispositions) 
and foreign policy outputs.
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Ghana's foreign policy under a militaiy-bncked regi­
me, will, according to this theory, tend to be posi­
tively or negatively inclined to the Bast or West 
depending more upon the "psychological predisposi­
tions" of deuision-makers than the "operational 
environment” within which Ghana's value synthesis 
ought, under a competent administration, to be maxi-
The concluding point then is not that military offi­
cers in all newly independent African States will 
approximate those of Ghana in their attitudes and 
behaviour in the field of foreign policy. On the 
contrary, military elites differ and so does foreign 
policy under military rule. What is needed is an 
analytic and explanatory instrument that can recog­
nise and account for these differences. The referen­
ce group approach provides an introductory contri­
bution to the development of such a sophisticated 
instrument.
Hansard. Vol.1, No.1, Accra: Government Printer,
The following section is based on Professor 
W, Scott Thompson's assessment of the situation. 
Refer to the article "Ghana's Foreign Policy
Under Ml., tary Rule", Africa Report. M&y-June
1969, op. cit. I am greatly indebted to Professor 
Thompson.
Welch, Claude, "The African Military and Poli­
tical Developmen" in Henry Bienen (e<3.) The
Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1962, 
p. 76.
Rustow, Dankwart A., A World of Nations: Problems 
of Political Modernization. The Brookings Insti­
tution, Washington D.C., p. 187.
APPENDIX A
SUCCESSFUL COUPS SINCE INDEPENDENCE
[""]] STATES WITH MMTARYRUIEAS
SOURCE: New African, No. 199, April 1984
APPENDIX B
GHANA'S DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN AFRICA TO 1965 
Algeria;
A Ghana mission was formally established in Algiers 
in 1962, although while the Algerian struggle was 
still in progress, Ghana had accorded Algeria de
facto recognition in 1959 and de jure recognition
in 1961; Ghana also made financial arrangements 
for an Algerian mission to be opened in Accra, before 
Algerian independence, with the late Frantz Fanon 
as Algeria's Ambassador,
Burundi:
An Embassy established in late 1964 after the visit 
of the Burundi Foreign "Jnister to Accra. The first 
Ambassador appointed b' krumal. was a Bureau of 
African Affairs activist. For some time he used
the communications facililies of the Ghana High 
Commission in Kampala.
Cameroon;
One of the last missions established by Ghana in 
December 1965 just before the coup. Although he 
had assisted Foncha with political advice and funds 
and encouraged him to seek unification with the 
French-speaking sector of the Cameroons, Nkrumah
t'*.
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was never happy about the circumstances of Felix 
Moumie's mysterious death in Geneva. He distrusted 
Ahidjo as a protege of the French authorities. Ahidjo 
on the other hand protested persistently against 
the presence of a large pro-Moumie faction in Ghana. 
The National Liberation Council closed the Ghana 
Embassy in 1966. It thus had a short-lived existence 
in the Cameroons.
Central African Republic;
No diplomatic relations.
No diplomatic relations.
Congo Br -aville:
Owing to hana's close association with Congo (Leo­
poldville) Kinshasa, Brazzaville was neglected. 
The Abb6 Youlou, when President, was too pro-French 
to attract Nkrumah's attention interest. Later, 
when Masemba-Debat became Frei-1riant, relations be­
tween the two countries improv# •„
Congo (Leopoldville) Kinshasa:
A politician, A.Y.K. Djin, v s  appointed in 1 960. 
He had been Nkrumah's persovia' representative in 
the Congo loin? before the country attained dndepen- 
dence. He thus became a very intimate associate
of the Congolese political leads s. Lumumba, Kassa- 
vubu, Albert Kalonji, Gizenga, Mobutu, Kiwewa, and 
others.
Dahomey:
A mission was set up in 1 962 at embassy level amid 
high expectations of close relations as a counter 
to the slow response of Togo to Ghana's attentions. 
President Mag a was superficially co-operative lc£. 
his contribution at OAU>, but expected financial 
assistance similar to loans given to Mali and Guinea. 
Ghana was at this time not so affluent herself. 
Maga was also subject to domestic and external pres­
sure, particularly from Abidjan; Dahomey was more 
interested in a 'Benin Federation' involving Ghana, 
Togo, Dahomey, and Western Nigeria, but regionalism 
was political anathema to Nkrumah.
Ethiopia:
An erbassy was established in 1959. The first Ghanai­
an Ambassador was M.A. Riberio who later served 
in the same capacity in Washington and Rome. He 
held the latter post until his retirement in 1 969.
Gabon:
No diplomatic relations.
Gambia:
Before Gambia's independence Nkrumah maintained 
close personal relations with Garba-Jahumpa, whom 
he met in Manchester at the 1945 Pan-African Con-
Guinea;
This post, owing to the Declaration of Union between 
Ghana and Guinea in November 1958, was opened as 
a Resident Ministry in January 1959. After the OAU 
Charter was inaugurated in May 1963, it became a 
normal embassy having an Ambassador.
Ivory Coast:
The establishment of diplomatic relations was agreed 
in September 1960. An Ambassador was appointed in 
March 1961. There was considerable friction in Ghana-
Ivory Coast relations owing to the presence of poli­
tical exiles from both states in each other's capi­
tal. The difference between the two states were
ideological. Houphouet-Boigny often said that his 
ancestors hailed from Ashanti in Ghana.
A Ghana High Commission was set up in Nairobi in 
December, 1963, It is noteworthy that up to the 
end of 1965, in spite of Ghana's close links with 
Kenya and Nkrumah's personal association with Presi-
dent Kenyatta, no Kenya mission had been set up
in Ghana.
Liberia:
Diplomatic relations between Ghana and Liberia exis­
ted from Ghana's independence. For many years, and 
right up to the time of the coup in Ghana, Liberia's 
Ambassador was the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps.
Ghana's mission in Tripoli from 1960 and for many 
years afterwards was occupied by a Charge d' Affaires? 
Libya did not appoint a representative to Ghana.
Malagasy Republic:
No diplomatic relations.
Malawi:
Although Dr. Banda had received financial aid from 
Nkrumah for his political campaigns in Nyasaland 
(the Ghana Times of 8 April 1959, records one grant 
of f. 10 000) he showed little inclination towards 
Ghana when his country secured independence.
A resident Minister was appointed in December 1960, 
after the visit of Nkrumah to Bamako in November 
1 960, Mali was a member of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali
Mauretania:
Relations existed between 1964 and 1965.
Morocco:
An embassy was estabalished in the autumn of 1961. 
Between King Mohammed V and President Nkrumah there 
were very intimate personal relations. I once heard 
the President say that King Mohammed wished him 
to regard his son (Prince Hassan) as his younger 
brother and ward. The King gave Nkrumah a personal 
gift of a villa in Tabat, although Nkrumah never
An embassy was opened in 1962 with a charge d' Affai­
res. The Niger government appointed and Ambassador 
to Ghana in 1961.
Nigeria:
Ghana set up a Commission in 1 959 when Nigeria was 
still a dependent territory. This was elevated to 
High Commission status on the attainment of Nigeria's 
independence on 1 October 1960.
Rwanda:
An embassy was established in 1965. Rwanda had no 
mission in Ghana.
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Senegal:
An embassy was set up in 1961, but the mission was 
maintained by a Charge d ’ Affaires until 1962 when 
an Ambassador, Dr. Foil, A Paris-educated political 
economist, was appointed.
Sierra Leone:
As in Nigeria, a Ghana Commission was opened here 
in 1960, prior to Sierra Leone's independence. This 
was raised to the status of High Commission in April 
1961, to accord with Sierra Leone's independence.
Somalia;
An embassy was established headed by a Charge d ' 
Affaires in 1961 followed by an Ambassador before 
the end of that year. Somalia did not have a diplo­
matic mission in Ghana.
Sudan;
Diplomatic relations were established at embassy 
level in 1959.
Tanzania:
A High Commission was set up by Ghana in Dar-es- 
Salaam in 1962. Tanzania had no diplomatic mission 
.in Ghana between 1957 and 1965.
Diplomatic relations were established in 1 963 at 
embassy level.
Tuni sia:
An embassy was set up in Tunis in 1960.
Uganda:
A High Commission was established in Kampala in
A Ghanaian Ambassador .ed his credentials
to President Nasser in May 1958, a little over a 
year after Ghana's independence. Israel had set 
up a consulate in Accra even before the proclamation 
of independence in March 1957.
Upper Volta:
Diplomatic relations were established in 1961 at 
embassy level.
Zambia:
Ghana set up a mission in Lusaka in 1963.
Source: Dei-Anang, Michael, The Administration of
Ghana's Foreign Relations. 1957-1965: A Personal
Memoir. Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, 
The Athlone Press 1975, pp. 73-77.
APPENDIX C
GHANA'S DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS OUTSIDE AFRICA 
TO 1965
Albania:
This mission, established in January 1962, would 
not have been, necessary for political and diplomatic 
reasons. Having given the "blanket" order for mis­
sions in Eastern Europe, Nkrumah would have been 
embarrassed by failure to establish one at Tirana.
Australia:
A Commonwealth state. Diplomatic relations were 
arranged soon after Ghana’s independence.
Belgium:
Relations with Belgium, established in 1960, were 
erratic because of the Congo crisis. Initially cor­
dial, although not without a degree of suspicion 
on both sides, they were broken at the end of that 
year and not re-estabished until 1962. Ghana did 
not assign an Ambassador to Belgium until 1965. 
Even then, he was resident in The Hague. Belgium 
was very badly served by her first representative, 
Mr. Walravens, notorio1 s in diplomatic circles and 
Accra society as a philanderer.
A mission in Brazil (opened in 19C2) was of economic 
anti cultural, rather than political, importance. 
The country is an effective rival to Ghana as a 
world cocoa producer. It also had a large African 
population, with distinct ethnic relations with 
the Ewe tribe (first-hand evidence of Bensah, former 
Ewe Minister who led a Ghana delegation to Brazil).
Bulgaria:
A mission was established in 1962 in the aftermath 
of Nkrumah's Eastern European tour.
Canada;
One of the Commonwealth posts established in 195"7 
shortly aftar independence. A High Commissioner 
was, however, not appointed until 1961.
Ceylon:
A Commonwealth state. The first Ghana High Commis­
sioner was Reverend S.G. Nimako. Ceylon recipro­
cated by providing the first woman d.1 plom.it in Ghana, 
Mrs, Senaratne.
Established in 1 960 with Ohenenana Cobina Kessie 
as Ghana's envoy. For Ghanaians, because of its 
austerity and remoteness from Africa, this post
was regarded almost as penal. Those who accepted 
service there received considerable respect.
An embassy was established in 1960. There was a 
general feeling of mutual respect between Fidel 
Castro and Nkrumah in the context of Afro-Asian- 
Latin American solidarity against imperialism and 
colonialism. Che Guevara visited Ghana in 1965.
Czechoslovakia:
An embassy was estabalished in 1962 in furtherance 
of Nkrumah's Eastern European policy. As, apart 
from Eastern Germany, this is the most prosperous 
state among the Soviet Eastern allies, it would 
have been deserving of Ghana's diplomatic atten­
tions anyway.
Denmark:
Ghana had no mission in Denmark until 1966, although 
the Danish government had appointed its represen­
tative in Ghana as far back as 1961. At the time 
of the Ghana coup the Danish envoy was a woman, 
the first European female diplomat in Accra. The 
tardiness in establishment of a mission in Copenhagen 
was a reflection of Ghana's assessment of its econo­
mic and political importance.
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France:
An embassy was set up in 1957 soon after independen­
ce. Until 1959 the Ghana High Commissioner in London 
represented Ghana's interests in Paris. Sir Edward 
0. Asafa-Adjaye fulfilled this dual role with marked 
competence.
German Democratic Republic:
In compliance with the 'Hallstein Doctrine1 Ghana 
maintained only a Trade Mission in East Germany. 
This was, of course, a diplomatic camouflage for 
the trade representatives of both states were to 
all intents and purposes, except in diplomatic sta­
tes, national representatives.
German Federal Republic:
An embassy opened in 1969.
Hungary:
One of the Eastern European states which became 
diplomatically linked to Ghana in 1962 after Nkru- 
mah's tour of Eastern Europe in 1961.
A Commonwealth state. A High Commission was estab­
lished after Ghana's independence and there had 
been a long period of pre-independence association.
An embassy was set up in 1958 although Israel estab­
lished a full mission at ambassador level in 1957. 
Before independence, Israel had a small consulate 
in the Gold Coast.
Italy:
An embassy was set up in 1961. No effort was made 
to establish formal links with the Vatican. This 
would have been achieved by accreditation of the 
Ghanaian envoy in Rome and would have involved addi­
tional expenditure, but might have been a reasonable 
concession to the religious sentiment of the large 
Catholic population in Ghana. The present Pope, 
as Cardinal Montini, visited Ghana before his ele­
vation to the Papacy.
Japan:
An embassy was established mainly for economic rea­
sons in January 1960.
Lebanon:
Lebanon had an envoy in Ghana by 1 960. From June 
1959 it had maintained a legation. There has long 
been a large Lebanese and Syrian trading community 
in Ghana. Ghana did not establish a mission in Bei­
rut. The National Liberation Council appointed an 
envoy to the Lebanon in 1966.
Mexico:
This mission was opened in 1964 for cultural reasons 
and within the framework of African-Latin American 
solidarity.
Netherlands:
An embassy office was set up in 1 965. There has 
been a Royal Netherlands envoy in Ghana since Janua­
ry 1959. The same reason as for Denmark obtains 
for the late opening of an embassy.
Pakistan:
A Commonwealth country. A Ghana High Commissioner 
was posted to Karachi in 1962.
Poland:
An embassy was established in 1962.
Romania:
An embassy was established in 1962.
Switzerland:
An embassy was set up in 1 965. There was also a 
permanent UN Mission from 1959.
Turkey:
The National Liberation Council appointed an envoy 
in 1966. Ambassador resident in Rome.
Diplomatic •slations were established in 1959? an 
embassy was set up in 1960.
United Kingdom:
A High Commission was set up on Independence Day, 
6 March 1957.
United Nations:
A Permanent Mission was established in September 
1957. Major Seth Anthony was the first Ghanaian 
representative.
North Vietnam:
Diplomatic relations were established in 1965. 
Yugoslavia:
An envoy was posted in 1960, but relations were 
established between the two states in 1959. There 
was a strong personal link between the two Presi­
dents on the basis of their non-alignment policy.
Ghana had no missions in Indonesia, Iraq, the Philip­
pines, Saudi Arabia and Sweden, although these states 
had established diplomatic missions in Accra. The 
Swedish representative was resident in Monrovia. 
At no time did diplomatic relations exist with Singa­
pore, Malaysia or New Zealand, all Commonwealth 
countries.
Source: Dei-Anang, Michael, The Administration of
Ghana's Foreign Relations. 1957-1965: A Personal
Memoir, The ftthlone Press, London, 1975, pp. 78-81.
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APPENDIX D
(Transcript)
GHANA EMBASSY, 
No./BR/PR/BU/64 B.P. 79,
BUJUMBURA,
BURUNDI.
17th November, 1964.
I wish to refer to my telex message No. BR/PR/1/64 on recent d c  ,;!opmtnis in Bnmndi and to 
enclose a  full report oa them.
2. As para-military actions against neo-colonialist forces in Africa arc the responsibility of the Bureau 
of African Affairs, I  thought it expedient to  inform you of the necessity o f taking such an action in 
Bi rundi, in the interest of the African cause.
3. As a  sequel to my report, I wish to inform you that Chief of the Burundi Army (who was in Accra 
to attend the African High Command Conference) held secret meetings with me and insisted that I 
recommended to Osagycfo to give material assistance to the Army to overthrow the decadent monarchy. 
The Army is fully supported by the Workers and the masses in general.
4. As stated in my report, the King is likely to  have a secret army of 60 paratroopers— definitely 
Western mercenaries. Also across the Burundi border in Kamcmbe and elsewhere are American 
military ’planes which may assist the King to put down any revolution. However, assessing the strength 
of the Army and the progressive forces, I do not think that any outside force can avail against this 
national avalanche of progress.
5. I  cannot specify in detail the sort of arms which are necessary, but 1 think that it would be expedient 
to send small arms as diplomatic packages, considering the difficulties involved in transporting heavy 
packages to as a remote a place as Burundi. I may mention that some sort o f financial support to the 
revolution may also be necessary.
6. The revolutionaries approached the Chinese also, and I had frequent discussions with the 
Ambassador. The Chinese are highly interested in the success o f  the revolution but the Ambassador 
could not tell me to what extent they were prepared to help.
7. A t this very moment when I am drawing up this report in Kampala, the Chief of the Army is await­
ing my arrival in Burundi to learn from me if there are any possibilities of assistance from Ghana.
I hope. Sir, that you will give this matter your urgent but careful attention and let me have your 
directives as early as possible.
I am, Sir,
Yours very sincerely,
(Sgd.) M. K. AMEKO 
Ambassador
Dear Mr, Dci-Anang
T w  o f  our experts must accompany oar contingent to teach them 
in the handling o f  weapons from  the li  which we shall he sending.
A. K. DARDEN, ESQ.,
DiRECTOIl,
RURltAU OF AFUICAN Af-FAHtS,
APPENDIX D
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APPENDIX E
(Transcript)
IMMEDIATE
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS 
BAA/SC$UOt/VoU P.O. BOX M.84
9lh February, I9C5.
SECRET
Dei-Anang,
Will you and Barden see me 
about this.
Dear Mr. Dei-Anocg,
ACTIVISTS
It has been decided (hat in view of political trends in certain African States, the Bureau's Activists 
should be sent out immediately to take care of the internal situation there, The states concerned are:— 
Ivory Coast 
Upper Volta 
Njaer.
Nigeria
Burundi
2. This decision is based on authentic information about projected manoeuvres and plans that are 
being hatched and about which Osagycfo The President has been informed.
3. It is proposed that the Activists should b i  posted to these countries for a year and should cover 
events before the O.A.U, Conference in September. I  have therefore provided below the details o f 
expenditure involved.
(a) Salaries for 52 months (Ref. my letter BAA/SCR.lOt of 8th Dec.,
1 9 6 4 ) ................................................................................................ £14,415
(b) Foreign Service Allowance for 6 Activists on posting (Originally 
not included in my letter BAA/SCR.101 of 3rd June 1964. Ref.
your minute to  Osagycfo dated 9th June, 1 9 6 4 ) ..........................  5,800
(c) Outfit Allowance  ..........................................................  2.200
(d) Air passage.........................................................................................  2,450
(e) Rent and Transport expenses . .  . .  . .  ,,  3,000
( f)  Contingencies.................................................................................  500
4. I should point out again that funds for the Activists have been excluded from our Estimates for 
tills Budget Year through no fault of ours and I  should be grateful for funds to be released to enable 
the Activists to be posted as soon as possible,
Yours sincerely,
Osagyefo,
//ore  you approved these 
proposals by Mr. Barden?
We cannot proceed without 
Osag)'cfo's recorded approval please. DIRECTOR.
M. F. DEI-ANANO, ESQ,,
AFRICAN AFPATHS SECRETARIAT,
OFFICE OP TtlE PRESIDENT,
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APPENDIX E
APPENDIX F
(Transcript)
PASTORAL LETTER FROM HEADS OF CHURCHES OF THE CHRIS­
TIAN COUNCIL OF GHANA TO BELIEVERS IN GOD AND IN 
THE LORD JESUS CHRIST ;
Brothers in Christ, i
|
WE, HEADS OF CHURCHES belonging to the Christian j
Council of Ghana, greet you in Jesus' name. We are !
writing to encourage you always to pray and not i
to lose hope in these days when food is scarce and p
the activities of some organs of the 31st December j
Revolution cause de.:p anxiety.
We want to give you full details of the attack on 
members of the Methodist Church Accra District Synod j
on Monday, 9 May, because the incident reflects i
methods which may be employed again in future against [
some of you, and it also suggests ways to which ;
the people of Ghana may respond to our prophetic I
utterances. !
The Critical Food Situation i
We also want you to see the emergency food situation 
which now exists all over the country not merely 
as a disaster but also as a call to the Churches ;
l a
to serve the whole community in a new way. We call 
on you to care for those in special need, and to
share all existing resources equally and wisely.
In particular we ask you to co-operate with the 
Churches Relief Committee of the Christian Council 
in distributing commodities in your area. The Chur­
ches Relief Committee was set up during the emergen­
cy created by the returnees from Nigeria earlier
this year, when the Christian Council distributed 
some 30 tons of food and other aid, and received 
donations within Ghana totalling over $5 132 Of 0. 
Out of this fund £ 82 000 has been spent as follows:
FOOD ITEMS g 59 000
TRAVEL AND TRANSPORT 0 17 000
ADMINISTRATION $ 6 000
We are using the balanc*1 of (£ 47 000 to launch the 
next stage of our relief programme.
The major relief operation is in the hands of the 
government end the Churches' scheme is on a smaller 
scale, it is intended to supplement the government 
operation.
However, the Churches do plan to distribute on a
cash sale basis soma 7 000 tons of food which we
have requested from Churches around the world. 
We shall send all the food we receive to main 
centres in each region; from there it will be
the task of Local Councils of Churches to contact 
their regional Councils to collect their allocations 
and ensure that the food reaches those who really 
need it.
When supplies arrive, Councils of Churches should 
consult with other distribution agencies about 
local needs and methods of distribution. We shall 
ask you to sell commodities for cash in most cases 
and to pay the money into a Churches Relief and 
Development Fund which will be used to finance 
projects in the most needy areas.
Local Councils of Churches in those areas should
therefore prepare projects for farming, water 
supply, planting of fruit trees, re-afforestation, 
repair of school buildings, and other similar 
projects. Please explain to your people that the 
purposes of selling commodities for cash is to
finance such projects and that provided wo receive
well-planned schemes, up to 50 & of the proceeds
of sales oan bo devoted to local development projects.
It has been said LhoL man's extremity is God's 
opportunity. Let us not be dismayed by the problemn
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around us, but offer Him our energy and honest 
dedication to be used in the tremendoun task that 
lies before us. By His grace we shall succeed.
A Christian Response to Crises
Paced with incidents such as that which occurred 
in Accra on Monday, 9 May, the Christians' only 
weapons are love, prayer and truth. Love desires 
the highest good of every man. We are therefore 
to love people who seek to harm us, to believe 
that God offers them a chance to repent and to 
rejoice if they find Jesus and change their ways.
Prayer is our daily habit, we pray individually 
in the privacy of our homes, and we pray together 
whenever we meet, especie -iy in public worship 
when scripture commands us to pray for thoae in 
authority over us. Prayer is our link with our 
God and the secret of our strength.
Our duty to tell the truth includes exposing and 
revealing the actions of sinful men, "Take no 
part in the unfruitful works of darkness, but 
instead expose them" (Ephesians 4 r Z1). Therefore 
we should be accurate reporters of cvi] act 
we should record names and personal details, times, 
numbers, places, vehicle details including colours
and registration numbers, and other information 
which will later on help in bringing offenders 
to justice.
We give you the following account as an example:
Activities of Some Organs of the Revolution
On Saturday, 7 May, there was a meeting in Bukom 
Square at which an influential adviser of the 
Government encouraged his hearers to stage a demon­
stration against the students of the University 
of Ghana, Legon, the following Monday, 9 May.
Those interested were asked to meet at the Accra 
Community Centre on Monday morning. Women who 
prepare food, especially rice and maaca, were 
also asked to come to cook for the demonstrators.
The women who responded to this invitation on
Monday morning were marched from the Community
Centre to tho nearby Baden-Powell Memorial Hall
between 8 and 9 a.m. They were given bags of rice 
and told to cook food in readiness for tho demon­
strators' return.
In the hall the women met a crowd nf mon, aomc 
already holding weopono, who had been gathered
together by various means.
For instance, one party of fishermen was recruited 
at the Accra beach. These people were promised 
that after the demonstration they would be given 
rice, sugar and <2 500 each. Other parties came
from Madina, Tema, Nima and the Total Petrol Station 
at Pig Farm, Kotobabi? in thds case the organisers 
first attracted by-standers by distributing free 
cigarettes and then brought them together into
a waiting bus. Some returned the cigarettes and
got down, others were willing to go.
All these people, and many other groups, including 
soldiers in mufti and armed members of the people's
militia, were in tha Baden-Powell Memorial Hall.
The party, estimated by the Ghanaian Times (Wednes­
day, 11 May) to number 500 people, eventually 
moved in some 10 to 14 government vehicles, inclu­
ding a green Information Services Department Land- 
Rover carrying public address equipment, and buses 
bearing the names of State Transport Corporation, 
Tema Textiles Limited, Tcma Pooit Complex Corporation, 
Tema Steel Works, Cocoa Marketing Board and National 
Defence Committee.
After causing a disturbance at the TUC and injuring
Mr. F.D. Ad abeng, National Chairman, Industrial
5 Commercial Workers Unicn, Mr. Van-Less, Chief 
Accountant and Mr. L.Y. Avrna of the Agricultural 
Union, the convoy of vehicles came at about 1.30 p.m. 
to Calvary Methodist Church where the lay members 
of Accra District Synod were leaving after refresh­
ment, prior to the ministerial session which was
to take place in the afternoon.
The Information Services Land-Rover was in the 
lead. A man looking out from the roof and holding
a microphone led the demonstrators in shouting 
insults at the members of Synod. Among the remarks 
they made were,
"You foolish people, you think you can do politics? 
You will see."
"You Christian Council people - you have been
praying for what?"
"You say government should hand over. You are
against the government."
"Where is that Essamuah?"
Some used such obscene language in Ga that witnesses 
do not wish to repeat the words.
As the demonstrators continued tf shout, many 
of them, probably over 100, got out of their vehicles 
and came on to the Church grounds. Some removed 
knives from their socks and boots as they came.
Others held a variety of weapons, including iron 
bars, sticks, cudgels, matchets ar.d pick-axes.
One of them shouted, "Charge".
They then passed through the assembled synod dele­
gates threatening and molesting them, so that
most of the people scattered. They also threw 
out leaflets.
Some of the demonstrators shouted, "You have to 
go to work. This is no work." "We arc the hungry 
workers." Another declared, "There is no Cod" - 
then he smashed one of the chapel doors with a 
hammer.
When the demonstrators came to the Reverend Edmund 
Ashietey he asked them, "What are you after?" Some 
six or seven of them seized Reverend Ashietey 
as he sought refuge in the choir vestry, tore 
his coat and trousers, ^nd began to beat him up 
and drag him into the adjoining conference room
where refreshments had just been served. Reverend 
Ashietey protected himself by seizing a metal 
chair and holding it over his head to ward off 
the blows.In spite of this he received two knife 
wounds in the back of his head and bruises on
his left hand and right shoulder. Many people 
assumed ho was mortally injured.
While under attack. Reverend Ashietey was repeatedly 
calling "Thanks be to God! Thanks be to God!"
Mr. J.S. Coleman and Mr. J.K. Essuon, both chapel 
stewards of Calvary Methodist Church, attempted 
to come to Reverend Ashietey' s aid. Both were 
injured. Mr. Coleman lost his spectacles and received 
a deep cut over the right eyebrow? he was bruised 
and his trousers were torn. Mr. Essuon had bruises 
on the right side of the body, and a blow from 
a pick-axe caused a deep wound on his left shoulder 
which required several stitches.
Refreshments had been served by students of Calvary 
Girls Vocational Institute, and these students 
and other ladies were still in the hall at this 
point. The demonstrators attacked Mrs. Abeaoi, 
knocked her down and causod cuts or. ser leg. Miss 
Aryee, one of the students, recor lised her own 
brother among her attackers. She cried "Brother!" 
He replied, "Sisi1 Saa awoa!" (Sisi, it's you!) 
Immediately he called out, "Stop, stop, stop I" 
and encouraged his comrades to leave the hall.
However, before leaving they first consumed the
remaining food, overturned some tables, and destroyed
hundreds of plates, cups, saucers and teopoto.
some tea-pots and plenty of cutlery were removed
by the demonstrators.
Outside, they were dragging Mr. Coleman towards 
one of their vehicles. The Conference Secretary, 
the Reverend Tekyi-Ansah, then shouted to the on­
lookers, "Christians! Why are we standing still 
while they take our brother away?" At this some 
stepped forward, but one of the demonstrators said, 
"If you approach, I will shoot you!"
Reverend Abe-Arthur then pleaded with demonstrators 
to release Mr. Coleman and they did so. Climbing 
back into their government vehicles they left the 
scene, chanting war songs.
Throughout the incident no member of the Methodist 
Church made any attempt to retaliate against their 
attackers.
The wounded were given first aid by Dr. Joe Riverson 
of Akosombo Hospital, one of the Synod delegates, 
before being taken to the Ridge Hospital for further 
treatment.
Soon after the convoy of buses had left a Police 
Task Force jeep arrived at Calvary Church and three 
armed men got out, one wore the uniform of a police 
sergeant, one was in army overalls, the leader was
t-
in plain clothes and held a pistol. They asked,
"What has happened? Where are the students?" Appa­
rently they believed, or wished to make others belie­
ve, that the demonstrators were students. They asked 
Reverend Ashietey to go with them to make a statement 
but he declined to leave the Church premises. Later 
the incident was reported to the Adabraka Police
Station by the Reverend Entsua-Mensah, Superinten­
dent Minister of North Accra Circuit, the Circuit 
Steward Mr. E.A. Hayford, and Mr. J.S. Annan.
A similar violent demonstration w c i  jld on the campus 
of the University of Ghana. Some students and lectu­
rers were severely beaten.
Miss Ama Busia, a member of Calvary Methodist Church 
and a matron at the University, had her house broken 
into. A lot of her property was taken away, and 
some destroyed. She was later forced to drive her 
car at gunpoint to the Regional Administration office 
where the car was seized. Her crime was that she
had fed the students on Friday, 6 May, and was to 
explain her action to Mr. Akrase Sarpong, PNDC Secre­
tary to WDC's and PDC's.
Our Reaction
We, heads of Churches, belonging to the Christian
Council of Ghana, believe that these incidents were 
not caused by a few thugs acting on their own ini­
tiative, but that they were carefully arranged by 
certain organs of the 31st December Revolution who 
were in a position to provide official transport, 
food supplies, cutlasses and guns, for the purpose. 
We believe that these attacks were intended to frigh­
ten Ghanaians into the silent acceptance of certain 
actions and policies: they were meant to stifle
free speech and prevent criticism which is so neces­
sary for a just and good government. The Christian 
Council has submitted a memorandum to the PNDC re­
questing an immediate public enquiry into the Calvary 
Methodist Church incident in particular so that 
those responsible for organizing it can be charged 
and dealt with in accordance with the laws of Ghana.
Finally we appeal to all citizens who have knowledge 
of any aspect of this and all similar incidents 
to come forward to the Ghana Armed Forces and Police 
and to their pastors, church officers, or Local 
Councils of Churches, and make full reports naming 
the organizers, describing exactly what they did, 
and giving all relevant details. With the three 
weapons of love, prayer and truth, and by the grace 
of God, we shall overcome the forces of violence 
and anarchy. God be with you all.
18 MAY 1983 
Signed:
1. Rt. Rev. Prof. N.K. Dzobo
Moderator, E.P. Church and Chairman, Christian 
Council of Ghana.
2. Mr. David Acquah
The Society of Friends and Vice-Chairman Chris­
tian Council of Ghana.
3. Rt. Rev. I.H. Prempong
Moderator Presbyterian Church of Ghana.
4. Rt. Rev. S.B. Essamuah
President of Conference, Methodist Church, Ghana.
5. Rt. Rev. J.K. Dadson
Bishop of Sunyani and Tamale, on behalf of the 
Joint Anglican Diocesan Council.
6. Rev. Paul Kofi Fynn 
Evangelical Lutheran Church.
7. Brother Abraham Wetseh 
Ghana Mennonite Church
8. Rev, Brother Yeboah-Korce 
Feden Church
9. Lt. Col. Agbcnorto - Salvation Army.
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